Introduction: Legal, Economic, Strategic and Political Issues Involving NMD Investment and Deployment

The technology for building a comprehensive national missile defense (NMD), in the true sense of the word “defense” is not available. The technology for the deployment of NMD currently does not exist. Reoccurring test failures indicate that it is likely that the technology will not exist in the future. Rather, the technology that does exist is for offensive purposes in outer space. What is currently available for deployment in outer space is a weapons technology capable of uniting the military, economic, and political components of a U.S. strategy for the hegemonic dominance of the globe.

The proposed investment in national missile defense (NMD) and theatre missile defense (TMD) dramatically alters the strategic balance between nations. Not only are major powers such as Russia and China affected, but also U.S. allies and the geopolitical terrain of the Middle East, Africa, Latin America, East and Central Asia. Taken in combination, these realities also impinge upon the very integrity of the international law environment which regulates not only relations between states but affects the integrity of the treaty system, the future direction of the military industrial complexes of the world, and the way in which humanity views “crimes against peace” through the lens of the 1945-Nuremberg Principles. Further, the economic costs of NMD, not only in its research, production, and deployment aspects, but also in the wider global context, raises serious questions about the leadership of the international financial system and the growing gulf between haves- and have-nots.

The processes of globalization, as exemplified by the IMF, World Bank, and WTO, have effectively reinforced worldwide economic disparities through its structural adjustment programs (SAP). Increasingly, most nations on the planet, as acknowledged by the United Nations Millennium Summit, are unable to enjoy the benefits of international trade and the related benefits of a global economy. Globalization is a combination of political, economic, social, military, and cultural elements. In combination, globalization represents a fundamental historical shift for humanity. It has reframed the entire context in which governments, corporations, NGOs, and global civil society thinks and acts. It is in this context that U.S dominated NMD investment and deployment strategies must be viewed.

Insofar as the growing gulf between haves- and have-nots is exponentially expanding, those individuals and nations with the greatest stake in the status quo increasingly rely on military solutions to what are predominantly political problems. According to the World Bank’s report, World Development Report 2001/2002: Attacking Poverty, the gulf between the haves- and the have-nots already leaves 2.8 billion people living on less than $2 a day. The social, economic, and political consequences of this disparity leads to growing conflicts between nation-states and regions. Unless these problems of global governance are addressed by providing concrete solutions both conflict and terrorism will escalate. In this new environment, a planned deployment of NMD technology can only be viewed by billions of human beings as a repressive and oppressive device to maintain the injustices and deprivations of the status quo.

The militarization of space, as proposed by the advocates of NMD, represents a radical departure from established international laws and customs, which historically have guided international relations on earth. Because of the problems associated with maintaining economic and political hegemony, over large geographical regions and billions of people, the complexity of global governance has expanded. The U.S. military- industrial complex and certain corporate and financial interests, which guide many aspects of U.S. government decision making, have decided that planning and preparation for aggressive war is going to be the most effective way to govern the planet. As expressed by U.S. Space Command’s book, Vision for 2020, the goal of dominating the space dimension of military operations is ” to protect U.S. interests and investment” [EXHIBIT 6].

The goal of achieving the domination of the space dimension of military operations, with its central purpose of protecting U.S. interests and investments, is not a “defensive” posture or purpose. Rather, the stated plan involves the militarization of space for aggressive purposes, aimed at rivals, anticipated revolts, and opposition to U.S. hegemony around the globe. As such, in violation of the 1945-Nuremberg Principles, the vision of U.S. Space Command, as well as its governmental and industrial supporters, constitutes “planning and preparation for war”. In the language of the Nuremberg Principles, it constitutes “a crime against peace”.

Insofar as the year of 2001 is the first year in which formal funding requests for NMD are being renewed in the United States Congress, it may be alleged that the four major companies who seek this funding (Lockheed-Martin, Raytheon, TRW, Boeing), in conjunction with the Pentagon/CIA, are currently engaged in what the Nuremberg Principles call a “conspiracy to engage in planning and preparation for aggressive war”. As such, this is an indictable offense/violation of international law. It should be opposed within the United States and submitted to the World Court (The Hague), and the United Nations, for legal action and condemnation. For while each nation has the right to “defend” itself, no nation has a protected right, under international law, to engage in a “conspiracy” to promote “planning and preparation for aggressive war”. Should such a course be funded or endorsed, then, by definition, it will constitute a sanctioning and legitimation of a “crime against peace”. To move in this direction will also allow for the abrogation of treaties, such as the 1972-ABM Treaty.

(A) The Abrogation of the 1972 ABM Treaty

The Bush administration, in its efforts to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, has demonstrated its commitment to establishing an offensive military capability. It has also expressed such an intention in terms of the planned production and deployment of various space-based weapons systems [EXHIBITS 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, E]. The U.S. Space Commands’ position, as recently expressed in its book, Vision For 2020, makes clear its intention to embark upon the militarization of space in conjunction with a variety of war fighting capabilities [EXHIBIT 6]. In response to this threat, Russian leaders have repeatedly and consistently declared their strong opposition to even limited NMD and to amending the ABM Treaty. Russian concerns about U.S. efforts to install even a limited NMD capacity fall into six categories:

First, the Russian leadership fears that even a limited NMD would only serve to undermine confidence in the retaliatory capability of its current forces;

Second, Russia assesses its nuclear capabilities by a more demanding standard than the one the U.S. has used, so even a limited NMD system would appear still more threatening;

Third, Russia fears that the planned limited deployment would provide the United States with the infrastructure and experience to field a larger and more advanced NMD system in the future;

Fourth, even if the Bush administration had favored amending, rather than abandoning the ABM Treaty, Russia would remain worried that amending the ABM Treaty to allow limited NMD would set a precedent that would support the eventual elimination of negotiated limits on NMD. Because the real value of the treaty is premised on the belief that the parties will abide by its terms, U.S. insistence upon amending the ABM Treaty would reduce the value that Russia would place on an amended treaty;

Fifth, Russia is most likely concerned about the symbolic implications of the deployment of an NMD system;

Sixth and finally, responding to the U.S. deployment of a NMD system would require Russia to increase spending on strategic nuclear forces at a time when resources are scarce and much of the Russian nuclear force is nearing the end of its useful lifetime [EXHIBIT P].

In light of these concerns, the United States should take Russia’s position and its perceptions much more seriously. To fail to do so, leaves the U.S. in an international stance of moving toward a unilateral direction, separating it from both allies and potential adversaries. In this formulation, the adoption of NMD represents a revived American isolationism for the 21st century. It is supportive of exclusionary governance, the search of geopolitical dominance, and the endorsement of an imperial hegemony. Such an approach is divorced from traditional American values of democratic deliberation, inclusionary forms of governance, and inclusionary decision-making at the national and international levels.

As the International Tribunal at Nuremberg put the matter in its judgment: “…individuals have international duties which transcend the national obligations of obedience imposed by the individual state”. The judgment at Nuremberg relates to those individuals in government, industry, and the military-industrial complex of the United States, who advocate the abrogation of the 1972-ABM Treaty. The imposition of NMD, on the international stage, constitutes an offensive, aggressive, and hostile intent by seeking to undertake the domination of the space dimension of military operations to “protect U.S. interests and investment” by “integrating space forces into war fighting capabilities across the full spectrum of conflict” [EXHIBIT 6].

