The history of defense
systems
And remarks on the National Missile Defense
by Gert G. Harigel, November 2001
"Our scientific
power has outrun our spiritual power.
We have guided missiles and misguided men."
Martin Luther King, Jr.
1. Introduction
This is a timeless article, for there has never
been a time in history when some tribe or nation has not been
contemplating actions and policies that lead to war or peace.
During the history struggle arose frequently between families,
clans, small and large population groups, first about chasing
ground for animals, then possession of arable land, and finally
about mineral resources. Local fights spread with time to larger
areas. Was it first fists and teeth the main weapons, soon humans
learned to prepare special tools for fighting each other. In parallel
they developed means of body protection by armor, and to surround
their living quarters with fortifications. Each advance in offensive
weapons was countered by defensive structures, mostly in this
time sequence. First all developments stretched over longer periods,
but intervals are getting smaller and smaller with progress in
technologies and science. It is the aim of this talk to describe
briefly the major defense systems, culminating in the proposed
Star War idea, developed by President Reagan, who claimed that
it would make all other weapons obsolete. This claim had already
been made for other weapons at earlier times in history. Will
the National Missile Defense idea do what is advertised, or will
it lead only to new arms race? Are we willing to learn from historical
precedents?
There is another underlying pattern to defense
policy. Soldiers and statesmen are forever laying the pavements
of good intentions that lead to the hell of military conflict.
The process is endless and will not be interrupted before there
is societal understanding of the patterns that lead to destruction
and a modification of the behavior on the basis of that understanding.
One such pattern is the predilection of tribes and nations to
choose their statesmen from the ranks of a military hero [1].
The transition from soldier to statesman may occur at any phase
of the career. We all know of the political path taken by General
Eisenhower, Captain Truman, Lieutenant Kennedy, Corporal Hitler,
and Shepherd David as they make the transition from military hero
to national leader. We see the same pattern with General Powell,
becoming Secretary of State, and perhaps in four years time President
of the strongest nation in the world. It looks that the training,
temperament and skills of the soldier are diametrically opposed
to the training, temperament and skills of the statesman.
2. Lifetime and efficiency of defense systems
Built-up of defense systems is as old as any offense
activity. There is no defense system that could withstand forever
attack, and no defense system is even at the start perfect. To
quote Hellmuth von Moltke: Offence is the straight way to the
goal, whereas the defense is the long way around. A few of such
systems will be briefly discussed:
2.1 The Great Wall
The Chinese Great Wall can be considered as the
longest living defense system. It stretched over a length of 6'300
km from the Yalu River (Gulf of Chihli) to Jiayuguan (Central
Asia). It has been built and rebuilt during almost 2'000 years,
beginning with the interconnection of walls which surrounded small
kingdoms. The major construction periods start with the 4th century
BC, were accelerated by the first Chinese Emperor Qin 220-206
BC, using almost a million compulsory labor including some 300'000
soldiers. Maintenance work in the 7th century caused a death toll
of half a million workers within ten days. A major upgrade was
made during 1368-1644 in the Ming Dynasty (5'660 km). The fortification
consisted of a 9-meter high wall and about twenty-five thousand
alarms towers 13-meters high. Signals could be transmitted over
a distance of 2'000 km in 24 hours. During the Qin reign 180 million
cubic meters rammed earth provided for the core of the wall (10
meter thick, 5 meter high). The aim of the Wall was to protect
against Huns. However, this fortification never performed properly
as defense line. In 1208 Dschingis-Khan broke through the Wall
and China was liberated again only in 1368. In 1644 the Wall was
opened by the treason of a general near Shanghaiguan, where it
had the formidable height of 16 meter and a width of 8 meters.
The Wall degraded and its remains are since not more than a tourist
attraction.
2.2 The Roman Limes
In comparison the Roman Limes was a much less ambitious
defense building. The best known part was in the western part
of Germany spanning between the Rhine and Danube Rivers. Building
had been started in 9 AD, and it was reinforced between 117-161
AD. It had a length of 480 km, and consisted of a 3-meter high
palisades and watch towers. It fulfilled its intended function
only until 260 AD, when Alemanni broke through. Romans built similar
Limes in Great Britain, Anatolia, and Syria in 2nd century AD,
again with relatively short lifetimes.
2.3 Castles and city walls
Castles and city walls were the preferred fortifications
for small city-states. Their efficient lifetime was at the best
a couple of hundred years, before they were destroyed with the
help of gunpowder, canons, and fireballs.
