Disarmament: The Missing Link to an Equitable Non-Proliferation Regime
by David Krieger and Carah Ong

Non-Proliferation Today

When the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) entered into force in 1970, nuclear weapons states and non-nuclear weapons states agreed upon obligations for all parties to the NPT by committing both to non-proliferation and complete nuclear disarmament as essential components to achieving global security. At the heart of the NPT is a central bargain in which the non-nuclear weapons states agreed to refrain from acquiring nuclear weapons. In exchange, the nuclear weapons states (China, France, UK, US, USSR) pledged to end the nuclear arms race and to negotiate nuclear disarmament (Article VI). As an incentive, the non-nuclear weapons states were promised assistance with research, production and use of nuclear energy for "peaceful" purposes (Article IV). Each non-nuclear weapons state also agreed to accept "safeguards" under the auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency. However, these safeguards do not apply to the nuclear weapons states themselves and thus, there is no built-in mechanism for their accountability on both sides of the bargain.

The sad fact is that since the NPT’s inception, the nuclear weapons states have shown scant inclination to fulfill their part of the bargain. As recently as the year 2000, the nuclear weapons states agreed to 13 practical steps to achieve nuclear disarmament. Their near-perfect record for failure in this pursuit is due primarily to the lack of political resolve in these countries to pursue complete disarmament. Without a serious effort by the nuclear weapons states to achieve nuclear disarmament, the discriminatory nature of the NPT will continue to allow nuclear weapons states to promote double standards that provide them special privileges while denying these same privileges to the non-nuclear weapons states ? a recipe for increased ill-will and distrust.

Today, the non-proliferation regime is in serious danger of unraveling altogether as witnessed by the fact that India, Israel and Pakistan have joined the list of states in possession of nuclear weapons; North Korea has withdrawn from the NPT and claims to have developed nuclear weapons; nuclear powers are seeking to upgrade and improve their nuclear arsenals; and a nuclear black market – capable of providing states and extremist groups with nuclear technology and weapons-grade material – has emerged. In order to meet the challenges of the 21st Century, the NPT – and the non-proliferation regime in general – is in urgent need of reconstruction.

Calls for Countering the Proliferation Threat

Recently, there have been proposals addressing the need to stem the proliferation of nuclear weapons and materials in order to achieve a more secure world. In a speech at the National Defense University on February 11, 2004, President George W. Bush outlined “Seven Initiatives to Combat Nuclear Proliferation.” Commendably, President Bush called upon all countries “to strengthen the laws and international controls that govern proliferation,” including criminalizing proliferation.

Unfortunately, President Bush’s recognition of and recommendations to stop nuclear proliferation are long overdue and fall seriously short of creating real progress. His proposed initiatives are based on double standards that would allow some states to continue to “legally” possess nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons materials outside of international inspections and safeguards, while imposing more rigorous standards on other states.

With regard to the NPT specifically, President Bush pointed out that a loophole in the treaty has allowed states such as North Korea and Iran to produce nuclear materials. He recommended that this loophole be closed. While he is correct in this recommendation, any effort to address this issue must be based on equal and fair application of the treaty to all parties, not on double standards. President Bush’s initiative called for restricting the ability of non-nuclear weapons states to develop technology for their nuclear power programs, despite the bargain contained in the NPT under Article IV. The implementation of such an initiative would only further enshrine the discriminatory nature of the treaty.

In a statement following President Bush’s speech, Mohammed ElBaradei, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), proposed that the world could be headed towards destruction if the spread of nuclear technology is not stopped. He made several recommendations to curb nuclear proliferation. Pointing out the existing double standards inherent in the NPT, ElBaradei stated, “We must abandon the unworkable notion that it is morally reprehensible for some countries to pursue weapons of mass destruction, yet morally acceptable for others to rely on them for security ? and indeed to continue to refine their capacities and postulate plans for their use.”