(B) The 1945 Nuremberg Principles

With the inauguration of the Bush administration in 2001, the executive branch of the U.S. government has sought to unilaterally abrogate the ABM Treaty [EXHIBITS 9, M, P], has refused to reintroduce in the U.S. Senate the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) [EXHIBITS F, G], has chosen to ignore the terms of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, and has intentionally violated the Nuremberg principle which maintains that the laws of war and some other rules of international law are superior to domestic law. In this context, the Nuremberg Principles assert the proposition that individuals may be held accountable to them.

In pertinent part, the Charter of the International Military Tribunal convened at Nuremberg, August 8, 1945, outlines in the section on “Jurisdiction And General Principles” (Article 6), the means by which to identify acts and crimes coming “within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal for which there shall be individual responsibility: (a) Crimes Against Peace: Namely, planning, preparation, initiation or waging a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing” [EXHIBIT 3, pp. 19-20 (Italics are mine)]. It is legitimate to contend that the proposed withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, when combined with the continued and renewed corporate lobbying of Congress by: (1) Boeing; (2) Lockheed-Martin; (3) Raytheon; (4) TRW, constitutes “planning” and “preparation” for aggressive war by the Bush administration and U.S. Space Command, in conjunction with corporate collusion with U.S. governmental agencies by “participation in a common plan or conspiracy” to fund the industrial component of the American National Security State. Under this analysis, taken together, both individually and collectively, members of the Bush administration may be legally indicted, under international law, for their “conspiracy” with elements of the military-industrial-complex to engage in “planning and preparation for aggressive war” in violation of the 1945 Nuremberg Principles [EXHIBIT 3].

(C) The Legal Basis for an Indictment of the United States’ Military-Industrial Complex Regarding NMD/TMD Funding

In combination, the Bush administration’s refusal to comply with the rules and norms of international law represents a grave danger to both world peace and the control of weapons of mass destruction through: (1) the abrogation of treaties; (2) numerous violations of international law; (3) the lack of fidelity to the maintenance of peace through the commission of crimes against peace by undertaking policy, spending, research, and deployment measures designed to advance the process of planning and preparation for waging aggressive war. The dominant reason for this unlawful trend, as acknowledged by the U.S. Space Command, is “to protect U.S. national interests and investment” and to provide the means to begin the process of “integrating space forces into war fighting capabilities across the full spectrum of conflict.”

The Charter of the International Military Tribunal convened at Nuremberg, August 8, 1945, also set forth definitions for “leaders, organizers, instigators and accomplices participating in the formulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing crimes are responsible for all acts performed by any persons in the execution of such plan”. In Article III, section (B), a militarist is defined as: “(1) Anyone who sought to bring the life of the German people into line with a policy of militaristic force; (2) Anyone who advocated or is responsible for the domination of foreign peoples, their exploitation or displacement; or (3) Anyone who, for these purposes, promoted armament”. Further, in Article III, section (C), “(I) A profiteer is: Anyone who, by use of his political position or connections, gained personal or economic advantages for himself or others from the national socialistic tyranny, the rearmament, or the war. (II) Profiteers are in particular the following persons, insofar as they are not major offenders…anyone who made disproportionately high profits in armament or war transactions”.

In the case of the United States, it may be argued that, since the 1950s to the present, there has been a continuous effort by a variety of persons and corporations who sought to bring the life of the American people into line with a policy of militaristic force (the Korean War, Vietnam, Star Wars). Since the early 1950s, the country has spent over $100 billion on ballistic missile defense, $70 billion of it since Reagan’s SDI proposal, with little to show for it. By the year 2000, the Congressional Budget Office had estimated the cost of the Star Wars plan at around $60-billion dollars. Yet, a more comprehensive land-, sea-, and space-based scheme, as favored by many Republicans, would cost more on the order of $240-billion dollars. This price tag precedes any further calculations that would take into account the inevitable delays and cost overruns [EXHIBIT X].

Viewed in this light, following the 1945-Nuremberg Principles, it may be argued that: (1) militarists in the Pentagon/CIA, throughout a string of administrations since the 1950s, have sought to increasingly divert U.S. government funding into planning and preparation for aggressive war by giving the United States a “nuclear first-strike” capability; (2) this capacity/capability for a military “first-strike”, whether from land-, sea-, or space-based stations would be provided for by civilian profiteers who have made “disproportionately high profits” in the name of ballistic missile defense; (3) this expenditure has taken place despite the warning of President John F. Kennedy, in 1961, that “unconditional war can no longer lead to unconditional victory. It can no longer concern the great powers alone. For a nuclear disaster, spread by wind and water and fear, could well engulf the great and the small, the rich and the poor, the committed and the uncommitted alike. Mankind must put an end to war-or war will put an end to mankind” [EXHIBIT Z].

(D) Funding for the Military-Industrial Complex

From 1999 to 2000, just four U.S. corporations have accounted for 60% of all missile defense contracts. These four corporations are: Boeing, Lockheed-Martin, Raytheon, and TRW. These four corporations are in a unique position to provide the Bush administration with the technological means to use the resources of the United States government to fund research and development for the planning and preparation for aggressive war. This is not a “defensive” process or task for a variety of key reasons. According to U.S. Space Command, the capabilities of NMD will comply with four central operational concepts: (1) control of space; (2) global engagement; (3) full force integration; (4) global partnerships. It has been asserted, by U.S. Space Command, that these operational concepts provide the new conceptual framework to transform the Vision For 2020 into war fighting capabilities [EXHIBITS 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, E, L, N]. The role of the aforementioned corporations will include the enjoyment of virtually unlimited access to permanent funding by the military industrial complex [EXHIBITS I, J, O, P, T, V, X, Y].

As early as 1988, the Council on Economic Priorities completed a study which predicated that the potential economic impact of the NMD program (referred to as “Star Wars” at that time), would result in a cost to every American household of as much as $12,000 for a fully funded $1 trillion dollar NMD system. In fact, the council found that research funds alone would dwarf all other military programs and the needs of all other domestic programs. Further, it would engage the energies and talents of up to 180,000 scientific and engineering specialists if the program moved into production. Production of such a system impacts many interrelated areas of the economy. For example, “Whatever the final costs of an SDI system, it will clearly cost the average American household a total of $5,000 to $12,000, spread over eight to twenty years. For the average family earning between $30,000 and $50,000 a year, SDI could increase the annual tax bill by $570.” Such a massive shift of economic priorities, if implemented, would “seriously weaken the nation’s ability to meet the challenges of unemployment, export market loss, dwindling technological leadership, and antiquated industrial plants”. Now, at the dawn of the 21st century, the United States finds itself in precisely this exact position [EXHIBITS H, I, J, O].

Throughout the Third World, from Latin America to South Asia, and from Sub-Saharan Africa to the countries of Europe and Central Asia, there resides a deepening poverty amid plenty. According to the World Bank’s report, World Development Report 2000/2001: Attacking Poverty, “of the world’s 6-billion people, 2.8 billion-almost half- live on less that $2 a day, and 1.2-billion–a fifth– live on less than $1 a day, with 44% living in South Asia.” The cited statistics are indicative of the fact that funding for the military industrial complexes of the world, as well as an unrestrained trade in global armaments, not only fuels violent conflicts but also contributes directly to enduring and deepening poverty. The correlation between the trade and purchase of weapons, on the one hand, and rising levels of poverty on the other, provides clear and convincing evidence that humanity cannot sustain this trend. This relationship is well documented throughout the scholarly literature on the subjects of war and peace in the nuclear age.

