President Bush's Seven Initiatives to Combat Nuclear Proliferation
In a speech at the National Defense University on 11 February 2004 , US President George W. Bush outlined "Seven Initiatives to Combat Nuclear Proliferation." Below, the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation compares President Bush's Initiatives to what is being done and what should be done.
1. President Bush: "First, I propose that the work of the Proliferation Security Initiative [PSI] be expanded to address more than shipments and transfers" to interdict lethal materials in transit.
NAPF Response: Just prior to the G8 Summit , US President George Bush announced during a speech in May 2003 the establishment of the Proliferation Security Initiative. The PSI is a program under which the US and some of its allies bestow upon themselves the authority to interdict shipments carrying suspect cargo and to seize illegal weapons or missile technologies at sea, in the air or on land. Thus far, the United States has recruited ten PSI partners: Australia , France , Germany , Italy , Japan , the Netherlands , Poland , Portugal , Spain , and the United Kingdom . Although the core group of PSI participants is seeking to enlist as many willing countries to the cause as possible, there are no current plans to take the initiative before the UN Security Council to win its backing.
To its credit, the PSI does reflect an evolving and welcome understanding of the proliferation threat as it regards nuclear, as well as chemical and biological, weapons-related shipments as illegal. However, according to Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Kong Quan, "Quite some countries have doubts over the legality and effectiveness of the PSI."
While the NPT explicitly prohibits the transfer of nuclear weapons and weapons technology to non-nuclear states, the right to intercept shipments on the high seas, in straits, or in international space has not yet been established under international law. Such interceptions would not be sanctioned by the Law of the Sea Convention or other international laws. In fact, it may indeed be contrary to such laws, as well as the UN Charter's prohibition on use of force and its guarantee of state sovereignty. PSI partners must accept the fact that in some cases, including international territory and in non-PSI member states' territories, the Security Council's approval will be required to conduct such interdictions.
The PSI currently goes beyond existing, legitimate, treaty-based mechanisms. Furthermore, the PSI enshrines existing nuclear double-standards by allowing NPT-acknowledged nuclear weapon states to deploy nuclear-armed submarines in the world's oceans, or deploy nuclear weapons on other states' territories, while at the same time claiming the right to interdict other states' nuclear, as well as biological and chemical, weapon-related shipments.
Finally, under President Bush's proposed expansion of the PSI norms, it remains unclear whether they will be democratically developed by the international community and applied uniformly to all nations.
2. President Bush: "Second, I call on all nations to strengthen the laws and international controls that govern proliferation. At the U.N. last fall, I proposed a new Security Council resolution requiring all states to criminalize proliferation, enact strict export controls, and secure all sensitive materials within their borders. The Security Council should pass this proposal quickly. And when they do, America stands ready to help other governments to draft and enforce the new laws that will help us deal with proliferation."
NAPF Response: On March 24, 2004 , the Security Council formally proposed the US draft resolution on non-proliferation. The resolution fails to recognize the disarmament obligation under the NPT and neglects to propose measures in reducing and eliminating nuclear arsenals. As long as resolutions are passed that ignore disarmament obligations, the proliferation of nuclear weapons and their potential acquisition by terrorists will never be effectively addressed.
3. President Bush: "Third, I propose to expand our efforts to keep weapons from the Cold War and other dangerous materials out of the wrong hands. In 1991, Congress passed the Nunn-Lugar legislation. Senator Lugar had a clear vision, along with Senator Nunn, about what to do with the old Soviet Union . Under this program, we're helping former Soviet states find productive employment for former weapons scientists. We're dismantling, destroying and securing weapons and materials left over from the Soviet WMD arsenal. We have more work to do there."
NAPF Response: Unfortunately, the President's claims do not match reality. In fact, the US administration's 2005 budget proposal projects a 9.3 percent cut for the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, falling from $450.8 million in 2004 to $409 million in 2005. The US 's overall spending on WMD reduction and security programs is currently $1 billion annually, totaling less than one quarter of one percent of all US defense spending.
In 2002, the Group of Eight (G8) countries' established a Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction , which would provide $20 billion over the next ten years to this effort. However, the Washington, D.C.-based Center for Strategic and International Studies reported in November 2003 that pledges of G8 countries to secure nuclear, chemical and biological materials are falling "far short" of what is needed to "prevent terrorists from obtaining weapons of mass destruction." More than a year after G8 leaders committed to the agreement, a consortium of research institutes led by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, concluded that only a "tiny fraction" of funds have been released and no more than a small number of projects have been started as a result.
