Freedom
or Force on the High Seas?
Arms Interdiction and International Law*
by Devon Chaffee**, August 15, 2003
North Korea’s withdrawal from the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Regime and announcement of a nuclear weapons
program was an unfortunate development, which the international
community must work to reverse. Some US officials are, however,
advocating for a policy of interdicting [1]
North Korean ships - a policy that would do more harm than good
to international stability by undermining the International Law
of the Sea.
The International Law of the Sea is one of the
most comprehensive and well-established bodies of international
regulatory norms in existence. The Law of the Sea regime (LOS)
is buttressed by longstanding international norms, and formal
legal agreements, critical to creating a more secure international
environment. [2]
The Law of the Sea grants several freedoms, including
the right to navigation on the high seas and rights to transit
[3] through international straits,
exclusive economic zones (EEZ), and the territorial and archipelagic
waters of another state. The regime does bar a select number of
illegal activities, including piracy, slave trade, illicit traffic
in narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances, and unauthorized
broadcasting, and grants states the right to intervene in such
activities. [4]
There is nothing in the LOS regime that explicitly
prohibits transit of weapons of mass destruction or gives States
rights to interdict such transit. On the contrary, a number of
States, including the United States, have actively opposed the
development of such prohibitive norms or interpretations of international
law that would inhibit the transit of weapons of mass destruction
by the seas or air, and cite the rights and privileges established
in the Law of the Sea to affirm their unhindered military use
of the oceans. Nuclear weapon states such as the US, UK and France
have continuously worked to ensure that their ability to transit
nuclear weapons is not hindered by regional nuclear weapons free
zones or UN efforts to create a Nuclear Weapon Free Southern Hemisphere.
The US, UK and France, along with Japan, have also asserted their
rights to transit nuclear materials - in particular reprocessed
plutonium – through the high seas and through the EEZ’s
of coastal States. In addition, a number of States, including
the United States, France, Israel, China, Russia and Italy, export
missile technology transiting through the oceans to do so.
In contrast to this general assertion of rights
to transit nuclear weapons, missile technology [5],
fissile materials and other materials related to weapons of mass
destruction, the US is currently advocating for the selected interdiction
of such materials to and from certain states of concern to the
Bush Administration as a means to stem proliferation. Ten countries
have now joined what is known as the Proliferation Security Initiative
(PSI), which met in Madrid, Spain in early June and in Brisbane,
Australia in the beginning of July 2003 [6].
Members of PSI include: Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan,
the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom.
However, there are limitations to the transit that
countries can legally inhibit in their territorial waters and
EEZs and even stricter limitations on what can be intercepted
on the High Seas.
The legal implications of arms interdictions on the oceans depend
greatly on the nature of interdictions and the way the interdictions
are undertaken. Some States have agreed to export controls amongst
themselves, such as those laid out in the Missile Technology Control
Regime. However, the States of concern to the US, such as North
Korea, China, Pakistan and Iran, are not members and so are not
bound by these controls. It might be legal to interdict shipments
on the High Seas that have been deemed by the Security Council
or the Law of the Sea Tribunal to violate the Law of the Sea and
to constitute a threat to the peace. This option is pursued in
a recent strategy issued by the Council of the European Union
calling on the EU to support a Security Council Resolution that
would arms interdictions “when appropriate.” [7]
Also, in territorial waters it might be possible for the coastal
State to determine the transit of missiles or WMD to be a threat
to its security and thus prohibit such transit deeming it to be
non-innocent passage.
Any interdictions outside those explicitly allowed in the existing
International Law of the Sea regime would clearly violate the
freedom of navigation on the high seas and the right of innocent
passage through territorial waters.
Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer has
recognized that there is a “very real difficulty in terms
of vessels that might be going through the high seas because international
law requires that those ships should not be intercepted,”
[8] and that there might therefore
“need to be some change to international law to facilitate
these types of interdictions, to stop illicit trade.” [9]
However, changing the Law of the Sea would be a long process requiring
extensive negotiations and would unlikely yield the discriminatory
approach desired by the PSI of allowing transit by certain States
but not others.
The likelihood that the US and PSI will thus develop
an interdiction strategy outside international law is reinforced
by the current trend in US policy towards dismantling norms that
prevent the US from exercising its military dominance. The US
has moved away from multi-lateral non-proliferation solutions,
withdrawn from the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty, abandoned START
II, failed to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and stalled
efforts to improve the Biological Weapons Convention regime. The
controversy over the UK and US use of intelligence in Iraq will
also bring into question the legitimacy of intelligence information
used to justify interdictions regarding the existence of arms
and material shipments and their intended destination and/or use.
Restricting the transit of weapons of mass destruction
would be a positive development in furthering arms control and
stemming proliferation, if such norms were carefully developed
by the international community and applied uniformly. International
law cannot, however, maintain its integrity if applied whimsically
or discriminately, or if defined by a small “coalition of
the willing.” While PSI membership may appear to be an easy
way for leaders of certain countries to get back into the good
graces of the Bush administration after disagreements over Iraq,
if they contribute to the degradation of LOS it will likely come
back to haunt them. If leaders of the states participating in
the PSI attempt to exchange LOS norms for selective nonproliferation
measures, they should realize that such a trade-off could eventually
restrict their own country’s access to international waters.
If members of the international community begin to allow the erosion
of the Law of the Sea to suite the policy goals of the sole existing
superpower, they should not expect that such concessions would
be easily reversed.
* This article is a summary of a longer piece
pending publication in Science for Democratic Action, the newsletter
of the Institute for Energy and Environmental Research.
**Devon Chaffee is the Research and Advocacy Coordinator
of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation
1. Interdicting: intercepting
ships and ensuring that no proscribed activities are being conducted.
2. Such formal agreements include the four 1958
Conventions that resulted from the Geneva Conference on the law
of the sea, to which the US is a party, and the 1982 UN Convention
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which President Ronald Reagan
decided not to sign onto for fear that it could interfere with
certain US sovereign prerogatives. The US has however signed the
1994 Agreement relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the
U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea.
3. Transit through territorial waters is
limited to innocent passage. According to the 1958 Convention
on the Territorial Sea “Passage is innocent so long as it
is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the
coastal state.”
4. In addition to their codification into
the law of the sea through the 1958 and the 1982 Conventions,
the prohibition of these activities has been codified by a series
of multilateral treaties including: 1965 Agreement for the Prevention
of Broadcasts Transmitted from Stations outside National Territories;
General Act for the Repression of the Slave Trade, 1890;
5. See UN Register of Conventional Arms,
http://disarmament.un.org/UN_REGISTER.nsf and Nuclear and Missile
Trade and Developments, The Nonproliferation Review, Center for
Nonproliferation Studies, http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol05/53/db53.pdf
6. Chairman’s Statement, Proliferation
Security Initiative, Brisbane Meeting, July 9-10, 2003. http://www.dfat.gov.au/globalissues/psi/
7. Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons
of Mass Destruction and its corresponding Action Plan adopted
by the Council of the European Union on April 14, 2003.
8. “N Korea Ships Face more Scrutiny,”
BBC, June 11, 2003.
9. Sonni Efron and Barbara Demick, “11
nations to Discuss Blocking Shipments of Weapons Materials,”
Los Angeles Times. June 12, 2003.
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