Fueling the Nuclear
Fire:
Nuclear Policies of the Bush Administration
by David Krieger, August 19, 2003
The George W. Bush administration
came into office with the clear intention to strengthen US global
military dominance, including its nuclear dominance, and it has
been true to this major policy goal. Under this administration,
military expenditures have increased by some $100 billion to approximately
$400 billion annually, and nuclear weapons have assumed a far
more central role in US security policy.
The administration’s blatant disregard for
the United Nations Security Council and for long-standing arms
control and disarmament efforts are clear signs that it is prepared
to chart a unilateral course with regard to security issues. The
US has signaled its desire to overhaul its nuclear arsenal by
developing smaller and more usable nuclear weapons, which could
be used as part of the new “Bush doctrine” of preemption.
The administration has developed contingency plans for the use
of nuclear weapons against seven other countries and against weapons
of mass destruction (WMD) stockpiles of what it considers to be
“rogue” states.
In its dramatic shift towards increasingly aggressive
nuclear and military policies, the Bush administration has opened
a new era of increased likelihood of US nuclear weapons use. In
turn, the administration has provoked the initiation of a new
nuclear arms race as other states attempt to develop or increase
their nuclear arsenals to counter-balance US military dominance
and the threat of US willingness to employ the Bush doctrine of
preemptive warfare.
Bush Policy Goals
Nuclear “Reduction”
As a candidate for president in 2000, Mr. Bush announced
that he wanted to reduce the level of strategic nuclear weapons
in the US arsenal to the lowest number compatible with US security.
Based on military studies, that number was placed at between 1,700
and 2,200 deployed strategic nuclear weapons. According to the
Nuclear Posture Review, a classified document released to Congress
on December 31, 2001, “Based on current projections, an
operationally deployed force of 1700-2200 strategic nuclear warheads
by 2012…will support US deterrence policy to hold at risk
what opponents value, including their instruments of political
control and military power, and to deny opponents their war aims.”
This “reduction” of deployed warheads
will be accomplished by transferring warheads from active delivery
vehicles to either a “responsive force” or to “inactive
reserve.” This should be seen more as a de-alerting measure
rather than a disarmament measure, as nuclear weapons are merely
shifted to non-deployed status and not dismantled.
Missile Defense
While campaigning, Bush also promoted the development
and deployment of a National Missile Defense to protect the United
States against nuclear attacks by so-called rogue states, a proposal
that would have been prohibited under the Anti-Ballistic Missile
(ABM) Treaty. Upon assuming the presidency, Bush dealt with the
impediment of the ABM Treaty by withdrawing from it. He gave the
six months notice required by the Treaty for withdrawal on December
13, 2001, and US withdrawal became effective on June 13, 2002.
Since then, Bush had announced plans to deploy the first twenty
interceptor missiles in Alaska and California by 2004.
The US Nuclear Posture Review
The clearest indication of a shift of US nuclear
policy can be found in the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), marking
a major change in the US nuclear strategy beyond the Cold War
doctrines of deterrence. This document lays out a “New Triad,”
composed of offensive strike systems (nuclear and non-nuclear),
defenses (active and passive), and a revitalized defense infrastructure
(providing new capabilities) to meet emerging threats.
The Review states, “Nuclear weapons play
a critical role in the defense capabilities of the United States,
its allies and friends. They provide credible military options
to deter a wide range of threats, including WMD [weapons of mass
destruction] and large-scale conventional military force. These
nuclear capabilities possess unique properties that give the United
States options to hold at risk classes of targets [that are] important
to achieve strategic and political objectives.” This is
an extraordinary assertion of the benefits that US leaders attribute
to nuclear weapons in US defense policy, benefits that they are
clearly reserving for themselves and a small group of other nuclear
weapons states while seeking to deny them to other nations. Salient
points of the report are summarized below:
Nuclear strikes against
WMD
In proposing the use of nuclear weapons to deter against
WMD, the NPR embraces the option of using nuclear weapons not
only against countries with nuclear weapons but also those in
possession of chemical and biological weapons. The document states,
“U.S. nuclear forces will continue to provide assurance
to security partners, particularly in the presence of known or
suspected threats of nuclear, biological, or chemical attacks
or in the event of surprising military developments.”
New nuclear capabilities
The report makes a discernible move towards making nuclear
weapons "usable" on the battleground. The NPR talks
of credible nuclear policies “over the coming decades”
that include “new generations of weapon systems.”
