Depleted
Uranium Weapons -
a Threat to Human Health?
by Gert Harigel, November 2001
The use of Depleted Uranium (DU) Weapons
in the Gulf War, and more recently in the Balkan Wars, has drawn
a lot of attention.
This short review will explain what is DU, for
what purpose DU weapons have been manufactured, and how many of
them were used, first in the Gulf War and then later on in the
Balkan Wars in Herzegovina and Kosovo.
Widespread leukemia and other ailments have
been claimed in the media. They were mostly attributed to the
radioactivity of DU and partially to the chemical effects of the
heavy metal. A critical analysis of these claims needs a brief
review of basic physics and relevant radiation regulations as
well as legal limits on toxic chemicals. How is DU ammunition
dispersed on impact, and how can minute particles find their way
into the human body. Possible health risks will be put in perspective
and compared with other risks in war and in daily life. The question
is raised, if DU weapons can be called still conventional or if
they fit better the definition of radiological and chemical weapons.
DU weapons and their "efficiency" have to be
seen also in the context of treaties on so-called weapons of mass
destruction (WMDs), which are signed and even ratified, but do
not yet have an implementation procedure or the political will
to enact.
1. What is Depleted Uranium (DU)?
1.1 Activity of Uranium Ore Before and After
Extraction
Uranium is a chemical element that is more abundant
than silver, gold, mercury and cadmium and is contained by 2 to
4 millionths in the Earth's crust. It can be found on surface
and in ore mines in many countries, among them Zaire, South Africa,
and Canada and also in the Czech Republic. One ton of ore contains
on the average about 3 kg of uranium.
Uranium comes essentially in three isotopic forms.
Isotopes are any of two or more forms of an element having the
same atomic number (i.e. the same chemical property) but different
atomic weights due to a different number of neutrons in the nucleus.
Natural uranium contains 99.274% of 238U, 0.720% of
235U, and 0.0055% of 234U, they all have
92 protons in the nucleus, but 146, 143 and 142 neutrons, respectively.
The half-life of 238U, 235U, and 234U
is 4.49·109, 7.10·108, and
2.48·105 years, respectively, ranging from
billion to million years. The longer the half-life the less radioactive
decay products appear in a given time interval and could effect
human health. When uranium is dug out of the Earth its radioactive
decay products come along. However, in the chemical process of
uranium extraction of the three isotopes from the ore, all radioactive
daughter products in the radioactive decay series' 238U
and 235U are eliminated, with the exception of the
radiogenic isotope 234U.
In short, radiation background in mines and in
extraction facilities is different and so are the health risks.
There is an extensive evidence of excess lung cancers in underground
uranium miners caused by the decay products of the radioactive
gas radon (222Rn). But uranium mill workers
have not shown increased mortality or excess lung cancers despite
their increased exposure to uranium dust and radon decay products.
There is no obvious explanation for this difference.
1.2 Enriched and Depleted Uranium
The extraction of energy from uranium for peaceful
or military purposes asks for well-defined ratios of the two isotopes.
In order to sustain the chain reaction of nuclear fission, uranium
has to be enriched by the fissible isotope 235U to
a reactor grade of 3.2 - 3.6% or weapon grade
(90%+) uranium. This process not only produces the enriched
product, but also a waste stream depleted in 235U,
typically to less than 0.3%, which is often called the tail. The
235U content in the depleted uranium in the U.S. are
lowered to 28% of its content in natural uranium.
Depleted uranium is a byproduct of uranium enrichment
process, with a relatively small contribution from reprocessing
of nuclear spent fuel. In addition to the 3 natural isotopes 238U,
235U, and 234U, depleted uranium from this
latter source also contains a minute quantity (0.003%) of a man-made
isotope 236U. The specific activity of DU is 15,902
Bq/gram (for definitions of radioactive units see annex). Traces
of 236U were found in Kosovo after the war and gave
rise to - unjustifiable - concern in various press reports.
