Non-Proliferation
Treaty Stays Alive - for now
by David Krieger*, September 2000
With the exception of a few cloistered
academics, almost no one would seriously argue that the spread
of nuclear weapons would make the world a safer place. Most individuals,
including policy makers, understand that it is essential to future
security to keep nuclear weapons from spreading. Based on this
understanding, the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was put forward
and signed by the US, UK and USSR (three countries with nuclear
weapons) in 1968. The Treaty entered into force in 1970. Since
then the Non-Proliferation Treaty has become the centerpiece of
international efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.
Currently there are only four countries in the world that have
not signed and ratified the NPT: India, Israel, Pakistan and Cuba.
The first three of these have nuclear weapons.
At the heart of the NPT is a basic bargain: the
countries without nuclear weapons agree not to acquire or otherwise
develop these weapons in exchange for the nuclear weapons states
agreeing to engage in good faith efforts to eliminate their arsenals.
This bargain is found in Article VI of the Treaty, which calls
for "good faith" negotiations on nuclear disarmament.
Many of the non-nuclear weapons states have complained over the
years that the nuclear weapons states have not upheld their end
of the bargain.
In 1995, when the Treaty was extended indefinitely
after powerful lobbying by the nuclear weapons states, these states
promised the "determined pursuit" of systematic and
progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally with the
ultimate goal of their elimination. Over the next five years,
however, these countries continued to rely upon their nuclear
arsenals to the dismay of many countries without nuclear weapons.
When the five-year Non-Proliferation Treaty Review
Conference was held in April and May 2000, the parties to the
Treaty, including the nuclear weapons states, agreed to take a
number of "practical steps" to implement promises under
Article VI of the Treaty. Thirteen steps were listed. I would
like to highlight just two. The first of these is an "unequivocal
undertaking by the nuclear weapons States to accomplish the total
elimination of their nuclear arsenals...." The second is
"early entry into force and full implementation of START
II [Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II] and the conclusion of
START III as soon as possible while preserving and strengthening
the ABM [Anti-Ballistic Missile] Treaty as a cornerstone of strategic
stability and as a basis for further reductions of strategic offensive
weapons...."
The "unequivocal undertaking" is language
that the New Agenda Coalition (Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico,
New Zealand, Sweden and South Africa) has been pressing for, along
with practical steps to achieve "the total elimination"
of nuclear weapons. In essence this commitment is a reaffirmation
of what the nuclear weapons states promised many years ago when
they first signed the Treaty in 1968.
Moving forward with START II and START III are
also in the offing. After many years, the Russian Duma finally
ratified START II, and President Putin has indicated that he is
prepared to proceed with reductions to 1,000 to 1,500 strategic
nuclear warheads in START III. The US has responded for inexplicable
reasons that it is only prepared to discuss reductions to the
2,500 level at this point, a response hardly in keeping with its
promises to pursue good faith efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons
globally.
An even greater problem, however, lies in US determination
to deploy a National Missile Defense. It can hardly do this and
keep its promise of "preserving and strengthening" the
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. The US has been trying unsuccessfully
to convince the Russians that the ABM Treaty should be amended
to allow the US to deploy a National Missile Defense. However,
this is exactly what the ABM Treaty was designed to prevent, based
on the reasoning that a strong defense would lead to further offensive
arms races, and the Russians want nothing to do with altering
the ABM Treaty.
US officials have told the Russians that the National
Missile Defense that the US seeks to deploy is aimed not at them,
but at "states of concern" (the new US name for states
they formerly referred to as "rogue states"). These
officials have actually encouraged the Russians to keep their
nuclear armed missiles on hair-trigger alert and not reduce the
size of their arsenal below START III levels in order to be able
to successfully overcome a US National Missile Defense. In their
eagerness to promote the National Missile Defense, these officials
are actually encouraging Russian policies that will make an accidental
or unintended nuclear war more likely. Russia is not buying this,
and has made clear that if the US proceeds with deployment of
a National Missile Defense, thereby abrogating the ABM Treaty,
Russia will withdraw from START II and the Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty.
US insistence on proceeding with a National Missile
Defense will be even more destabilizing in Asia. The Chinese have
made clear that their response to US deployment of a National
Missile Defense will require them to further develop their nuclear
forces (at present the Chinese have only 20 nuclear armed missiles
capable of reaching US territory). Should China increase its nuclear
capabilities, India is likely to follow suit and Pakistan would
likely follow India. How Japan, North Korea, South Korea and Taiwan
would respond remain large question marks.
At the recent Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference
the US committed itself to "preserving and strengthening"
the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. US plans to move forward with
a National Missile Defense are incompatible with this promise.
If the US wants to uphold the Non-Proliferation Treaty and prevent
the disintegration of this Treaty, it must act in good faith.
This means finding another way to deal with potentially dangerous
states than building an unworkable, provocative and hugely expensive
missile defense system.
The 2000 NPT Review Conference offered some
promise of progress on nuclear disarmament. Unfortunately, the
fine words Final Document of the Conference notwithstanding, this
promise will be dashed if the US continues in its foolhardy and
quixotic attempt to put a shield over its head. Such a course
will lead only to a leaky umbrella and global nuclear chaos. A
far safer course for the US would be to carry out its promise
of seeking "the total elimination" of the world's nuclear
arsenals. Without US leadership this will not happen. With US
leadership a nuclear weapons free world could become a reality
in fairly short order. It is past time for this issue to enter
the public arena and move up on the public agenda. The American
people deserve to become part of this decision which will so dramatically
affect their future and the future of the planet.
*David Krieger
is president of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation.
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