These have been conceived as “low-yield deep earth penetration
nuclear weapons,” popularly described as “bunker-busters”,
to defeat hard and deeply buried targets such as underground bunkers
and bio-weapon facilities, and “mini-nukes” (with
yields less than 5 kilotons). These are weapons that proponents
believe will cause limited civilian casualties and collateral
damage, and opponents view as making nuclear weapons more usable
and more likely to be used. The Bush administration is seeking
$70 million to advance these nuclear weapons programs.
Shortening nuclear test
readiness
The report calls for strengthening the “U.S. Nuclear
Warhead Infrastructure.” It states, “The need is clear
for a revitalized nuclear weapons complex that will: …be
able, if directed, to design, develop, manufacture, and certify
new warheads in response to new national requirements; and maintain
readiness to resume underground nuclear testing if required.”
Consequently, the Bush administration has sought
funds to “enhance” test readiness and shorten the
time required to prepare for the resumption of full-scale test
explosions – decreasing the current time from 24-36 months
to approximately 18 months.
Contingency plans
The report further calls for development of contingency
plans for the use of nuclear weapons against seven countries:
Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Syria, Libya, Russia and China. As five
of these countries are non-nuclear weapons states, the US threat
to use nuclear weapons against them violates the negative security
assurances that it gave to the non-nuclear weapons states that
are parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty at the time
of that NPT’s Review and Extension Conference in 1995.
In sum, the Bush administration’s Nuclear
Posture Review is a strategy for indefinite reliance on nuclear
weapons with plans to improve the capabilities of the existing
arsenal and to revitalize the infrastructure for improving US
nuclear forces in the future. The NPR promotes an expanded nuclear
strategy as opposed to measures for irreversible nuclear disarmament
as agreed to at the 2000 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference.
Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty
In May 2002, President Bush reached an agreement
with President Putin on a Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty
(SORT). In the treaty, the two governments agreed to reduce the
number of deployed strategic nuclear weapons on each side to Bush’s
preferred numbers, as set forth in the US NPR, of between 1,700
and 2,200 by the year 2012. The treaty made no provisions for
interim reductions, and thus, despite SORT, it remains possible
for either or both sides to actually increase the size of their
arsenal between the inception of the treaty and 2012, so long
as the reductions to the agreed numbers are accomplished by 2012.
The treaty, however, does not provide verification measures to
assure that the reductions are made. The treaty is also set to
terminate, unless extended, in 2012.
Furthermore, the treaty has no provisions for the
nuclear warheads to be removed from active deployment. The US
has announced its intentions to put many or most of these warheads
into storage in “reserve” status, where they will
remain available to be reintroduced to active deployment should
this decision be taken in the future. Russia is likely to follow
the US approach, and the treaty may exacerbate a new threat of
theft and transfer of nuclear weapons and materials from Russia
to other nations or terrorist groups
SORT was announced with considerable fanfare. It
gave the public a sense of progress toward nuclear disarmament,
when in fact it was far more of a public relations effort than
an actual arms reduction treaty. Although it did provide for removing
several thousand nuclear weapons on both sides from deployment,
and in this sense it was a de-alerting measure, it did not make
these reductions irreversible (i.e., by dismantlement) or accountable
to verification as agreed to by the parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty at the 2000 NPT Review Conference.
US National Security Strategy
In September 2002, the Bush administration released
a document entitled “The National Security Strategy of the
United States of America.” In a letter introducing the document,
Mr. Bush stated, “The gravest danger our Nation faces lies
at the crossroads of radicalism and technology. Our enemies have
openly declared that they are seeking weapons of mass destruction,
and evidence indicates that they are doing so with determination.
The United States will not allow these efforts to succeed….
[A]s a matter of common sense and self-defense, America will act
against such emerging threats before they are fully formed.”
[Emphasis added.]
This statement underlined Mr. Bush’s intention
and willingness to engage in preemptive war, including the possibility
of a nuclear first strike. A few months earlier, on June 1, 2002,
when Mr. Bush spoke at the graduation ceremony of the United States
Military Academy, he introduced the idea of preemptive war by
stating, “[O]ur security will require all Americans to be
forward-looking and resolute, to be ready for preemptive action
when necessary to defend our liberty and to defend our lives.”
US Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction
In December 2002, the Bush administration released
a new document, entitled “National Strategy to Combat Weapons
of Mass Destruction.” The document recognized the dangers
of the “massive harm” that weapons of mass destruction
could inflict upon the United States, its military forces, and
its friends and allies. “We will not permit,” it stated,
“the world’s most dangerous regimes and terrorists
to threaten us with the world’s most destructive weapons.”
The document is premised on the administration’s
strategy for the US to possess and possibly use nuclear weapons,
while denying, preventing, and responding to the possession and
possible use of weapons of mass destruction by other countries
or terrorists.
In setting forth its plan to retaliate with a nuclear
strike in response to a nuclear, biological and chemical weapon
attack, the document stated clearly that the US would counter
such weapons with “overwhelming force – including
through resort to all of our options.” The Washington Times
reported on January 31, 2003 that the classified version of the
document, National Security Presidential Directive 17, signed
by President Bush in September 2002, stated the issue in this
way: “The United States will continue to make clear that
it reserves the right to respond with overwhelming force –
including potentially nuclear weapons – to the use of [weapons
of mass destruction] against the United States, our forces abroad,
and friends and allies.” [Emphasis added.]
In vowing that the US will seek capabilities enabling
it to “detect and destroy an adversary’s WMD assets
before these weapons are used,” the strategy boldly forewarns
states seeking WMD that the US could strike first.
Failure to Lead toward Nuclear Disarmament
In sum, Bush’s aggressive nuclear policy
has shown scant concern for US treaty obligations, rendering many
international arms control measures meaningless.
• Most prominently, the Bush administration
has withdrawn from the ABM Treaty to pursue missile defenses and
test space-based weapons.
• The Bush administration is not taking seriously, nor attempting
to fulfill, US obligations for nuclear disarmament under Article
VI of the NPT, nor has it shown good faith in fulfilling the 2000
NPT Review Conference’s 13 Practical Steps for Nuclear Disarmament
- including pursuing the promised “unequivocal undertaking
by the nuclear weapons states to accomplish the total elimination
of their nuclear arsenals….”
• Washington has made clear that it does not intend to send
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) back to the Senate for
ratification. The Bush administration has indicated plans to shorten
the time needed to resume underground nuclear testing, and is
developing more usable nuclear weapons and contingency plans for
their use.
Current nuclear policies by the Bush administration
must be viewed as highly provocative to other countries. They
suggest that the US reserves to itself the right to use its own
weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, as it
deems appropriate, while, at the same time, seeking to deny that
possibility to other countries.
Early in his presidency, Mr. Bush labeled Iraq,
Iran and North Korea as an “Axis of Evil.” Based upon
his doctrine of preemption, Mr. Bush has already led the US to
wage a preventive war on Iraq without sanction by the United Nations.
The other two countries singled out by Mr. Bush have not been
unresponsive to the aggressiveness of the Bush administration.
In January 2003, North Korea withdrew from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty and announced that it is reprocessing spent nuclear fuel
to develop a nuclear arsenal. Iran, which is still a party to
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, has attracted international
suspicion in recent months due to its ambitious plans to extend
its nuclear facilities, showing signs of moving forward with developing
its own nuclear arsenal. In both cases, US policies and provocations
have helped drive the reactions.
The Bush administration, by withdrawing from the
ABM Treaty and proceeding with deployment of regional and national
missile defenses, has provoked China to further develop its offensive
nuclear arsenal in order to maintain a minimally effective deterrent
force. China’s plans to further its nuclear program may
in turn spark further developments in the South Asia nuclear impasse.
Under the military and nuclear policies of the
Bush administration, the United States is leading the world into
an even more dangerous era, with the effect of pouring fuel on
the nuclear fire. Current Bush administration nuclear policies
pose an enormous threat to US and global security. These policies
must be reversed and brought into line with US obligations to
international non-proliferation and disarmament agreements. Since
the Bush administration is unlikely to initiate such change, the
challenge to reverse these policies and bring the US into compliance
with international commitments lies with the US public and the
international community.
--David Krieger is president of the Nuclear
Age Peace Foundation (www.wagingpeace.org). His recent books include
Choose Hope, Your Role in Waging Peace in the Nuclear Age (Middleway
Press, 2002) and Hope in a Dark Time, Reflections on Humanity’s
Future (Capra Press, 2003).
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