In addition, the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), negotiated with Russia in 2002, will lead only to the reduction of the number of actively deployed strategic (long-range) nuclear weapons to between 1,700 and 2,200 by year 2012, with no timetable other than the endpoint and no procedures for verification. The US has announced that it will not be destroying most of the weapons taken off active deployment. It plans merely to place them on a shelf for retrieval in case they are deemed to be needed again in the future. The treaty also has no effect on tactical (shorter-range) nuclear weapons.
4. President Bush: ". . . but the treaty [the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty] has a loophole [that] has been exploited by nations such as North Korea and Iran . These regimes are allowed to produce nuclear material that can be used to build bombs under the cover of civilian nuclear programs.
"So today, as a fourth step, I propose a way to close the loophole. The world must create a safe, orderly system to field civilian nuclear plants without adding to the danger of weapons proliferation. The world's leading nuclear exporters should ensure that states have reliable access at reasonable cost to fuel for civilian reactors, so long as those states renounce enrichment and reprocessing. Enrichment and reprocessing are not necessary for nations seeking to harness nuclear energy for peaceful purposes."
NAPF Response: While there is a clear need to close the NPT Article IV "loophole," President Bush's proposal fails to call on all states currently capable of producing fissile materials, highly enriched uranium and plutonium to cease such activities. Based on such double standards, it would be difficult for the US to persuade the global community to abide by new restrictions on nuclear fuel technology.
A more effective approach would be to negotiate a global ban on spent fuel reprocessing with all states currently capable of producing highly enriched uranium and plutonium. Moreover, all countries with nuclear reactors should reduce reliance on nuclear power in favor of energy from renewable sources. The US should lead efforts for a global ban on spent fuel reprocessing and phase out the need for energy produced by nuclear reactors. This would ensure that non-nuclear weapons states would not develop the expertise, facilities and materials to build nuclear weapons.
5. President Bush: "As a fifth step, I propose that by next year, only states that have signed the Additional Protocol be allowed to import equipment for their civilian nuclear programs. Nations that are serious about fighting proliferation will approve and implement the Additional Protocol. I've submitted the Additional Protocol to the Senate. I urge the Senate to consent immediately to its ratification."
NAPF Response: Still a waiting ratification in the US Senate, the Additional Protocol was voluntarily signed by the US in 1998. Markedly different from those applied to non-nuclear weapon states, the US protocol contains a "national security exemption" clause which restricts IAEA inspection sites and prohibits IAEA inspection of all US nuclear weapons activities. The protocol also reserves the right of the US to make "full and repeated use" of the "national security exemption" clause "without explanation" to bar IAEA access to any of its nuclear sites. The IAEA will also have "no right to challenge or question" US nuclear activities.
By these broad exclusions, the US diminishes the incentives for non-nuclear weapons states to sign a protocol that demands that they alone open all of their sites. If all states applied such exclusions, the Additional Protocol would be meaningless.
6. President Bush: "We must also ensure that IAEA is organized to take action when action is required. So, a sixth step, I propose the creation of a special committee of the IAEA board [that] will focus intensively on safeguards and verification. This committee, made up of governments in good standing with the IAEA, will strengthen the capability of the IAEA to ensure that nations comply with their international obligations."
NAPF Response: The Nuclear Age Peace Foundation agrees that the IAEA should be able to take action when action is required. However, the US and other nuclear weapons states must also be required to prove that they are abiding by IAEA safeguards.
7. President Bush: "And, finally, countries under investigation for violating nuclear non-proliferation obligations are currently allowed to serve on the IAEA Board of Governors. For instance, Iran -- a country suspected of maintaining an extensive nuclear weapons program -- recently completed a two-year term on the board. Allowing potential violators to serve on the board creates an unacceptable barrier to effective action. No state under investigation for proliferation violations should be allowed to serve on the IAEA Board of Governors -- or on the new special committee. And any state currently on the board that comes under investigation should be suspended from the board. The integrity and mission of the IAEA depends on this simple principle: Those actively breaking the rules should not be entrusted with enforcing the rules."
NAPF Response: The Nuclear Age Peace Foundation also agrees with t his initiative. Following this logic, it would also be appropriate for the US and other nuclear weapons states to be placed under investigation for violating its NPT Article VI obligations. The same rules must apply to both nuclear and non- nuclear weapons states.
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