With the deployment of NMD, an international reaction will most likely result in a new arms race. With the continuation of these trends, the tragic consequences of the Cold War, which ended in 1990, will only worsen with a second Cold War at the dawn of the 21st century [EXHIBIT R]. If continued spending on weapons increases and expands under NMD and TMD, nationally and internationally, there will be a corresponding depletion of human capital, as social programs and investments in health, education, and welfare, are cut even deeper. This, in turn, will result in the inevitable widening of circles of poverty and a growing gap between the haves- and the have-nots. Such an outcome will probably produce revolts, revolutions, and rising levels of terrorism around the globe.

(E) International Relations and Security Concerns

On the international scene, the proposed NMD system and TMD system has the potential to dramatically destabilize an already precarious series of international relationships [EXHIBITS Q, S, T, U]. According to the Center For Defense Information (CDI), ” to pull out a keystone of arms control by abrogation of the ABM Treaty could weaken stability world wide, particularly sensitive areas of Chinese, Indian, and Pakistani programs”. The Bush administration’s desire to remove the U.S. from its obligations under the 1972 ABM Treaty reflects the tragic course of policy makers who dismiss the linkage of disarmament, proliferation, and unproliferation as softheaded. The tendency to dismiss the linkage between these various courses of action reflects a genuine contempt for the aspiration for equity between states. With the dismissal of policy choices that support equity between states, the primary emphasis in strategic planning returns to a calculation of how to factor the balance of armored divisions or missiles between states.

History is a record of the downplaying of the equity dynamic of nuclear politics. The downplaying of the equity dynamic presents a double irony, insofar as American policy makers promote democracy precisely because equity is seen as a worthwhile objective. According to the “democratic peace thesis”, it is believed that states that achieve relative equity will be more stable and peace loving. In this sense, democracy is perceived as a means to equity. Yet, when policy makers confront the challenge of global nuclear policy, American (and other) officials devalue equity as a necessary element in their planning and decision-making. In this context, NMD/TMD expands the scope of global instability with respect to global nuclear policy. If this trend is to be reversed, a more forthright acknowledgment of the balance of power mentality versus concerns with equity must be addressed. A better U.S. strategy toward the developing world as a whole and East Asia, in particular, will require a complete overhaul of the structures and processes of policy making, to bring them into accord with genuine equity, social justice considerations, human rights norms, United Nations covenants and conventions, and a nuclear weapons regime which promotes demilitarization within a specified timeline that can be consummated with the abolition of nuclear weapons through global disarmament. Such a course will benefit all states involved and will be more suitable to take into account, the non-military threats to international stability, such as terrorism.

To remove the keystone of arms control through the abrogation of the 1972 ABM Treaty would be especially tragic insofar as, in future years, the ABM Treaty could serve as the bridge to a new era in which further reductions in offensive missiles could be accompanied by the testing and building of more limited defensive systems [EXHIBIT W]. In this critical regard, as a practical matter, “no one will be reliably defended unless everyone is. The most objectionable feature of the current NMD effort is that it is being conducted as a unilateral initiative for the United States alone in defiance of legitimate opposing security concerns.”

The ramifications of ignoring the legitimate security concerns of other nations leaves the United States permanently trapped in a position of making unilateral policy decisions. The high diplomatic costs of taking a unilateral path have taken already their toll with regard to America’s NATO allies throughout Europe. Britain, Italy, Germany, and France have already voiced wide disapproval of President Bush’ conduct of foreign policy with regard to the administration intent to withdraw from the ABM treaty [EXHIBIT G].

In the East Asian context, North Korea has known, since the mid-1980s, that it was no match for South Korea-let alone a South Korea with U.S. military support, insofar as North Korea could no longer rely on Russia for its security and could expect assistance from China if attacked. The efforts of the late 1990s to defuse the DMZ and efforts to open negotiations for the normalization of the relationship between the North and South, as undertaken by the “sunshine policy”, represented new steps toward peace. However, by August 2001, the Bush Administration had undertaken efforts to sabotage these negotiations. If North Korea were to remain as a hostile state, it would allow the United States to continue to characterize it as a rogue nation. As a rogue nation, it would also allow the United States to raise the possibility that China would become a threat to American security interests in the region, and thereby justify NMD/TMD deployment [EXHIBITS Q, S].

The introduction of Theatre Missile Defense (TMD) [EXHIBIT 12, L, Q] also contributes to a sense of insecurity for China. The TMD concept originated in the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), forged during the Reagan administration. Following the end of the Cold War, the Bush (Sr.) administration revised the SDI into a program called Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS). By 1993, the Clinton administration declared the termination of the SDI era. The new focus was to be placed upon missile defense systems, such as NMD. By 2001, these trends have resulted in major shifts in perceptions in policies among Japan, Taiwan, China, North and South Korea. The greatest negative impact on these nations has been to damage efforts at confidence building among big powers, by bringing about new complications and problems for Sino-U.S. relations, Russian-U.S. relations, Sino-Japanese relations, Russian-Japanese relations and U.S-Japanese relations. In summary, the NMD/TMD program has harmed gradual progress toward cooperation and security in the region by deepening suspicion and confrontational sentiments among them [EXHIBIT L, Q].

(F) Planning and Preparation for Aggressive War

Beginning in 1957, the United States military prepared plans for a preemptive nuclear strike against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), based on America’s growing lead in land-based missiles [EXHIBIT 4]. Top military and intelligence leaders presented an assessment of those plans to President John F. Kennedy in July of 1961. At that point in time, a portion of high-ranking Air Force and CIA leadership “apparently believed that a window of outright ballistic missile superiority, perhaps sufficient for a successful first strike, would be open in late 1963”. Kennedy’s response indicates his personal determination, shared by his civilian advisors, that a first strike capability never be implemented or become U.S. policy. However, “the fact that first strike planning got as far as it did raises questions about the history of the Cold War. Much more needs to be known: about nuclear decision-making under Eisenhower and Nixon, about the events of late 1963, about later technical developments such as MIRV and Star Wars”.

At the dawn of the 21st century, with strong governmental and corporate support for NMD/TMD, placed at the center of U.S. strategic thinking and planning, research and investment, offensive capabilities, and geopolitical implications from military strategy to international relationships, the need to re-examine Star Wars, National Missile Defense (NMD), and Theatre Missile Defense (TMD), is more vital than ever. For advances in technological capabilities, both military and civilian, have reached a new stage of maturation, placing the fate of humanity at a critical juncture. The dynamics of war and peace are now, even more, left hanging in the balance. For example, Donald Rumsfeld before assuming the position of Secretary of Defense headed a 13 member “Space Commission” which included 2 former commanders in chief of the United States Space Command and an ex-commander of the Air Force Space command. The commission’s finding restored enthusiasm among NMD advocates to launch a new battle in congress for funding [EXHIBITS C,D,H,S,V,Y]. Contrary to NMD advocates, the critics of this recently endorsed proposal for a space weaponization plan, contend that its purpose is primarily offensive in nature. By removing the mythology of a defensive capability, the critics of NMD have reconfigured the debate and the dynamics of the “dog-fight” for dollars to be allotted NMD. [EXHIBIT J]

Specifically, with regard to the militarization of outer space, history reveals a continuing struggle within the highest echelons of the United States Government from 1963 through 2001. Speaking to the United Nations General Assembly in New York, September 25, 1961, President John F. Kennedy stated: “To destroy arms…is not enough. We must create even as we destroy-creating worldwide law and law enforcement as we outlaw worldwide war and weapons…For peace is not solely a matter of military or technical problems-it is primarily a problem of politics and people. And unless man can match his strides in weaponry and technology with equal strides in social and political development, our great strength, like that of the dinosaur, will become incapable of proper control-and like the dinosaur, vanish from the earth. As we extend the rule of law on earth, so must we also extend it to man’s new domain-outer space…The new horizons of outer space must not be driven by the old bitter concepts of imperialism and sovereign claims. The cold reaches of the universe must not become the new arena of an even colder war”.