Metallic armor of mercenaries turned out to reduce mobility, could
not protect the horses of the horsemen, and got soon out of fashion.
2.4 Defense lines in the 20th century
The lifetime of fortifications built in the first
half of the 20th century decreased
rapidly.
2.4.1 The French Maginot Line connected some modern
fortresses, which hold out during World War I. Built in the 1930s,
it presented a tremendous advance over previous fortifications
and had all imaginable comfort for the defenders to offer. It
was built along the French-German border, but not extended to
the French-Belgium border, assuming Germans would respect in any
conflict the neutrality of Belgium and The Netherlands. Germany
did not behave as expected in World War II and its troops marched
in 1940 through the northern flank into France, attacking the
fortifications from the rear side.
2.4.2 The counter part of the Maginot Line was
the German West-Wall, a much less elaborated defense structure.
It was not needed at the very beginning of World War II, but demonstrated
some efficiency towards its end in 1945.
2.4.3 Following the occupation of France in 1940
Germany built up the Atlantic-Wall. Its major fortifications were
built near the smallest part of the English Channel, where it
was expected that allied troops would try to land. This turned
out to be a miscalculation by the German headquarters combined
with an underestimation of air troopers that could land behind
the Atlantic Wall.
2.4.4 Antiaircraft canons, developed between the
two World Wars, became increasingly worthless due to countermeasures
in form of chaff (aluminized paper) used in WW II, that distorted
radar images and simulated planes where there were none. High-flying
planes flying could only be reached with insufficient accuracy.
2.4.5 Reagan's Star War program did not get beyond
a preliminary design study, since scientists showed that laser
canons could neither produce nor send the desired energy density
towards incoming missiles to destroy them.
The above examples show that time intervals are
getting shorter between building of new defense systems and for
their efficient use. This very preliminary study of some major
defense systems and their "effective" lifetime has been
made in order to find out if there is a pattern that might help
to predict the performance of future developments. Any such development
starts slowly, rises to maturity, and then declines in its efficiency.
Rise and decline time may vary considerably from case to case,
may have a steep rise and a slow decline, or vice versa, or may
be Gaussian. A reasonable scientific description could be done
by fitting the data by a Gaussian-like curve and define the efficiency
by the full-width at halve maximum. This was not (yet) done for
the present study. Instead best estimates for the start-up and
complete demise were given. Figure 1 shows a plot (for convenience
on a double logarithmic scale) of the so defined useful lifetime
of defense installations/methods over two-and-a-half thousand
years. In this plot is indicated for each system by whom or by
which technical development the system became obsolete. A straight
line can represent the data. No effort has yet been made to evaluate
error bars, to define the slope, and to represent this line by
an equation.
Since this eyeball-fitted line represents so well
the events during a very long period of human history, temptation
is great to extrapolate it into the future. Doing so leads to
the conclusion that defense mechanisms will become obsolete almost
immediately after putting them into place. Taking an extreme view,
it could mean that the National Missile Defense would not even
see the light of the day before being made obsolete by countermeasures.
Only time will show the validity of our extrapolation.
2.5 Shift of warfare from ground to air
A change in theory and practice of warfare becomes
obvious during the later part of the 20th century. Was the practice
in earlier epochs mainly composed of political, economic and military
elements, it is now increasingly influenced by technological,
scientific and psychological elements. In previous centuries the
theory of warfare had been subdivided into a strategic part, considering
wide spaces, long periods of time, large amount of forces as a
prelude to battlefield, and the tactic part, which was just the
opposite to the former. A distinction between strategic and tactic
blurred since World War I (WW I) and especially during World War
II (WW II). Surprisingly to the author, this distinction between
strategic and tactic is still kept for nuclear weapons, and finds
expression in the START and INF treaties.
Whereas warfare during WW I was mainly on ground
and at sea, and airplanes played only a secondary role for recognition
purposes, a dramatic shift occurred during WW II. Weapon systems
reached further and beyond front lines.
Defense systems crumbled, anti aircraft canons
became militarily impotent during massive air raids. German V1
and V2 rockets reached almost unimpeded their targets on the British
Island. The only defense against these rockets in the forties
was to bombard their launch pads. The recent Kosovo War demonstrated
even more vividly that defense against planes, now flying at considerably
higher altitudes, by anti-aircraft canons is a hopeless enterprise.
The second half of the 20th century witnessed a
dramatic improvement of the rudimentary German WW II rocket technology,
promoted on the other side of the Atlantic and now common knowledge
in most industrialized countries. These missiles can transport
nuclear warheads, and of less military value, chemical and biological
weapons [2]. A majority of people condemns these weapons, called
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), and demands their elimination.
