Nuclear Weapons Abolition: a Dreamy Solution for the Long Run?
by David Krieger, December 30, 2003

In the October 27, 2003 issue of Fortune, Bill Powell addresses the Brainstorm 2003 question, "Is there any way to stop the spread of nuclear weapons?" He dismisses the idea that the current nuclear powers would "take part in the elimination of all nuclear weapons, including their own" as a "dreamy solution for the long run." But is this idea really so far-fetched and wouldn't we all be much safer if the nuclear weapon states at least moved rapidly in this direction?

At the 2000 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, the nuclear weapon states parties to the treaty pledged "an unequivocal undertaking…to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals." Since 2000, the nuclear weapon states, particularly the US, have backed off of this commitment, but it is a commitment that makes as much sense for them as for any other country, perhaps more sense.

Nuclear weapons were deployed during the Cold War primarily for their deterrent value, but in today's post-Cold War world of terrorist threats, deterrence holds far less value. Rather, nuclear weapons have become potential equalizers in the hands of terrorist groups or "rogue" states. In such a world, the top priority of nuclear weapon states must be to keep these weapons from falling into the hands of terrorists or spreading to other states. It is clearly far simpler to accomplish this goal in a world with fewer nuclear weapons than in a world overflowing with them.

Thus, for nuclear weapon states to dramatically reduce their arsenals, moving toward zero, makes sense for their own security. No state any longer needs a mammoth deterrent force. The closer to zero nuclear weapons the world comes, the safer all states will be, and they will be the safest at zero. The larger the world's nuclear arsenals remain, the greater the possibility that some of these weapons will fall into the hands of terrorists and will be used.

Bomb shelters won't be particularly helpful against terrorist nuclear attacks, nor will raids such as the 1981 Israeli attack on the Iraqi Osirak reactor. Terrorists stand just as good a chance to attack us with one of our own weapons or those of another current nuclear weapon state as with those they create or obtain from a "rogue" state. Our safest course of action is to dramatically reduce and then eliminate the supply of these weapons, and we need a crash program to do this, a Manhattan Project in reverse.

Such a program can only succeed with US leadership and with far stricter international controls over the nuclear arsenals and civilian nuclear programs of all countries. With such an effort underway, there will be a lot more incentive by major states to stop all nuclear proliferation, and consequently a lot less incentive for other states to develop their own nuclear arsenals.

Nuclear weapon states would not go immediately to zero, but could move far more rapidly in that direction than they are today. In the process, they would establish the international safeguarding mechanisms and confidence that moving to zero would not leave them dangerously exposed to nuclear blackmail.

The key to stopping the spread of nuclear weapons is eliminating the current double-standard, as promised in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and taking tangible steps in moving toward zero. The US cannot continue seeking to make nuclear weapons more usable, by creating "bunker-busters" and mini-nukes, and at the same time quell the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries. For our leaders to take action on this, it is imperative that this logic be impressed upon them by the people. We need to act now instead of waiting for the explosion of a nuclear device in New York or any other population center in the world.

David Krieger is president of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (www.wagingpeace.org).