Robert Strange
McNamara:
An American Idol
by Richard Falk*, March 2004
It is hardly a surprise that “The
Fog of War” won
the Oscar for documentaries this year. As a film on the life
of the former Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, “The
Fog of War” succeeds brilliantly. It conveys the distinctive
complexity of this fascinating man who occupied such a prominent
place in the American political and moral imagination during
the Kennedy and Johnson presidencies. And the documentary presentation
of this material, centered on issues of nuclear war and Vietnam,
makes us think deeply about the troublesome interplay between
war and political leadership, an issue that has again assumed
a tragic salience since 9/11. “Fog of War” limits
its consideration to McNamara’s reflections on and experience
of war, and ignores altogether the thirteen years that he spent
as president of the World Bank, which are to me as revealing
as the seven years that he spent at the Pentagon. Although this
exclusion makes the film fall short as a biographical statement,
there are artistic and dramatic gains achieved by limiting the
focus to war, and its complexities.
The
technique of the film maker, Errol Morris, is quite remarkable,
managing to command
our attention for almost two hours despite
McNamara delivering what is essentially a monologue. Of course,
some of the credit belongs to McNamara’s captivating words
and delivery, and some to the editorial surgery that reduced
some twenty hours of film to what we watch in the theater. Also,
helpful in breaking the potential monotony of listening to a
single voice are McNamara’s eleven lessons that are flashed
on the screen at intervals giving us a sense of narrative structure.
But what is most riveting, I think, is the cinematography that
weaves a coherent fabric of a film consisting of illuminating
archival footage, cascading images associated with McNamara’s
words and deeds, and various bits of recorded conversations between
McNamara and his superiors in the White House. Philip Glass’s
edgy, rhythmically repetitive, music wonderfully complements
the visual presentation, reinforcing the themes of death and
destruction, as well as the contradictory pulls that make this
singular individual both fascinating and ultimately elusive.
It is never becomes clear whether this great man is genuinely
trying to impart the wisdom gained from his deep immersion
in the power games of the 20th century or whether he is elaborately
engaged in masking a rather pathetic appeal for absolution
from
the gods of public assessment. Most probably, it is both.
The
title “The Fog of War” is a phrase taken from
the Karl von Clausewitz, the early 19th century German theorist
of war, and used to explain
the inability of a military commander to grasp the full realities of a battlefield,
given its complexity. It bears so centrally on the McNamara enigma because
it is exculpatory in effect, suggesting that the mistakes of war are due to
its complexity, rather than the incompetence or depravity of the leaders. What
is misleading here is that Clausewitz was explaining why tactical errors are
made in war, while McNamara is indirectly excusing moral shortcomings, including
those that have been criminalized by international law. Technology has lifted
much of the fog that existed in Clausewitz’s day, but the process of
war continues to be enshrouded in the far thicker fog of personal ambition
and national pride. To confuse the one with other, as McNamara does throughout
the film is deeply self-serving, and in the end, quite discrediting.
The substance
of the eleven lessons is as revealing about McNamara’s
frailties as it is about learning from the mistakes of past wars. For instance,
Lesson #1: “empathize with your enemy” is used to vindicate the
flexibility of the Kennedy leadership in the Cuban Missile Crisis in helping
to extricate Khrushchev and the Soviets from the crisis without producing a
nuclear war. Later on, somewhat inconsistently, McNamara becomes quite animated
when he acknowledges that it was “pure luck” that saved us in this
country and the world from a nuclear war, discovering after the fact how ready
each side was to engage in catastrophic behavior to avoid backing down in the
crisis. One might have expected at this point some expression of concern for
the suffering inflicted by American military tactics, especially the deliberate
reliance on terror bombing in World War II, but instead such issues surface,
of all places, in relation to Lesson #4: “Maximize efficiency.”