However, some countries believe they need WMDs for deterrence,
but deny their possession for others. The escalation of the arms
race during the Cold War led to plan for comprehensive antimissile
defense systems for both super powers. Fortunately, the Anti-Ballistic
Missile Treaty (ABM), concluded in 1972, limited drastically,
and still does, such an out-of-control development.
3. Missile defense activities since the 1980s
President Reagan's speech on March 23, 1983 was
the starting point for the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).
The military-industrial complex eagerly picked up the idea. Even
the industry in several NATO countries was encouraged to get involved,
however not in their desired way in front-element technologies.
Concerned, eminent scientists made feasibility
studies, culminating in the "Report to The American Physical
Society of the study group on Science and Technology of Directed
Energy Weapons" [3]. Soviet scientists made a similar study
[4]. Both groups came to the conclusion that most of the systems
would not work as advertised or even not at all. The latter is
the case for space-based laser canon [5]. The software aspects
cause another tremendous hurdle [6]. A discussion of the results
of these two documents is beyond the scope of the present paper.
The reader is referred to the original literature, which remains
a valid document up to date.
Considerable amount of money was wasted during
the years following Reagan's proposal. Deception of the public
about supposed successes played a role in promoting SDI [7, 8].
However, the topic did for several years no longer make any headlines.
Public awareness was reawakened only during the first Gulf War.
Unfounded success stories and tests were then sold to the public,
which does mostly not understand the basic science and technology
behind such claims. During CNN broadcasts, the military commanders
claimed a widely exaggerated success rate of the Patriot missile
in shooting down Scud missiles coming from Iraq. The General Accounting
Office found that only nine percent of the Patriot-Scud engagements
are supported by the strongest evidence that an engagement resulted
in a warhead kill. The Patriot's supposedly near-flawless performance
may be one of the greatest myths in weapons history. As Winston
Churchill once said "In war truth is such a precious good
that it has to be surrounded by a strong body guard of lies".
The Patriot was originally designed to shoot down
aircraft. In the 1980s, it was given an upgrade and a modified
warhead to give it a limited capability to defend against short-range
ballistic missiles. The Scuds were flying over 3,600 km per hour
faster than the Patriot had been designed to deal with. The Patriot
must detonate when it is within a few meters of the Scud to have
a high probability of destroying the warhead [9-11].
During the Clinton presidency SDI was revived,
now only under another name, as National Missile Defense (NMD).
An excellent description of all aspects of NMD, written for general
public, can be found in [12]. NMDs task is advertised as a defense
against a small number of missiles coming from rogue states. NMD
consists actually out of two components: the Theater High Altitude
Area Defense (THAAD) and the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD).
A shift of SDI from Directed Energy Weapons (DEW) to Kinetic Energy
Weapons (KEW) occurred [13, 14].
NMD does no longer rely on space-based laser canons,
in so far becoming more realistic. It is supposed to destroy warheads
in mid-course, but this policy may still change to the easier
boost-phase interception [15].
NMD is planned to protect against both, so-called
theatre missiles and strategic (intercontinental) missiles. Such
a development is seen by the departing and the incoming administration
of the U.S. as a positive step in the right direction, but by
a majority of other countries as counterproductive and giving
rise to an unlimited arms race [16-20].
3.1 Countermeasures
First tests of BMD are very far from successful
[21-23]. Will the BMD system be effective? The answer will depend
among many other questions to be solved on the effect of countermeasures
on the kill probability. It appears to be highly impossible to
protect entire countries against missile attacks, as it is claimed
by the United States.
The kill probability is one of the key technical
parameters for evaluating the effectiveness of a missile defense
system. The higher the kill probability is, the more effective
the defense system will be. Inevitably, a missile defense system
will be challenged by countermeasures, which may decrease the
kill probability. There are three different kinds of them against
THAAD system: infrared stealth, radar interference and decoys.
A brief qualitative discussion of these measures follows.
3.1.1 Infrared stealth
The endgame phase of an intercept begins when the
infrared (IR) sensor built in interceptor's kill vehicle (KV)
acquires the target. The distance between the KV and the target
at the beginning of the endgame is the so-called acquisition range.
During the whole endgame phase, the KV maneuvers according to
target's trajectory information provided by the IR sensor to put
itself on a path that leads to a direct hit with the target. For
realizing a hit, enough endgame time, which is to say large enough
acquisition range, is needed for the KV to correct its current
velocity and position errors.