Kennedy’s prophetic analysis of 1961 remains at the heart and center of debates on NMD in the year of 2001. His analysis will probably persist as a constant reminder that the search for peace is usually juxtaposed to unrestrained technological advances that are united with the military mind and its search, not so much for defensive capabilities as for offensive capabilities [EXHIBIT Z]. In this regard, the argument of the advocates of missile defense, to the extent they articulate their general strategic purpose, “tend to emphasize the moral superiority of the defensive mission. It is better, they say, to defend against attack than to threaten retaliation. They implicitly acknowledge, however, no feasible elaboration of defensive technology would make it a reliable substitute for the threat of retaliation, and they do not propose to accompany a more robust NMD deployment with the very drastic restrictions on US offensive capability that would be necessary to make it plausibly acceptable to the principal potential opponents. In fact, most of the assertive NMD advocates also aggressively support the development of advanced conventional offensive capability that is the principle concern of such opponents”. Both NMD and TMD have strong U.S. offensive capability built into them. In fact, the U.S. Space Command’s own book, Vision For 2020, constantly repeats terminology such as: “dominating the space dimension of military operations”, “integrating space forces into war fighting capabilities across the full spectrum of conflict” [EXHIBIT 6].

By 1999, leading American experts argued that both NATO and the cause of peace would gain from ” a no-first-use” policy. Thomas Graham Jr., Robert McNamara and Jack Mendelsohn, argued that, “it is critical for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to reconsider its nuclear policy and agree to a no-first-use provision on nuclear weapons. Such a policy would be a signal to the international community that the most powerful nations in the world are prepared to accept that nuclear weapons have no utility other than to deter a nuclear-armed opponent from their use”. The emphasis upon deterrence must be underscored as the most essential place to begin analysis of nuclear policy, whether it be a “no-first-strike” or NMD/TMD. U.S security is still influenced by how other major powers understand Washington’s goals. In the context of NMD, Space Command’s publication, Vision For 2020, places emphasis not so much on defense as upon war fighting capabilities “across the full spectrum of conflict”. This is significant because the distinction between defense per se and planning and preparation for aggressive war, allows us to bifurcate the ideological arguments of advocates for NMD from the critique of opponents. The publication, Vision For 2020, is clearly a blueprint for the implementation of a first-use-strike capability.

The recognition by Russia and China that NMD constitutes the basis for planning and preparation for aggressive war understandably gives rise to anxiety about how, where, and when the U.S will employ its newly acquired military capabilities in space, as it proceeds in the pursuit of advancing its vital interests. The advance of U.S military power in space increases an entire spectrum of considerations that could be augmented by a destructive force without parallel in the nuclear age. In this regard, “because Russia and China are not confident that the United States will respect their vital interests, U.S security policy, while pursuing its other requirements, should avoid fueling their fears and triggering reactions that ultimately would decrease U.S security.” In this regard, the dangers of miscalculation are enormous [EXHIBITS 3, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, A, B, O, P, Q, R, S, T, Y, Z].

As with World War I, the greatest danger of NMD, may be that it could actually make the U.S more vulnerable, because of the dangers of miscalculation. Miscalculation can be registered in rising levels of global insecurity since it would exacerbate strategic, psychological, and geopolitical tensions between the U.S, Russia, and China. Senator Tom Daschle (D-South Dakota), summed up the danger in articulate terms when he stated on May 2, 2001, “many in the administration… argue that deploying an ineffective defense can still be an effective system simply because it would cause uncertainty in the minds of our adversaries. That position is based on the flawed assumption that the president would be willing to gamble our nations security on a bluff, and that no adversary would be willing to call such a bluff. Instead of increasing our security, pursuing a strategy that cannot achieve its goal could leave our nation less secure and our world less stable.” Senator Daschle’s assessment closely corresponds to the interpretation of historians with respect to the start of World War I. The combination of flawed assumptions, bluffs, and an unexplored and previously unused military technology was responsible for the worst carnage the world had yet experienced in war. Similarly, the NMD plans, as proposed in, Vision For 2020, comprise an analogous set of flawed assumptions.

In the context of international law, even before the introduction of NMD/TMD technologies, scholars have argued that, “the effects produced by nuclear weapons have forced the need for a fundamental reevaluation of the nature and objectives of war in the ‘nuclear age’.” The necessity for this reevaluation is even more pertinent in the NMD context, because NMD exponentially expands the capacity of an NMD state to fundamentally alter the balance of terror through the destruction of international law, in its totality, by abrogating treaties and principles which have provided an effective restraint and deterrent effect [EXHIBITS K, L, M, N, O, P, Q, T, U, W, Y, Z]. To maintain the integrity of international law it will be necessary to uphold treaties that have enduring significance and principles that embody enduring guidelines [EXHIBITS U, W]. In conjunction with the 1945 Nuremberg Principles, the International Court of Justice ruling on the threat or use of nuclear weapons has direct bearing on NMD funding, research, and ultimate deployment. With this in mind, the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, on July 8, 1996, provides the basis on which to critique many of the flawed assumptions behind the advocacy of NMD.

(G) The Opinion of the International Court of Justice

On July 8, 1996, the International Court Of Justice (hereinafter referred to as, ICJ) responded to requests by the World Health Organization (WHO) and the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) for an advisory opinion on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons. The case divided the judges jurisprudentially and doctrinally in fundamental ways, with a narrow majority (that depended on a second casting vote by the President of the Court, Judge Mohammed Bedjaoui of Algeria, See-International Court of Justice Statute Article 55 [2]) forging a consensus that lends strong, yet partial and somewhat ambiguous, support to the view that nuclear weapons are of dubious legality. According to Professor Richard Falk, “the most critical aspect of the dispositif on the core issue of legality reach a result that surprised those who anticipated an either/or outcome, the court having created some new doctrinal terrain by deciding that the threat or use of nuclear weapons is prohibited by international law, subject to a possible exception for legal reliance on such weapons, but only in extreme circumstances in self-defense in which the survival of a state is at stake”.