Based on the measured isotopic composition of
depleted uranium, the total activity (a-particles = helium nuclei,
b-particles = electrons, g-rays) can be calculated as 22% less
and the a-activity as 43% less compared to natural uranium.
The gaseous diffusion process for enrichment of
the fissible isotope 235U is used in the United States.
This process requires uranium in the form of uranium hexafluoride
(UF6), primarily because the compound can be used in the gas form
for processing, in the liquid form for filling containers, and
in the solid form for storage. At atmospheric pressure, UF6 is
solid at temperatures below 57°C and a gas above this temperature.
Workers in metal processing plants, including
those who make DU penetrators, do not exhibit increased mortality
or excess cancers.
2. Application of DU
Depleted Uranium is a low cost material that is
readily available, since it was produced during the separation
of weapon grade uranium. The Department of Energy in the U.S.,
as of June 1998, is in possession of almost 3/4 of a million
metric tons (725·103 tons) stockpile of
depleted uranium hexafluoride. This corresponds to a total
activity of 527,000 Ci and a-activity 193,000 Ci. The
a-activity per mass amounts to 0.389 mCi/kg.
Depleted uranium's high density (19.05 g/cm3,
1.7 times more than 11.35 g/cm3 for lead) and its high
atomic number Z = 92 also provide useful solution for g-radiation
shielding. It has been used at various occasions at particle accelerators,
e.g. at CERN in the UA2 detector.
Control surfaces on wide body aircraft require
heavy counterweights. Tungsten (with density 19.3 g/cm3)
or DU is ideal materials for this application where volume constraints
prohibit the use of less dense metals. An airplane such as Boeing
747 needs 1,500 kg of counterweight. However, DU for this purpose
gets out of fashion due to a few accidents and problems with surface
embrittlement.
2.1 DU Ammunition
The US Army considered high-density materials such
as tungsten and DU as metal in kinetic energy penetrators and
tank armor already in the early 1970's. DU was ultimately selected
due to its availability and pyrophoricity. While 50% of
tungsten has to be imported, mainly from China (US$ 150/kg in
1980), DU is provided for free to arms manufacturers. Tungsten
also has much higher melting point than uranium and lacks pyrophoricity.
DU penetrators contain no explosives; they act only by
impact and immediate ignition of the dust (500°C). Conventional
ammunition does not penetrate DU armor, however DU projectiles
are capable of piercing it.
2.2 Proliferation of DU Weapons
The United States is no longer the only country
with DU munitions. 17 countries including Britain, France, Russia,
Greece, Turkey, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Egypt, Kuwait,
Pakistan, Thailand, South Korea, Taiwan, and other countries have
acquired depleted uranium weapons. Probably NATO countries will
follow soon. These weapons were extensively tested on at least
14 sites in the U.S. and also in Britain.
As of early 1994 already more than 1.6 million
tank penetrators and 55 million small caliber penetrators had
been manufactured in the U.S. and another 200 million rounds (some
part made out of tungsten) had been ordered by 1998. The approximate
cost per shell of a 120-mm tank round is US$ 3,300, implying that
handling of DU and manufacturing of ammunition takes the lion's
share, whereas the material itself comes almost for free.
3. Combat and Accidents
The US military used depleted uranium ammunition
on the battlefield for the first time during the Gulf War in 1991.
The amount of DU munitions released in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and
Iraq during the Operation Desert Storm totals to
860,550 rounds and corresponds to 294,500 kg DU, for a total activity
of 312 Ci and a-activity of 115 Ci. In addition, 9,720 DU aircraft
rounds and 660 DU tank rounds (6,430 kg of DU) burned as a result
of a monstrous fire in the ammunition storage area and motor pool
at the US Army base in Kuwait.
Data on the use of DU ammunition are still less
well known for the war in Bosnia in 1994-1995 and in Kosovo in
1999. They are estimated to 11,000 and 31,000 rounds, corresponding
to a total of 10,000 kg of DU.