A disturbing motif throughout the film
is the recurrent reference to General Curtis LeMay, a leading
air force general during both World War II and the
early phases of the cold war, who epitomizes the pure logic of warfare
carried on without regard to the limits of law or morality,
but dedicated single
mindedly to victory and the total destruction of the enemy. McNamara’s
attitudes toward LeMay are revealing, combining undisgusied admiration
for his “efficiency” and
dedication to duty, with an effort to contrast McNamara’s contrasting
active moral indignation about killing people with Lemay’s indifference.
It was LeMay who, for the sake of efficiency in the latter stages of
World II, proposed and engaged in the fire bombing of 67 Japanese cities
causing
hundreds of thousands of deaths of women and children. At a telling moment
in the film LeMay acknowledges that if the Allies had lost the war then
he, and McNamara who was working under his command at the time, would
have prosecuted
as war criminals. At another point, McNamara wonders out loud “What
makes it immoral if you lose, but moral if you win.”
There
is undoubtedly something mesmerizing about McNamara’s sustained
discussion of what we should learn from the experience of war. It is connected
with his obsessive effort to portray himself as a man of reason and efficiency
who always performed as well as humanly possible in view of the historical
circumstances. Sure, he made mistakes with horrifying human consequences,
but he could not do otherwise and serve the leadership and reflect
the priorities
of his country. Significantly, the McNamara of the movie and of real life
has trouble expressing emotion except in highly personal encounters.
It
is odd that the only times that McNamara seems choked with emotion
is when he
recalls picking out a cemetery plot for the burial of JFK after his assassination
and when Lyndon Johnson awards him the Medal of Freedom after dismissing
him as Secretary of Defense over disagreements on how to prosecute
and explain
the Vietnam War. When he is talking about destroying nations with nuclear
bombs or about the millions of Vietnamese killed by American tactics
or about the
toxic effects of Agent Orange used extensively as a defoliant, McNamara
remains cool as a cucumber, all head, no heart.
Closely related, are the revealing points
at which he draws red lines as to where he refuses to go with the inquiry.
When asked about why he did not speak
out on the war after he left the Defense Department, he refuses to answer.
Similarly, when it comes to the specifics of his personal responsibility.
I know that close friends and associates begged McNamara to
speak out against
the Vietnam War after he left the Pentagon, which just might have led to
a dramatic shortening of a futile effort, saving thousands
of lives, and yet
he refused. In the present global setting McNamara is deeply critical of
the American response to 9/11, especially to the Iraq War,
but when asked to comment,
he refuses once again to offer any criticism of the roles played by Rumsfeld
and Bush. From personal experience, I went to see McNamara at the World Bank
in the 1970s about loaning money to Chile during the brutal Pinochet dictatorship.
He asked that our meeting be treated as “off-the-record,” and then
proceeded to say how he more than anyone would rejoice at the overthrow of
Pinochet, but said he would continue to encourage the bank to prop up the regime
with loans. Once again McNamara was blending almost seamlessly a career at
the summits of power with moral indignation that is kept safely “in the
closet.”
We learn from the film that at every stage
of his life, from primary school onwards, McNamara burned with
ambition and glowed with a sense
of achievement.
He tells us that he was the youngest assistant professor ever appointed at
the Harvard Business School. In a sense, McNamara can be best understood
as a consummate careerist who was also remained a compulsive
teacher throughout
his life. Serving the rich and powerful, whether in the Ford Motor Company,
or in Washington, he is at every stage more loyal to his superiors than responsive
to the moral precepts he has always delighted in espousing. McNamara is the
man of reason who still at the age of 85 turns lives into statistics, with
a self-satisfying smile, while explaining his Lesson # 6: “Get the
Data.”
McNamara seems amused while recalling that
when his fiancé,
then living in a separate city, wanted to send out engraved wedding invitations,
she sent
him a message asking for his full middle name, to which McNamara responded “Strange.” His
future wife replied, “I know you are strange, but what is your middle
name?” Perhaps, in the end, McNamara’s life and sensibility are
best understood by having given a original and enigmatic twist to the word
strange! *Richard Falk, a Distinguished Visiting
Professor at the University of California at Santa Barbara,
is chair of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation.
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