A few years ago, my wife pointed out that whoever coined the term nuclear deterrence was a marketing genius: it implies that threatening to destroy the world will deter behavior we donít like. But what happens if nuclear deterrence morphs into nuclear chicken, with neither side willing to back down and be humiliated? Two articles I came across today help illuminate how that could happen.
Todayís New York Times has an article about the ongoing Sino-Japanese dispute over a few uninhabited island known as the Senkaku in Japan and the Diaoyu in China. The article noted:
The diplomatic maneuvering underscores the emotions in both nations. In China, the islands are seen as the last unreturned piece of Chinese territory seized during the building of Japanís empire more than a century ago, and thus a sign that Japan remains unrepentant. To many Japanese, the islands have become emblematic of the broader challenge that their nation, long Asiaís strongest power, faces from the emergence of an increasingly powerful China seemingly bent on settling old scores.
Where territorial disputes are concerned, even a few small, uninhabited islands can cause rationality to evaporate, and an irrational adversary is unlikely to be deterred. If Japan is irrational enough to get into a war with China, we would be dragged in by our mutual security treaty which Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell clearly stated extends to these disputed islands.
Paradoxically, nuclear deterrence depends on our adversary being rational enough to be deterred, while we must appear irrational enough to risk our existence as a nation. The second part of that paradox was clearly enunciated in a 1995 USSTRATCOMM white paper, ďEssentials of Post-Cold War DeterrenceĒ:
Because of the value that comes from the ambiguity of what the US may do to an adversary if the acts we seek to deter are carried out, it hurts to portray ourselves as too fully rational and cool-headed. The fact that some elements may appear to be potentially ďout of controlĒ can be beneficial to creating and reinforcing fears and doubts within the minds of an adversaryís decision makers. This essential sense of fear is the working force of deterrence. That the US may become irrational and vindictive if its vital interests are attacked should be part of the national persona we project to all adversaries. [emphasis added]
The second article today which relates to a potential failure of nuclear deterrence is Ward Wilsonís guest post on the Arms Control Wonk blog, which explains how President Kennedy failed to be deterred during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Wardís column is related to his new book, Five Myths About Nuclear Weapons, which I highly recommend. When I got my copy of the book, I wasnít sure how much time Iíd be able to give it. After all, this is my primary area of academic interest and Iíve read extensively on the issues treated here. But I found myself drawn in to the point that I finished the book the same day it arrived! That hasnít happened in a long time, and is a tribute to both Wardís masterful writing style and his concise arguments. Buy it, youíll like it!
And, most importantly, letís start recognizing that nuclear chicken (i.e., nuclear deterrence) is not a rational basis for our national security.
Martin Hellman is a NAPF Associate and is Professor Emeritus of Electrical Engineering at Stanford University.