Professor Falk’s interpretation of the ICJ advisory opinion brings to the foreground of legal analysis an emphasis upon the defensive role of nuclear weapons. The fact that the threat or use of nuclear weapons is strictly prohibited by international law, with only one extreme exception, the self-defense of a nation, underscores the defensive aspect. This point is extremely relevant in the case of NMD. The impact of NMD on Russia and its nuclear security is significant. Russia today, according to The Center For Defense Information, “can barely cope with U.S offensive power, let alone a combination of offensive and defensive” [National Missile Defense: What Does It All Mean?-A CDI Issue Brief, (enclosed with the attached EXHIBITS as the APPENDIX to Volume-I)]. The report also emphasizes the fact that, “if Russia wants to overwhelm an NMD shield it must plan to launch massively and quickly in a crisis”. If the U.S decides to follow Space Command’s language in carrying out U.S policy by “dominating the space dimension of military operations to protect U.S interests and investments” through its ability to integrate space forces “into warfighting capabilities across the full spectrum of conflict”, then the aggressive side of U.S force capabilities will be unleashed in violation of the ICJ ruling and the understandings contained in the 1972 ABM Treaty. The offensive nature of NMD engages the U.S in a historically new project by embarking upon the militarization of space. The militarization of space, for analytical purposes, should be understood as the aggressive nuclearization of space (my term) for offensive purposes.

The 1972 ABM Treaty states that the parties declare that it is “their intention to achieve [at] the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to take effective measures toward reductions of strategic arms, nuclear disarmament, and general and complete disarmament”. Further, the treaty states that the parties desire “to contribute to the relaxation of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States.” In conjunction with this purpose, it is appropriate to interpret the ICJ ruling in which a unanimous conclusion was reached that upholds the finding that any use of nuclear weapons contrary to Article 2 (4) of United Nations Charter, and not vindicated by Article 51, is “unlawful”. It was agreed by all the judges that a threat or use of nuclear weapons is governed by “the international law applicable in armed conflict, particularly those of the principles and rules of humanitarian law, as well as [by] specific obligations” arising from treaties and other undertakings that “expressly deal with nuclear weapons”. On this matter, this finding was not challenged by any nuclear weapons states in their pleading.

The plan of U.S Space Command and the Bush administration, as outlined in, Vision For 2020, reflects none of these propositions. Rather, the reports states in no unequivocal terms that, “just as land dominance, sea control, and air superiority, have become elements of current military strategy, space superiority is emerging as an essential element of battlefield success and future warfare” [EXHIBIT 6]. This plan, contradicts all of the aforementioned laws, rules, conventions, charters, and treaties since the 1970s. In part, American high technology weapons, ever since the 1991 Persian Gulf War, have laid the basis of the phenomenal pace of innovation in the modern computer industry which, in turn, has led directly into a virtual revolution in military affairs. Defense analysts have posited that we are on the threshold of a revolution in military affairs (RMA). RMA proponents “believe that military technology, and the resulting potential of radically new types of warfighting tactics and strategies is advancing at a rate unrivaled since the 1930s and 1940s”. These changes reflect radical developments in offensive forces, not defensive forces, as alleged by the Bush administration. Dennis M. Ward has argued that, “American policymakers’ interest in both theatre and national missile defenses is driven by their perceptions of new ballistic missile threats. The threats stem from the proliferation of relatively unsophisticated missiles, not from exotic technologies.” Unfortunately the U.S Space command and the Bush administration have continued to worked in collusion with the civilian and military sectors dedicated to achieving the goal of “global engagement” that “combines global surveillance with the potential for a space-based global precision strike capability” [EXHIBIT 6].

In the aftermath of the ICJ decision, Professor Falk has argued that it is the obligation of all nuclear states to pursue their good faith obligations by bringing to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament and all of its aspects. According to Falk, such an obligation entails giving “weight to the legal commitment by the nuclear weapons states to pursue disarmament as a serious policy goal”. Professor Terrence E. Paupp, in his study, Achieving Inclusionary Governance: Advancing Peace and Development in First and Third World Nations, has emphasized the fact that “genuine security and a peaceful world order cannot be premised upon notions of ‘deterrence’ and ‘balance of power’ because a spiral of violence is created by these concepts so that the exercise of power becomes self-defeating…the process that is identified by the spiral model of conflict is associated with the characteristics I have attributed to the leadership and policies of exclusionary states”. The U.S may be depicted as an exclusionary state on the international stage in light of the fact that it retains a strategic focus on the “balance of power” paradigm as its governing principle, it has reinvigorated justifications for unilateral actions in defiance of allies and potential adversaries, and has demonstrated a fidelity to an isolationist credo in an age of “globalization” and interdependence among nation-states. By retaining a “balance of power” focus, the U.S along with the most important nuclear weapon states, has betrayed an arms control approach that is based on minimizing the risks of possessing nuclear weapons. Rather than minimizing the risks, it has enhanced them. In fact, the U.S has periodically, in times of diplomatic and political crisis, actually threatened to use them [EXHIBITS 3 (p.16.), 4].

Significantly, the legal endorsement of disarmament, also amounts, even if unwittingly, to a sharp criticism of the nuclear weapons states for their abandonment of any serious pursuit of disarmament goals in recent decades. If the ICJ advisory opinion is to achieve any meaning, it must be within the context of helping the advocacy of those committed to nuclear disarmament, demilitarization, and ultimately the abolition of all nuclear weapons on land, sea, and outer space. Such a conclusion demands a thorough condemnation of NMD and its associated technologies.

(H) The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)

In Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the relevant treaty obligation provides: “Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effect measure relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control” (Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, 21 UST 483, 729 UNTS 161). Based on this provision, the ICJ found unanimously that “[t]here exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects in strict and effective international control”[Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory opinion of July 8, 1996, 35 ILM 809 & 1343, 1996, para. 105 (2) (F)]. The ICJ’s advisory opinion of July 8, 1996, expanded on the phrase, “and bring to a conclusion” as follows: “the legal import of that obligation goes beyond that of a mere obligation of conduct: the obligation involved here is an obligation to achieve a precise result-nuclear disarmament in all of its aspects-by adopting a particular course of conduct, namely, the pursuit of negotiations on the matter in good faith” (paragraph 99).

The significance of the ICJ’s additional language is to underscore the obligation, which exists to pursue negotiations in good faith toward a particular result-namely, a duty to make all reasonable efforts to reach the goal of disarmament through the negotiating process. The problem is that the Court’s finding does not dictate any timetable or negotiating forum for reaching this result. The failure to establish either a specific timetable or a particular negotiating forum, has resulted in the current crisis surrounding the NMD proposals and the continuing advocacy of TMD strategies. For example, on May 23, 2000, Governor George W. Bush, proclaimed, “it is time to leave the Cold War behind, and defend against the new threats of the 21st century. America must build effective missile defenses, based on the best available options, at the earliest possible date”. On May 1, 2001, President George W. Bush, stated: “more nations have nuclear weapons and still more have nuclear aspirations…Some have already have developed a ballistic missile technology that would allow them to deliver weapons of mass destruction at long distances and incredible speeds, and a number of these countries are spreading these technologies around the world”. These statements of candidate Bush and later President Bush demonstrate the tragic consequences of the American National Security State failed to act on the ICJ Advisory Opinion which calls for meeting an obligation to achieve the precise result of nuclear disarmament in all of its aspects [EXHIBITS 13-22]. Hence, the continuing relevance and importance of a CTBT is even more apparent. The fact that there have been no good faith negotiations on the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the testing of nuclear weapons, or the first steps toward genuine disarmament has created the political and economic opportunity for R&D investment in NMD and the deployment of NMD/TMD.