Against IR sensors, there may exist several kinds
of countermeasures; among which to shorten the acquisition range
to an unacceptable level is a common one, known as IR stealth.
For a given IR sensor and background noise, the acquisition range
depends mainly on temperature, material and sizes of the target.
The most effective way of realizing IR stealth is to chill the
target to very low temperature since IR radiation decreases quickly
with temperature. Dry ice or liquid nitrogen will do the job,
being filled into the space between shroud and thermally insulated
layers.
3.1.2 Radar interference
The X band ground based radar (GBR) is one of the
most important components of the THAAD system. The GBR detects,
acquires and tracks targets before interceptors could launch.
When a certain tracking accuracy is achieved, interceptors are
committed to their targets and launched, then the GBR continues
to track the targets and issues updated target information through
BMC4I system to the interceptors and KVs to guide their boost
phase flights and midcourse flights respectively. When a KVs midcourse
flight finishes and its endgame flight begins, the KV is delivered
to the hand over point where the IR sensor of the KV is expected
to acquire the target. The so-called hand over point is actually
an error basket in space. To achieve a successful intercept, the
basket has to satisfy two conditions: (1) at the hand-over point,
the KV is at the position where it can acquire the target, (2)
the KV's position and velocity vector at the moment insures that
the resulting zero effort miss distance (ZMD) error is within
the KV's maneuvering capability. On the one hand, the above two
conditions depend mainly on the GBR's capability to accurately
predict the trajectory of the target. On the other hand, the KV's
capability of removing ZMD error is limited by the amount of fuel
it carries and the total time of flight (TOF) during the endgame
that is available for the KV to maneuver.
In addition to GBR information obtained from satellites
may be used for tracking. Their jamming could then be also being
an effective countermeasure.
3.1.3 Decoys
Decoys or false targets are a most commonly used
countermeasure. They are required to simulate some physical characteristics
of the real reentry vehicle (RV), like size, shape, and temperature,
speed etc., according to their task. The discrimination distance
plays an important role. KP drops as discrimination distance decreases.
Typical velocities of strategic targets are 7 km/s,
and for theater targets 5 km/s. Calculations show that the KV
with a speed of about 5 km/s will have nearly the same kill probability
against strategic missiles as against theater missiles. It strongly
suggest that a defense system with same performances would be
nearly as capable in intercepting strategic missiles as in dealing
with theater missiles if its performances and reliability are
proved in testing against theater missile targets. The KV should
explode when it is at about 4 meters away from the target. This
requires timing within a fraction of a millisecond.
3.2 Kill what and when?
There is no doubt that weapons attain more destructive
power over time, as was the case with the switch from TNT to nuclear
explosives. There is no longer a strong relation between power
and number of weapons as in a classical war. The population agglomeration
gets denser, and therefore the vulnerability of the civil population
increased and effects them physically and morally.
BMD is advertised as an efficient means to protect
the United States and its allies from weapons of mass destruction
(WMD). It assumes that the main threat is coming from missiles,
which could transport nuclear, chemical or biological warheads.
The author has argued that delivery of biological and chemical
agents this way is extremely inefficient and highly improbable
[2]. The main danger is originating from nuclear warheads. They
are getting so compact that countries of concern or terrorists
can choose many other ways for transportation.
Whatever the load the warhead contains, an intercept
with a kill vehicle can cause two effects, which are rarely discussed
in detail: Firstly, it can destroy either the propulsion part
of the weapon (if any is still connected with the warhead), or
the warhead itself, or both. Secondly, it could leave the warhead
intact, but gives an additional momentum to it, causing a deviation
of its trajectory.
Can warhead destruction always considered to be
an advantage or can it have detrimental effects?
The destruction of the warhead will leave debris
behind, which will essentially follow the original trajectory.
The parts will hit ground somewhere. Since an intercept will happen
at high altitude, chemical or biological material will be distributed
over wide space. The agent will probably not have severe effects
on humans, since its density at ground level will not reach the
necessary, critical value to cause adverse health effects. An
exception might be with plutonium, where strong negative long-term
effects at ground level might be expected.
In case the warhead remains intact and its trajectory
is changed in an unpredictable way, effects during landing at
another than the originally targeted place may be advantageous
or not for the attacked country.
4. Who should make decisions?
Clemenceau once said: Modern war is too serious
a business to entrust it to soldiers. This statement could be
modified and enlarged: "Preparation for peace through building
of defense systems is too serious a business to be handled by
military heroes, since it may lead to modern war."
