De-alert
by David Krieger and Carah Ong, April 2002

Although the Cold War ended more than a decade ago, the US and Russia maintain large nuclear arsenals with some 4,500 nuclear weapons on high-alert, ready to be fired at a moment's notice. While both countries have announced a formal "de-targeting" of one another, it is virtually meaningless when they keep their nuclear weapons on high-alert status and maintain a launch-on-warning posture.

The US and Russia have come to the "brink" of launching their nuclear weapons on several occasions because of miscommunication or misunderstanding. Removing nuclear weapons from high-alert status would eliminate the risk of major catastrophe caused by a hasty reaction from any nuclear weapons state. By some estimates, the presidents of the US and Russia would have only 15 minutes to verify an incoming attack, consult advisors and give the launch order.

De-alerting can be accomplished in a matter of weeks without negotiating or ratifying a treaty. It can be done by a simple executive order to stand down nuclear forces. In 1991, then US President George H. W. Bush took the bold step of removing hundreds of US nuclear weapons from high-alert status, and in response, Mikhail Gorbachev did the same with hundreds of Soviet nuclear weapons. It is time for similar courageous leadership to finish the process started Presidents Bush and Gorbachev.

Keeping nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert does not add to the security of either nation; indeed it makes the entire world less secure. The Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons strongly recommended de-alerting in 1996. There have also been numerous resolutions in the United Nations General Assembly and its disarmament bodies urging this course of action. Taking nuclear weapons off hair-trigger alert and placing them in a state in which it would take from hours to days, rather than minutes or seconds, to make them launch-ready would effectively eliminate the risk of accidental nuclear war. De-alerting all nuclear weapons would be the first practical step to substantially diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in security policy.

"Taking nuclear forces off alert could be verified by national technical means and nuclear weapon state inspection arrangements. In the first instance, reductions in alert status could be adopted by the nuclear weapons states unilaterally."

-The Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, August 1996