By Douaa Ahmed
India’s nuclear program began during the Cold War to build energy independence and protect national security. After China tested a nuclear bomb in 1964 and the 1971 war in South Asia, India decided it needed its own nuclear capability.
Pokhran I (1974) “Smiling Buddha”
On May 18th, 1974, India carried out its first underground nuclear test in Pokhran, Rajasthan. The government called it a “peaceful nuclear explosion.” Experts estimate the blast was about 12-13 kilotons in power. This test led many countries to restrict nuclear technology exports to India, and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) was formed as a result.
Pokhran II / Operation Shakti (1998)
On May 11th and 13th, 1998, India conducted five more underground tests at Pokhran. The first day included three explosions: a thermonuclear device (two‑stage design), a fission bomb (12 kt), and a small sub‑kiloton device. Two more sub-kilton devices followed two days later. India claimed the thermonuclear test had a yield of 45 kt with a 200 kt deployed yield. These tests officially made India a nuclear‑armed state and ended a 24‑year pause in testing.
Regional and Global Impact
The 1998 tests had far‑reaching global and regional effects. Countries such as the United States and Japan quickly imposed sanctions, as India’s decision to test nuclear weapons in 1998 broke a long period of restraint in South Asia. Within weeks, Pakistan responded with six of its own nuclear tests, directly sparked by India’s actions. This tit‑for‑tat testing created a new nuclear balance in South Asia, transforming the region into one of the world’s most volatile nuclear flashpoints. The rivalry intensified global concern over proliferation and pushed the international community, including the United Nations, to call for renewed dialogue and restraint Security Council resolution 1172 called on both countries to stop their nuclear weapons programs and sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).
India’s tests also reshaped global nuclear politics. They led to tighter export‑control regimes, such as the strengthening of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), and reignited debates about the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the future of global non‑proliferation. Although India has not signed the NPT or CTBT, it has observed a voluntary moratorium on testing since 1998 and continues to modernize its arsenal while maintaining a policy of minimum credible deterrence and no first use.
According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, India currently possesses about 180 nuclear warheads, while Pakistan has roughly the same number. Both nations remain focused on strengthening their nuclear capabilities, yet India consistently emphasizes that its weapons serve only for deterrence, not aggression. Together, these developments underscore how India’s testing reshaped South Asian security, heightened global scrutiny, and reinforced the urgency of preventing future nuclear escalation.