The 20th century has seen already one hero as statesman,
Adolf Hitler, who considered himself as the greatest strategist
of all times (Grösster Feldherr aller Zeiten). The world
experienced the consequences of his 'leadership'. The 21st century
needs diplomats and not heroes, heads of state who are able to
address questions of the international economy, market interventions,
unanticipated crisis, all by peaceful methods.
Fortunately, no decision on NMD had been made during
the Clinton administration [24, 25]. However, the probability
for a rush into failure at the beginning of the Bush administration
looms on the horizon. A starting point of the new government could
have been to limit the influence of military people in the decision
making process. However, the choice of a military hero, General
Colin Powell, to head the State Department, points in the wrong
direction. General Powell is three things Mr. Bush is not: a war
hero, worldly wise and beloved by Afro-Americans. That gives him
a great deal of leverage. It means that Mr. Bush can never allow
him to resign in protest over anything. The Bush team will be
serious about what the Clinton team was not serious about, which
is about intervening militarily [26]. This is the way generals
are trained for.
There should be an open discussion within the largest
existing military pact, the NATO, on its necessity after the end
of the Cold War and of its eventual dissolution. Building new
defense systems should not jeopardize disarmament treaties. In
particular the cornerstone, the ABM Treaty, should be maintained.
For some four decades, deterrence was at the center
of U.S. defense policy. There were three important features to
it. First, it sounded robust without being reckless. Second it
was hard to think of a better way to make sense of a nuclear inventory.
Third, it seemed to work. A re-evaluation started with Reagan's
Strategic Defense Initiative, which was based on the idea that
it was better 'to protect than avenge'. The problem with NMD is
that it is likely to aggravate other problems, in particular the
already tense relations with Russia and China. Worse, it could
provide an illusion of security that, if ever tested, might come
tragically apart. It may be wise to use deterrent threats only
sparingly, but it can hardly make sense never use them at all
[28.29].
Many prominent scientists should reevaluate, if
deemed necessary, their assessment of SDI and extend it to NMD.
Scientists in the big weapon laboratories should be given tasks
that are addressing more urgent problems of society, such as changes
in means of energy production, protection of the environment,
to name a few challenging tasks. Scientific evaluation, like the
one that had been done by a group of prominent experts in the
case of SDI, should get more weight than the judgement of military
heroes.
Should the American government pay more attention
to the will of the people? Answers during a recent poll in the
U.S. [18] on the question "Which of the following do you
think is the most important issue facing the country today: Education,
Medicare, health care, fight crimes/drugs, economic growth, crack
down on illegal guns, cut taxes, strong military, national missile
defense?" show that NMD has an extremely low priority of
1 percent, and a strong military a marginal 4 percent. This overwhelming
disinterest is a clear sign that the drive for NMD is to search
elsewhere. A good candidate may be the military-industrial complex.
5. Conclusion
There are an infinite number of better and necessary
actions to be taken by any responsible government than to build
the equivalent of a "National Missile Defense", that
has a high chance not to work at all. Not long ago a well-known
physicist had to testify on the feasibility and efficiency of
such a system during a hearing at an U.S. Senate's Committee.
He had been asked if NMD would work. It is reported that he thought
for a short while, then came up with a resounding "YES",
and after a pause he added, "provided the adversary collaborates."
Even such an answer seems to me still too optimistic.
6. References:
[1] Hero as Statesman, Political Leadership in
Military Defense
Edited by John P. Craven
Readings for Leaders, Harland Cleveland, Volume I
Hubert H. Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs, University Press
of America, 1988
[2] The Concept of Weapons of Mass Destruction:
Chemical and Biological Weapons, Use in Warfare, Impact on Society
and Environment,
Gert G. Harigel
Seventh ISODARCO-Beijing Seminar on Arms Control, Xi'an, October
8-13, 2000,
[3] Report to The American Physical Society of
the study group on Science and Technology of Directed Energy Weapons
N. Bloembergen, C.K.N. Patel, P. Avizonis, R.G. Clem, A. Hertzberg,
T.H. Johnson, T. Marshall, R.B. Miller, W.E. Morrow, E.E. Salpeter,
A.M. Sessler, J.D. Sullivan, J.C. Wyant, A. Yariv, R.N. Zare,
A.J. Glass, L.C. Hebel
Reviews of Modern Physics, Vol.59, No.3, Part II, July 1987, S0-
S201
[4] Space-Strike Arms and International Security,
Report of the Committee of Soviet Scientists for Piece, Against
the Nuclear Threat, Moscow October 1985
[5] Physics and Technical Aspects of Laser and
Particle Beam Weapons for Strategic Defense,
R.L. Garwin,
1986, submitted to Physikalische Blätter
[6] Software Aspects of Strategic Defense Systems,
David Lorge Parnass,
American Scientist, Volume 73, 432-440, September-October 1985
[7] Aspin Confirms Deception Plan Existed to Promote
SDI Program
Dunbar Lockwood
Arms Control Today, October 1993, pg. 18
[8] Strategic 'Deception' Initiative
John Pike
Arms Control Today, November 1993, pp. 3-8
[9] The Patriot Myth: Caveat Emptor
John Conyers, Jr.