4. Effects of Depleted Uranium
4.1 Effects of DU Penetrator Impact
When a depleted uranium penetrator impacts armor,
18 - 70% of the penetrator rod will burn and oxidize into dust.
The DU oxide aerosol formed during the impact has 50 - 96% of
respirable size particles (with diameter less than 10 mm, conditions
very similar to "desirable" particle size for efficiency
in chemical or biological warfare), and 17 - 48% of those particles
are soluble in water. Particles generated from impact of a hard
target are virtually all respirable. While the heavier non-respirable
particles settle down rapidly, the respirable DU aerosol remains
airborne for hours.
The solubility of the uranium particles determines
the rate at which the uranium moves from the site of internalization
(lungs for inhalation, gastrointestinal tract for ingestion, or
the injury site for wound contamination) into the blood stream.
About 70% of the soluble uranium in the blood stream are excreted
in urine within 24 hours without being deposited in any organ
and the remainder primarily depositing in the kidneys and bones.
The kidney is the organ most sensitive to depleted uranium toxicity.
When DU particles of respirable size are inhaled, roughly 25%
of the particles become trapped in the lungs, where the insoluble
particles can remain for years. Approximately 25% of the inhaled
DU is exhaled (particle diameters between 1 and 5 mm) and the
remaining 50% is subsequently swallowed.
4.2 Radiological effects
4.2.1 The Regulations
The International Commission on Radiological
Protection (ICRP) recommends and the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission in the US (NRC) mandates an occupational
annual dose equivalent for the whole body no more than
5 rem/year and no more than 10 rem in 5 years. No short-term
health effects are detectable at this dose equivalent.
The non-occupational annual dose
equivalent limit for the general public is selected as 100 mrem/year,
which is comparable to the average background of 363 mrem/year.
There are well-defined legal limits for inhalation
and digestion of DU.
4.2.2 Calculated and measured doses
The impact of one 120-mm tank round with the 5.35
kg DU penetrator on an armored target, with 18 - 70% of the penetrator
rod oxidizing into aerosol, is taken as an example. The initial
contaminated area from the impact of one DU tank round inaccessible
to general public (50 m radius circle) is about 0.8 hectares.
If contamination spreads with weather elements up to 38 hectares
become inaccessible to general public, with 0.9 nCi/m2
the allowed surface contamination for general public.
The air contamination after the impact and before
the DU dust settles can be estimated to maximum of soluble
uranium 16 times higher than the NRC limit for radiation workers
and 3,500 times higher than the allowed air concentration for
general public. The maximum air concentration of insoluble uranium
is 800 times higher than the NRC limit for radiation workers and
180,000 times higher than the allowed air concentration for general
public.
The residual contamination in Iraq 8 years after
the end of the Golf War in the oil fields north of Kuwait was
measured. It showed radiation levels 35 times above the background
over parts of the battlefield and 50 times above the background
over the rusting tanks hit by DU ammunition.
The accumulated dose equivalent becomes significant
when spent but unexploded DU penetrators are worn by army personnel
as war souvenirs in direct contact with the skin (1,800 rem/year)
or when used by children as toys. The skin dose equivalent limit
of 50 mrem/year for radiation workers would be reached in about
10 days.
4.3 Chemical Toxicity
4.3.1 Uranium Effects on Kidney
The RAND review on radiological and toxic
effects of uranium puts the overall maximum permissible concentration,
i.e. concentration of metal in the kidney associated with no significant
increase in the frequency of kidney malfunction, at 3 mg/kg of
kidney for uranium and calls it a de facto standard.
Soluble uranium, which is absorbed in the blood
circulation within the body, is eliminated rapidly through the
kidney in urine. About 67% are excreted within the first day without
being deposited in any organ. Approximately 11% is initially deposited
in the kidney and excreted with a 15-day half-life. Most of the
remaining 22% is initially deposited in the bone (up to 20%),
which is the principle storage site in the body, and the rest
is distributed to other organs and tissues.
The Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) established occupational limits for inhalation of heavy
metals. The values for tungsten, lead, uranium in soluble form
are 1, 0.05, and 0.05 mg/m3, for insoluble form 5,
0.10, and 0.25 mg/m3, respectively. Current Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) standards set the values at 44 mg/l for
groundwater and 20 mg/l for drinking water.
4.4.2 Gulf War Illness
An estimate for exposure of a veteran from the
Gulf War is difficult to make and studies on the illness came
not yet to a final conclusion. More than 10,000 veterans (out
of a total of 695,000) reported mysterious illnesses, like muscle
and joint pain, chronic fatigue, depressed immune systems, neurological
disorders, memory loss, chemical sensitivities, rashes. They may
have exceeded the OSHA limit for inhalation of DU by a factor
of 3 and the ATSDR minimal risk level intake for general public
by 17 times.
Many factors may have contributed to the ailments,
such as·
- Multiple vaccinations against anthrax and botulinum
toxoid
- Medical treatment with pyridostigmine bromide
to counter effects of potential chemical exposure
- Petroleum from oil fire
- Pesticide and insect repellants
- Tropical parasites such as leishmaniasis
- Depleted uranium dust and shrapnel from DU ammunition
and armor.
It is not clear to which extend DU contributed
to the reported illnesses.
However, there is ample evidence to show that contact
with DU ammunition had consequences, especially for children,
among them an increase of childhood leukemia in southern Iraqi
provinces by a factor of 3 between 1989 - 93, while in the
Central Provinces the incidence remained normal. Local concentrations
of DU may have been exceedingly high producing this high incidence
of leukemia.
It appears premature to attribute reported illnesses
of military personnel to effects of DU ammunition in Kosovo. In
Kosovo, similar to Iraq, many parameters may have played a role
in producing symptoms, that could be also attributed to the release
of chemicals after bombing of factories.
A study of possible health effects has been made
[2], assuming that 100 tons of DU were distributed uniformly
over a one-kilometer-wide strip along 100 kilometers on the
"Highway of Death" between Kuwait City and Basra, a
city in southern Iraq [2]. Under this assumption average dose
for someone who lived in the area for a year would be about one
millirem - or about 10 percent of the dose from uranium and its
decay products already naturally occurring in the soil. The authors
came to the conclusion that an individual's estimated added risk
of dying from cancer from such a dose would be about one in 20,000.
The doses for heavy metal effects are probably also far below
the exposure limits set by OSHA. However, since no exposure and
urine tests had been done for two years after the war, it is now
too late to draw any conclusions.
5. Comparison of DU with other risks
DU is a dangerous material when used as ammunition
in war fighting. Obviously, the driver of an armored tank
or vehicle, that is hit by a DU penetrator, has a high chance
to die from the blast and/or the heat immediately, and he is no
longer subject to the consequences of inhaling or digesting DU.
The spread of DU weighs on the environment and
the population, civil or military, in the vicinity of the impact
as a long-term consequence. For DU, and likewise for chemical,
biological or radiological weapons, the local concentration and
time constants of the dispersed material play the important
role.
The legal limit for exposure to chemicals and radioactivity
is set such, that values just beyond are not detrimental to human
health or the environment. Only an excess value by order(s) of
magnitude should give rise to serious concern.
The consequences of the use of DU ammunition pale
in comparison with the other direct and indirect effects of war.
As an example may serve the estimated 30,000 unexploded fragmentation
bomblets lying on Kosovo's ground, adding substantial danger to
the not yet cleared land mines.
In order to put the danger from radioactive exposure
into perspective the following example may be instructive.
The risks associated with radioactivity and irradiation
in general are, usually, measured in Sieverts. For most people,
even scientists, this unit has no real meaning. Therefore, following
a suggestion [3], a comparison is made with the risk with similar
consequence of producing cancer. Cigarette smoking is such a case.