ElBaradei’s proposal emphasized the necessity to achieve the nuclear disarmament requirement under Article VI of the treaty in order for any non-proliferation program to be successful. He also noted that all parties to a non-proliferation regime must be held accountable within an equitable multilateral framework. Elbaradei also proposed bringing parts of the nuclear fuel cycle under multinational control, universalizing export controls, curtailing the withdrawal clause of the NPT, achieving universal acceptance of on-site inspections, and internationalizing monitoring of fissile materials by an international agency such as the IAEA.

Moving Forward

ElBaradei’s proposals are constructive and necessary, as are those of President Bush, to the extent that they don’t enshrine double standards. However, the proposals, by themselves or combined, are not sufficient to stop nuclear proliferation. A more comprehensive program is needed in order to achieve this critical goal because the consequences of failure are so drastic. The Nuclear Age Peace Foundation calls for the following steps that would significantly increase the chances of stemming nuclear proliferation under a more strict and effective multilateral framework.

Universal Application of the NPT to All States Under a Strict Timetable

A treaty cannot be effective unless it is equitably applicable to all states in the world. In its existing framework, the NPT allows some states to possess nuclear weapons, but prevents others from obtaining or developing them. Furthermore, India, Israel, Pakistan and North Korea are not parties to the treaty, yet they possess nuclear weapons. These states need to be brought into the treaty, if necessary by action from the UN Security Council, and made accountable for controlling their nuclear weapons and materials under international safeguards. Along with every other nuclear weapons state, India, Israel, Pakistan and North Korea must also become subject to verifiable nuclear disarmament.

In order to achieve universal application of the NPT, the nuclear parties to the treaty must take leadership by accepting a strict timetable for and demonstrating substantial progress on fulfilling their Article VI nuclear disarmament commitments.
Although the NPT has been in force for more than three decades, there has been no substantial progress on nuclear disarmament. Only a strict timetable for achieving significant markers on the road to complete nuclear disarmament will assure that the nuclear weapons states fulfill their obligations in a timely way.

Addressing Horizontal and Vertical Proliferation

There are two types of proliferation, horizontal and vertical. Horizontal proliferation refers to nuclear weapons states transferring nuclear weapons, technology or materials to nuclear or non-nuclear entities. Vertical proliferation refers to nuclear weapons states researching and developing new types of nuclear weapons, technology, materials and means of warhead delivery. To date, only horizontal proliferation has been treated as illegal under the NPT. However, any comprehensive and successful non-proliferation regime must criminalize both vertical and horizontal proliferation and treat them as criminal violations.

Mechanisms for Enforcement

In order to control nuclear weapons and materials, it is necessary to have an accurate accounting of what exists. Therefore, a global inventory of all nuclear weapons and materials must be established. Without exception, all states should be subject to reporting requirements and international inspections in creating such an inventory. Furthermore, all countries should enter into a treaty for the cessation of nuclear weapons material production. Without such a global inventory, it is impossible to determine whether nuclear weapons or materials have been sold or stolen, or whether nuclear arsenals have increased. An inventory provides a necessary component of transparency to the treaty regime that will engender further trust and willingness to achieve the goal of complete disarmament.

Redirect Funding

Funding currently directed to maintaining and improving nuclear arsenals should be redirected to the goal of preventing nuclear proliferation, including international efforts to inspect and safeguard nuclear materials and weapons, and dismantling existing nuclear arsenals. Funding should also be redirected to meeting more pressing social needs in education, health care and social services.

Conclusion

In order for a non-proliferation regime to be successful in the long term, the same standards must be applied to all states. This means that nuclear weapons states must engage with determination in fulfilling their long-overdue obligations to achieve nuclear disarmament. In today’s world, the only way to halt nuclear proliferation is to eliminate existing double standards and implement a more equitable universal regime that includes a strict timetable for nuclear disarmament, the criminalization of both horizontal and vertical proliferation, effective international enforcement mechanisms and adequate funding to achieve these goals.