Arms Control Today, November 1992, pp. 3-10
[10] The Patriot Debate: Part 2, Letter to the
Editor
Frank Horten
Arms Control Today, January/February 1993, pp. 26/27
Author's Response,
Arms Control Today, January/February 1993, pp. 27, 29
[11] The Patriot Debate: Part 3, Letter to the
Editor
Theodore A. Postol and George N. Lewis
Arms Control Today, March 1993, pg. 24
[12] Defense Mechanisms
Kosta Tsipis
The Sciences, November/December 2000, pp. 18-23
[13] Theater Missile Defense Programs: Status and
Prospects
John Pike
Arms Control Today, September 1994, pp. 11-14
[14] The Clinton Plan for Theater Missile Defenses:
Costs and Alternatives
David Mosher and Raymond Hall
Arms Control Today, September 1994, pp. 15-20
[15] Boost-Phase Intercept: A Better Alternative
Richard L. Garwin
Arms Control Today, September 2000, pp. 8-11
[16] Missile Defense: The View From the Other Side
of the Atlantic
Camille Grand
Arms Control Today, September 2000, pp. 12-18
[17] A Pause in Unilateralism?
Jack Mendelsohn
Arms Control Today, October 2000, pp. 21-23
[18] No Pressure From the People
Mark S. Mellman, Adam Burns, Sam Munger
Arms Control Today, October 2000, pp. 19, 20, 23
[19] Security: The Bottom Line
Jack F. Matlock, Jr.
Arms Control Today, October 2000, pp. 17, 18, 24
[20] Facing the China Factor
Banning Garrett
Arms Control Today, October 2000, pp. 14-16
[21] Ballistic Missile Defense: Is the U.S. 'Rushing
to Failure'?
John Pike
Arms Control Today, April 1998, pp. 9-13
[22] Mixed Results in U.S. TMD Tests
Wade Boese
Arms Control Today, September 2000, pg. 29
[23] Officials Testify on National Missile Defense,
Assess Program
Wade Boese
Arms Control Today, October 2000, pp. 25, 29
[24] National Missile Defense, the ABM Treaty And
the Future of START II
Arms Control Association press conference,
Arms Control Today, November/December 1998, pp. 3-10
[25] Where Do We Go From Here?
Harold Brown
Arms Control Today, October 2000, pp. 12-13
[26] Powell, a Serious Man to Be Tested Before
Long
Thomas L. Friedman
International Herald Tribune, December 20, 2000
[27] Does Deterrence Have a Future?
Lawrence Freedman
Arms Control Today, October 2000, pp. 3-8
[28] Finding the Right Path
Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
Arms Control Today, October 2000, pp. 11, 24
Years "Efficient lifetime"
of defense systems
2000 - -------------- Chinese Great Wall - Huns
1000 -
500 -
---- Upgraded Great Wall - Traitor
200 - -- Roman Limes -- Complete metal armor - Horses unprotected
Alemanni --- Castles in Europe - Gun powder
100 -
50 -
20 -
Antiaircraft canons - Planes too high
10 - -- Maginot Line - Attack from behind
5 - - German West Wall - limited efficiency
('Siegfried Line')
- Atlantic Wall - Disembarkation in Normandy
2 -
- SDI - Scientists
1 -
0.5 - - Safeguard ABM - Maintenance cost
0.2 - NMD ?
Decoys Jamming Cooling
of radars of missiles
0.1
500 500 1000 1500 1800 1900 1950 1980 1990 1995 1998 2000
BC AC Year
Forum on
"The Missile Threat and Plans for Ballistic Missiles Defense:
Technology, Strategic Stability and Impact on Global Security"
Istituto Diplomatico "Mario Toscano"
and Parliament, Library Room "Il Refettorio"
Rome, Italy, 18-19 January 2001
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