The response of most European countries, with regard to the planned NMD system, has been negative. According to the Center For Defense Information, “the NMD plans put the European countries in a position of assisting a program aimed at providing additional safety for the United States but doing so at the likely expense of their own security. Many European states do not agree with the threat assessment that has led to NMD’s conception in the first place. All oppose any steps that would violate the AMB Treaty.” [EXHIBITS 9, F, G, K, N, O, P, R, T, U, W, Y,]

Rising levels of fear throughout the entire Asia-Pacific region match the negative response of most of the European countries to Bush’s NMD stance. The introduction of TMD and its impact on security in the Asia-Pacific region has exacerbated China’s fears, increased tension in the Taiwan Straits, and sabotaged negotiations for reconciliation between North and South Korea [EXHIBIT Q]. Further, the Bush administration seems to be leading the United States into an intensified and unnecessary conflict with China. This trend is entirely reckless insofar as China’s foreign policy is predictable. China has never been a global power or thought itself an actor in global affairs, like the European great powers or the United States [EXHIBIT A]. Laying the groundwork for potential hostilities with China, the Bush administration has proposed to tell the Chinese government that it would not object to a missile build up by the Chinese in order to win Chinese acquiescence for an American NMD program [EXHIBIT B]. The American strategy is pursuing a foreign policy course developed by Donald Rumsfeld in the early 1970s under President Gerald Ford. It was a poor proposal at that time and a worse one at the dawn of the 21st century [EXHIBIT C].

With the nomination of General Richard M. Myers, a former head of Air Forces and Space Command, to the position of chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, there is reason for greater consternation among opponents of NMD, in particular, and the international community at the large. General Myers’ nomination is important because it signals the commitment that President Bush and Secretary Rumsfeld have toward an NMD program. The nineteen months General Myers spent as head of the Space Command, ending in February 2000, gave him a familiarity with the kinds of technology the program would use [EXHIBIT M]. Senator Joseph Biden has assaulted President Bush’s foreign policy focus on NMD, because, he maintains, “everything-including relations with Russia and China, even NATO-is viewed through the prism of missile defense, which is dangerous and potentially disastrous. It weakens us. It weakens NATO. And it weakens our ability to deal with the real threats”. [EXHIBIT R]

In combination, Article V1 of the NPT, the 1999 defeat of the CTBT in the U.S Senate, and the proposed withdrawal of the U.S from the 1972 ABM Treaty all signal a ruthless disregard of the clear mandates contained in key instruments of international law. Further, despite denials Under Secretary of State, John R. Bolton, of a strict deadline for Russia to accept changes to the ABM Treaty by November 2001, the Bush administration has continued to push for the militarization of outer-space in violation of the good faith principles demanded by the ICJ advisory opinion of 1996 [EXHIBIT 22]. The domestic debate within the U.S over the wisdom of pursuing investment in NMD has become overly conflated with the September 11, 2001 bombing of the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. For the first time in American history, in July, 2001, the defense of the “American homeland” was incorporated into guidelines of American military strategy and also used to request more money from congress in order to spend countless billions of dollars in developing a high- tech missile defense [EXHIBIT 19].

If congress allocates funds for a truly “defensive” system, then congress must also mandate that such an expenditure does not violate any provisions of the 1972 ABM Treaty. A congressional mandate ensuring the integrity of the 1972 ABM Treaty is essential for the sake of constraining the course and scope of R&D to purely defensive, not offensive, capabilities. Should the advocates of NMD prevail in undermining attempts in the U.S Senate to protect the existing safeguards contained in the treaty, then there will be no effective legal restraint remaining to keep NMD research and deployment from transmuting into an offensive war fighting capability with existing military technologies.

In terms of substantive international law, and in the mind of the American general public, the salient feature of the Nuremberg trials was the decision that individuals could be held guilty for participation in the planning and waging of “a war of aggression”. As the International Tribunal at Nuremberg put the matter in its judgment: “…individuals have international duties which transcend the national obligations of obedience imposed by the individual state. He who violates the laws of war cannot obtain immunity while acting in pursuance of the authority of the state if the state in authorizing the action moves outside under international law”. Under this standard, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, the leadership of Space Command, President Bush, and the corporate interests behind NMD (Boeing, Lockheed-Martin, Raytheon, TRW), maybe held guilty for participation in the planning of a “war of aggression” [EXHIBITS C, D, E, H, I, J, L, M, N, P, R, X, Y, 4-22]. Space Command’s report, Vision For 2020, reveals that the interest of the military is not defense, but the protection of U.S.-based investments and commercial interests [EXHIBITS N, 6, 10-12].

Conclusion: International Duties Transcending National Obligations

In retrospect, the crusade by the advocates of NMD signals a back-to-the-future scenario, repeating the same depleted arguments of the Reagan administration. Prospectively, the crusade by the advocates of NMD constitutes a vision of a United States that is disconnected from the rest of the world. In the words of William D. Hartung, the President’s Fellow at the World Policy Institute at New School University, “the unifying vision behind the Bush doctrine is nuclear unilateralism, the notion that the United States can and will make its own decisions about the size, composition and employment of its nuclear arsenal without reference to arms control agreements or the opinions of other nations”. It is essential, in the area of NMD/TMD that the United States give up its unilateralism if humanity is to survive and prevail as a species. Such a view demands that the American foreign policy framework, employed since the end of World War II, must be discarded and reconfigured. This will mean taking the problem of exclusionary governance and exclusionary states more seriously. This will mean taking the promise and challenge of achieving inclusionary governance and the building of inclusionary states more seriously.

Exclusionary states are a reflection of the fact that, “in many parts of the Third World, economic systems function primarily to benefit a relatively limited number of people, and political systems are frequently manipulated to guarantee continued elite dominance. The general public often has little or no opportunity to influence the policy-making process or to participate fully in the economic system. These domestic inequalities, along with an international economic system not designed to operate in the interests of Third World countries, are at the root of underdevelopment.” In this situation, it is incumbent upon the nuclear states, especially the U.S., to move beyond the traditional preoccupation with its narrowly defined national interest (elite-centered) and begin to address the larger human interest. This means that a “better U.S. strategy toward the developing world as a whole will require an overhaul of the structures and processes of policy making.”

Global Inclusionary Governance in the 21st Century

The United States has international duties transcending national obligations. In this critical regard, the NMD/TMD approach to global governance is antithetical to building a peaceful, just, or secure world. Rather, the employment and deployment of NMD/TMD systems threaten the integrity of the entire international legal order and the objective living conditions of humanity as a whole. The waste and danger coupled with such an expenditure of resources cannot be either legitimated or rationalized in this content, in this early part of the 21st century.

If the promise and binding force of the 1945 Nuremberg Principles are to have any meaning and application in building more accountable states, advancing peace between nations, establishing accountability within and between states, then the U.S., the United Nations, and the entire international community, must reject the NMD/TMD approach to global governance and human security. Instead, a new definition of human security must emerge that is no longer primarily prefigured by the imprints and images of the military-industrial mind. Rather, the achievement of inclusionary governance demands the following:

First, structures and policies that allow for the continued investment in and expansion of both nuclear and non-nuclear assets shall be dismantled and replaced with peacekeeping and monitoring institutions.

Second, in recognition of the fact that spending on nuclear and non-nuclear assets depletes both First and Third World economies, it shall be the task of inclusionary governments and inclusionary regimes to embark upon the deepening of democratic norms, practices and policies so as to alter current spending priorities (especially in NMD/TMD).

Third, the necessity to embark upon a path toward inclusionary governance and demilitarization is supported by accumulated scientific evidence, which proves that the exchange and/or detonation of just a few nuclear bombs will have the capacity to create a global condition known as “nuclear winter” that could lead to climate catastrophe, agricultural collapse, and world famine.