The data are based on the following dose-effect relations: 0.04
lethal cancers per Sievert, 1 lethal cancer per eighty thousand
cigarette packs.
| Comparison between effects of some irradiation
exposures and cigarette smoking |
| |
Annual dose in millisieverts |
Equivalent number of annual cigarette packs |
| Natural total irradiation |
3 |
9 |
| Radon |
2 |
6 |
| Cosmic Rays |
0.3 |
0.9 |
| Medical X-rays |
0.4 |
1.2 |
| Comparison of allowed doses of irradiation
to effects of cigarette smoking |
| |
Maximum allowed dose in millisieverts/year
|
Equivalent in cigarette packs/year |
| Professionals |
20 |
60 |
| Public |
1 |
3 |
6. Conclusions
Depleted uranium produced as a by-product of uranium
enrichment is classified as radioactive and toxic waste and it
is subjected to numerous regulations for handling and disposal.
Yet the US regulatory limits for general public exposure are exceeded
- at least locally and temporarily - up to five orders of magnitude
for airborne radioactive emissions and up to 3 orders of magnitude
for residual radioactive contamination when DU ammunition has
been used in battlefield. The use of DU ammunition, perhaps the
most effective new weapon, was not publicly revealed until a year
after the Gulf War. These weapons have an indiscriminate character
and can have adverse health effects not only on combatants but
also on the population at large. Precautions could have been taken
to limit possible health effects for the combatants and the civil
population, and immediate medical tests could have removed a lot
of ambiguities of the effects of DU ammunition.
Cancer can be the expected long-term consequence
of both the radiological and toxic effects of depleted uranium
exposure, albeit with an extremely low probability.
In 1996 the UN Subcommittee on Prevention of Discrimination
and Protection of Minorities passed a resolution in which they
"urged all States to be guided in their national policies
by the need to curb production and spread of weapons of mass destruction
or with indiscriminate effect, in particular nuclear weapons,
chemical weapons, fuel-air bombs, napalm, cluster bombs, biological
weaponry, and weaponry containing depleted uranium".
If nothing else, the double standard for DU in
radiation protection and handling of low radioactive waste in
the civilian sector on one hand and by the military on the battlefield
on the other is morally and legally untenable.
The manufacturing and use of DU weapons is a new
man-made problem that should be addressed by the international
community on an appropriate level. However, it pales compared
to major, other unsolved problems in arms control. There is not
yet an implementation program for the biological weapons convention
(BWC, ratified in 1972!)! The elimination of enormous stockpiles
of chemical weapons may take decades, but there is at least a
working implementation body of the Chemical Weapons Convention
(CWC). The number of nuclear warheads does not shrink, only some
of their delivery vehicles are being discarded, slowly approaching
the limit set in the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II).
The Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) is in danger to be discarded,
the Test-Ban Treaty (TBT) is not yet ratified by all Nuclear Weapon
States (NWSs), and major possessors of land mines have not signed
up to the Ottawa Treaty.
7. Some Selected References
[1] Review of Radioactivity, Military Use, and
Health Effects of Depleted Uranium
Compiled by Vladimir S. Zajik, July 1999
http://members.tripod.com/vzajic/
[2] After the dust settles
Steve Fetter & Frank von Hippel
The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, November/December 1999, pp.
42-45
[3] Global warming or nuclear waste - which
do we want?
H. Nifenecker and E. Huffer
europhysics news March/April 2001, pp. 52- 55
Some radiation units:
1 Curie = 1 [Ci] = 37·109 decays/second
or
= 37·109 Becquerel = 37·109 [Bq]
1 milliCurie-of-intensity-hour = 1 Sievert = 1 [Sv]
1 Sievert corresponds approximately to 8.38 Roentgen
1 rem = roentgen equivalent man
The dose equivalents for the uranium isotopes 238U,
235U, and 234U and their decay products
uniformly distributed in the whole body are 1.28, 1.30, 1.32 [(mrem/year)/(pCi/kg)].
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