By Douaa Ahmed
Pakistan’s journey toward becoming a declared nuclear‐weapons state traces back several decades and is shaped by regional rivalries, domestic politics, and global non‑proliferation efforts. The country’s nuclear‑weapons program began after 1972, when the Pakistani government under Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto who ordered development of nuclear capability in direct response to India’s first nuclear test in May 1974, known as the Pokhran I or “Smiling Buddha” test, which inducted India into the nuclear club, heightening Pakistan’s security concerns.
The major turning point came in May 1998. Responding to India’s second nuclear tests (conducted on 11th and 13th of May), Pakistan carried out its own nuclear detonation series. On the May 28th, 1998 (code‑named Chagai‑I) Pakistan announced that it had conducted five simultaneous underground nuclear explosions at the Ras Koh Hills in the Chagai District of Balochistan. Two days later, on May 30th a sixth test (Chagai‑II) was reported at a nearby site.
Key Statistics & Facts
The five explosions conducted by Pakistan on May 28, 1998, produced a total claimed yield of up to approximately 40 kilotons of TNT equivalent, with one device reportedly being a boosted fission design and others of lower yield. Independent analysts, however, estimate the yield more conservatively at between 12 and 20 kilotons. In total, Pakistan is believed to have conducted six nuclear tests—five on May 28 and one on May 30th, in 1998. After these tests, Pakistan declared a unilateral moratorium on further nuclear explosive testing, although it has not signed the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).
Why Pakistan Tested
Regional security competition with India played a central role. Indian tests in May 1998 triggered the Pakistani leadership to move swiftly, in the view of many analysts, to maintain deterrence and strategic parity. Domestic political factors, national pride, domestic support for a nuclear posture, also mattered. One survey soon after the tests found around 70 % of Pakistanis favoured the decision to carry out the explosions.
Implications
By conducting nuclear tests, Pakistan entered the nuclear “club” of states with declared explosive nuclear capability. The tests shifted South Asia’s strategic dynamics, heightened international concern about nuclear proliferation, and triggered sanctions (especially from the U.S.) as well as regional diplomatic efforts. The tests also highlighted the limits of existing non‑proliferation treaties: Pakistan was outside the NPT (Nuclear Non‑Proliferation Treaty) as a non‑signatory, giving it different constraints than other nuclear powers. Since 1998, Pakistan’s nuclear programme has continued to evolve: it has developed delivery systems (missiles, aircraft), expanded production capacity (plutonium, uranium), and maintained a deterrence doctrine aimed primarily at India.
Conclusion
In summary, Pakistan’s nuclear testing in May 1998 marked a decisive moment in the country’s security policy and in regional strategic balances. Officially conducting six underground tests, with yields claimed up to ~40 kt, Pakistan entered the category of declared nuclear‑armed states. The tests were driven by the India–Pakistan rivalry, domestic politics and strategic deterrence logic. Pakistan’s subsequent moratorium on further tests signals its adoption of a testing pause, though questions remain about clarity of yields, number of devices and long‑term proliferation implications.