Fourth, the history and evolution of international law is moving in the direction of disarmament and has the capacity to build a global institutional structure that supports an alternative security system. Such a system must lead toward the effective subordination of military establishments of the nation-states under the rubric of values, principles, policies and goals of inclusionary governance.

Fifth, the historical experience of war and conflict has proven that a failure to recognize the influence of pre-existing beliefs has implications for decision making and that, therefore, the process of decision making must become more inclusionary so as to overcome a history and practice of concealment, secrecy and distortion through propaganda as well as bureaucratic and media manipulation.

Sixth, genuine security and a peaceful world order cannot be premised upon notions of “deterrence” and “balance of power” because a spiral of violence is created by these concepts so that the exercise of power becomes self-defeating (i.e., the publication of U.S. Space Command, (Vision For 2020).

Seventh, and finally, the recognized need for a global security policy which places emphasis upon non-military incentives to channel government’s behavior empowers the international system to give added support to an expanded role for international organizations or security regimes to facilitate cooperation and regulate inter-group conflict.

Establishing a New Congressional Role

In all of the aforementioned principles surrounding the principles of inclusionary governance there is one underlying requirement that has profound relevance for the U.S Congress in meeting its constitutional responsibilities. That requirement is in the category of congressional oversight of the executive branch. Specifically, the oversight of Pentagon contracting with major industries and corporations, as well as oversight with respect to procurement decisions and policies, constitutes a primary and fundamental role for the nation’s security.

With regard to the Star Wars project in 1993, The New York Times reported that the Star Wars project rigged a crucial 1984 test and faked other data in a “program of deception that misled congress as well as the intended target, the Soviet Union.” Former Reagan administration officials said that a program of deception had been approved by Casper W. Weinberger (Secretary of Defense from 1981 to 1987). Mr. Weinberger denied that Congress was deceived but argued that deceiving one’s enemies is natural and necessary to any major military initiative. The lesson to be drawn from this deception, in the context of the NMD debate of 2001-2002, is that congressional oversight and investigations into the actions and activities of the executive branch and the Pentagon is essential to maintaining any semblance of democratic accountability. It is also necessary for the sake of overcoming the inherent limitations of the mind-set of the military-industrial complex. I, therefore, propose the following policy changes for the U.S Congress to initiate in order to maintain democratic accountability with respect to NMD funding:

1. Enhancing Congressional-Oversight

As the Congress considers the cost of an NMD program, it must take into account numerous lessons that may be learned from the past. For example, in June of 1993, The New York Times reported that federal investigators had determined that the Pentagon misled Congress about both the cost and necessity of many weapons systems built in the decade of the 1980’s to counter the military forces of the Soviet Union. Eight reports from a three-year study by the General Accounting Office (GAO) exposed a pattern of exaggeration and deception by military leaders. In particular, the B-52 bomber, the B-1 bombers, and the B-2 bomber, were cited in the reports as part of a pattern in which the Pentagon misrepresented certain facts to the Congress in order to maintain or increase financing for new nuclear-weapons systems. In the year 2001, it may well be that that Rumsfeld Report of 1998 on the relevance of NMD will fall into the same category. In fact, in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was sharply questioned about the high cost and unproven effectiveness of an NMD system and the Bush administration’s threats to withdraw from the 1972 ABM Treaty [EXHIBITS C, V]. Rumsfeld was forced to admit that the technology did not exist and could not guarantee any specific date at which it would be available for defensive purposes.

2. Combating Terrorism Does Not Justify Investments in NMD

In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 World Trade Center and Pentagon terrorist attacks, Rumsfeld stated that “it is the asymmetric threats that are a risk, and they include terrorism, they include ballistic missiles, they include cyber-attacks” [EXHIBIT 19]. Despite the attempted linkage of disparate and unrelated threats to U.S. national security, the Rumsfeld analysis cannot stand the test of critical analysis. In the final analysis, terrorist attacks are a symptom rather than a cause of the underlying global maladies of our age.

Terrorist attacks are, in large measure, an expression of the powerless position of persons and groups who come from exclusionary states at the periphery of the international capitalist system. Behind the frustration of generations, there is a history of colonialism, imperialism, and great power rivalry. Where widespread poverty and deprivation is the rule, rather than the exception, there is little empirical support for the proposition that a truly “defensive” NMD system could prevent such attacks even if a truly “defensive” system existed [EXHIBIT 21]. Where poverty and deprivation have reigned supreme, there is no basis for alleging the possibility of a missile attack. The real source of U.S. support for investment in and the proposed deployment of a NMD system is largely a domestic concern, more closely associated with peacetime military spending than with the actual world situation. On this matter, Robert Higgs has argued: “if an effective NMD system is ever successfully produced-a big “if”-it will certainly have cost far more than the presently projected amount. Unfortunately, that vast expenditure will have availed little or nothing in the provision of genuine national security, for an enemy can always choose to play a different game, foiling the best -laid NMD plans by firing a nuclear-armed cruise missile from a ship lying off New York, or by delivering a chemical or biological weapon of mass death tucked into a shipment of cocaine bound for Los Angeles, or by any number of other means immune to the missile defense system”.

3. Establishing New Forms Of Arms Control

Ever since the mid-1980s, scholars, government officials and military experts have admitted that the deployment of a Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system will not facilitate the limitation and reduction of offensive forces. In fact, “if the adversary’s deployment of strategic defense is understood to reflect aggressive intentions, as it almost certainly would be” then nuclear states are likely “to be unable to pursue offensive limits or any other form of arms control.”[Italics mine] The planned deployment of space-based weapons, as proposed in, Vision For 2020, represents “aggressive intentions” by the U.S military to dominate space and earth for the purpose of achieving “war fighting capabilities across the full spectrum of conflict”[EXHIBIT 6].

The entire U.S Congress must be concerned with establishing new forms of arms control. In this technologically driven environment, which operates behind the camouflage of what defense analysts have euphemistically termed a “revolution in military affairs” [RMA], the Pentagon’s official version of RMA disguises its true intent, which is to embark upon the militarization of space. It focuses on “information systems, sensors, new weapons concepts, much lighter and more deployable military vehicles, missile defenses, and other capabilities…Precision engagement conjures up images of very accurate and long-range firepower. Full dimensional protection suggests, among other things, highly effective missile defenses”. Throughout history, “military revolutions” have been driven by vast social and political changes. “Revolutions in military affairs” have marked war in the Western world since the 14th century. These revolutions are inevitable but difficult if not impossible to predict. In the context of NMD, new forms of arms control must be established in order to avoid a multiplicity of contradictory and conflicting paths, which are antithetical to America’s genuine security.

America’s genuine security is intimately tied to international agreements such as the CTBT, the NPT, and the ABM Treaty. These agreements are obviously tied and connected to the expectations and stability of other nations. America’s international responsibilities and global power can never be reduced to military calculations, technological superiority, or economic dominance. Rather, America’s ultimate responsibilities can only be effectuated through political trust. Missile defense will destroy political trust. For example, “when the U.S and Japan pursue missile defenses, they do so out of the mentality of ‘fortress ourselves.’ That creates and intensifies distrust and tension among concerned nations that will in turn work as reasons for further arms races and will never be able to serve as forces for building stability”.

4. Keeping the Nuremberg Principles Alive in the 21st Century

The late 20th century revealed, in stark horror, the tragedy of genocide in Rwanda and Kosovo. Once again, the specter of “ethnic cleansing” had raised its head. Yet, crimes against humanity can take many forms. According to the International Tribunal at Nuremberg, such crimes must also contemplate “crimes against peace”. As Professor Richard Falk has noted: “The decision to prosecute German and Japanese leaders as war criminals after World War II, although flawed as a legal proceeding, represents an important step forward. It creates a precedent for the idea that leaders of governments and their subordinate officials are responsible for their acts and can be brought to account before an international tribunal. It affirms the reality of crimes against humanity and crimes against peace, as well as the more familiar crimes arising from violations of the laws of war.”

Proposals for NMD contemplate the inclusion of a variety of offensive weapons capabilities that lend themselves to a hegemonic dominance of the globe, the reinforcement of regimes of exclusion, poverty-producing financial orders, and a deepening gulf between the haves and have-nots. Hence, the NMD scenario represents “imperial overreach”. In the 20th century, its origin may be traced to Wernher von Braun. As a technical leader in the Third Reich’s program of the militarization of space, he embarked upon embracing the goal of creating weapons of terror and mass destruction. His ideological heir, Edward Teller, brought the dream to America. As the father of the H-bomb, he laid the foundation for the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) under President Reagan. However, Teller swept responsible science under the rug and led America into the fantasy of NMD, in pursuit of the most dangerous military program of all time.

We, on this planet, can neither allow nor permit the slow undoing of treaty commitments embodied in the 1972-ABM Treaty, block the application of the Nuremberg Principles, or ignore the lessons contained in diplomatic history and the history of conflict resolution. Rather, it is our task as human beings to recognize and honor our common humanity. In recognizing our common humanity, we also recognize the dangers of pride and arrogance when coupled to power. The possession and exercise of power requires both wisdom and restraint. The production, deployment, and potential use of NMD and TMD reflect neither wisdom nor restraint. It is, therefore, incumbent upon us, in this generation, to advance a strategy of peace that emphasizes the value of inclusionary governance at the state and international level. For, in the final analysis, it is not the triumph of exclusionary forms of governance and decision making that will enhance the chances for peace but, rather, it is the achievement of inclusionary governance in all of our deliberations that makes peace and development possible and achievable for all people on this small planet.

_____________________________________________________ Footnotes

Telford Taylor, Nuremberg and Vietnam: An American Tragedy, Bantam Books, c. 1971, pp. 83-84. Vision 2020 is available online at, Kevin Martin, Rachel Glick, Rachel Ries, Tim Nafziger, and Mark Swier, “The Real Rogues: Behind the Star Wars Missile Defense System”, Z-Magazine, September 2000, pp. 29-33. Rosy Nimroody, senior project director for, The Council on Economic Priorities, Star Wars: The Economic Fallout, Ballinger Publishing company, c. 1988, pp. 27 and 206. Center For Defense Information, National Missile Defense: What Does It All Mean?— a CDI Issue Brief, c. 2000, p. 1. John D. Steinbruner, “NMD and the Wistful Pursuit of Common Sense”, National Security Studies Quarterly, Summer 2000, Volume VI, Issue #3, p.114. Heather A Purcell and James K. Galbraith, “Did the U.S. Military Plan a Nuclear First Strike for 1963?”, The American Prospect, Fall 1994, p.88. Id., p.96. John F. Kennedy, speech to the United Nations General Assembly, New York, September 25, 1961, “Let The Word Go Forth”: The Speeches, Statements, and Writings of John F. Kennedy, Selected and with an Introduction by Theodore C. Sorenson, Delcorte Press, p.380. John D. Steinbruner, “NMD and the Wistful Pursuit of Common Sense”, National Security Studies Quarterly, Summer 2000, Volume VI, Issue 3, p.112. Thomas Graham Jr., Robert McNamara, and Jack Mendelsohn, “NATO-and Peace- Would Gain From a No-first-Use Policy”, Los Angeles Times, December 15, 1999, p. B-9. Charles L. Glaser and Steve Fetter, “National Missile Defense and the Future of U.S Nuclear Weapons Policy”, International Security, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Summer 2001), p. 41. Senator Tom Daschle, as quoted in, ” Ballistic Missile Defense: Shield or Sword?” by Carah Ong, Waging Peace: News letter of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, Summer 2001, Vol. 11, No. 2, p 7. Richard Falk, Lee Meyrowitz, and Jack Sanderson, ” Nuclear Weapons and International Law,” The Indian Journal of International Law, Vol. 20, 1980. p. 595. “Legality of The threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons” (advisory opinion of July 8, 1996), 35 ILM 809 & 1343 (1996) [ hereinafter, Opinion for UNGA ]; and “Legality of the use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict”, 1996 ICJ Rep. 66 (Advisory Opinion of July 8 ) [ hereinafter Opinion for WHO] Ved P. Nanda and David Krieger, Nuclear Weapons and the World Court, Transnational Publishers, Inc. c. 1998 Richard Falk, ” Nuclear Weapons, International Law and the World Court: A Historic Encounter”, The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 91, No. 1, January 1997, p.64. Center For Defense Information, National Missile Defense: What Does It All Mean? A CDI Issue Brief, c. 2000, p.20. Ibid., p 21. Richard Falk, “Nuclear Weapons, International Law and The World Court: A Historic Encounter”, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 91, No. 1, January 1997, p. 65. Micheal O’Hanlon, Technological Change and the Future of Warfare, Bookings Institution Press, c. 2000, p.7. Dennis M. Ward, ” The Changing Technological Environment”, Rockets’ Red Glare: Missile Defenses and the Future of World Politics, edited by James J. Wirtz and Jeffery A. Larsen, Westview Press, c. 2001, p. 80. Richard Falk, “Nuclear Weapons, International Law, and The World Court: A Historic Encounter”, American Journal Of International Law, Vol.91, No.1, January 1997, p. 65 Terrence E. Paupp, Achieving Inclusionary Governance: Advancing Peace And Development In First And Third World Nations, Transnational Publishers, Inc. c. 2000, p. 101 Ibid., p. 76 George W. Bush, “New Leadership on National Security”, May 23 2000, as quoted in, Rockets’ Red Glare: Missile Defenses and The Future of World Politics, edited by, James J. Wirtz and Jeffrey A. Larsen, Westview Press, c. 2001, p. 331 Ibid, p.334 Center For Defense Information, National Missile Defense: What Does It All Mean?-A CDI Issue Brief, c.2000, p.36. Senator Joseph Biden, Jr. (D-Delaware), as quoted in, “Democrats Plan Attack On Missile Defense”, Los Angeles Times, September 10, 2001. I Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg, 1947), p. 223, as quoted in, Telford Taylor, Nuremberg and Vietnam: An American Tragedy, Bantam Books, c. 1971, p. 84. William D. Hartung, “Bush’s Nuclear Revival”, The Nation, March 12, 2001, p.4. Terrence E. Paupp, Achieving Inclusionary Governance: Advancing Peace and Development in First and Third World Nations, Transnational Publishers, Inc., 2000. 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*Terrence Edward Paupp, J.D. is a Nuclear Age Peace Foundation Policy Analyst; National Chancellor of the United States, for the International Association of Educators for World Peace (IAEWP); on the Advisory Board of, The Association of World Citizens; Professor of Politics and International Law, National University, San Diego, CA.