Combating Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
July 1999

Report of the Commission to Assess the Organization of the Federal Government to Combat the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Pursuant to Public Law 293, 104th Congress, July 14, 1999

Executive Summary

Every American should understand that weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and their means of delivery -- pose a grave threat to the United States and to our military forces and our vital interests abroad. The most serious threats are:

• Terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction against the United States or its allies;
• Possession of, and the manufacturing infrastructure for, WMD by Iran, Iraq, North Korea, or other unfriendly states;
• Diversion of WMD-related weapons, technology, materials, and expertise from Russia;
• Transfer of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, delivery means, and technology by China; and
• Destabilizing consequences of WMD programs in the Middle East, South Asia, and East Asia.

These threats define a chilling new reality for our country. Their magnitude and reality require anew strategy focused not just on prevention, but also on combating all aspects of proliferation, to include impeding the spread of capability, responding to proliferation as it occurs, strengthening our capacity to defend against such weapons, and preparing to respond if these weapons are used against us at home or abroad.

Congress established this Commission to assess the organization of the Federal Government with regard to WMD proliferation and to make recommendations for improvements. The task is formidable. Proliferation is related to catastrophic terrorism, infrastructure protection, and espionage. Many separate government agencies that have overlapping jurisdiction are involved. Combating proliferation requires actions both at home and abroad, both unilateral and with other nations and international organizations. The Commission finds that the US Government is not effectively organized to combat proliferation.

This report makes many recommendations, including particular ones for each agency involved. Together, the recommendations aim to bring about four major changes:

Presidential leadership is essential to ensure that a strategy for combating proliferation is formulated, understood, and implemented by the many agencies involved. The President should consider assigning the Vice President a special role in the National Security Council to ensure that adequate attention and resources are devoted to WMD proliferation.

Central direction and coordination. A new post of National Director for Combating Proliferation should be established. The National Director would operate within the National Security Council structure and would chair a new Combating Proliferation Council. The Council, composed of senior-level officials designated by each agency, would formulate policy, reach timely decisions, and harmonize the interagency process of program execution and resource allocation in accordance with an integrated national plan.

Improved execution of policies and programs by responsible agencies. Each agency must adjust its internal organization, programs, and resources in ways that reinforce an integrated government-wide effort to combat proliferation. The Commission's specific recommendations primarily address process and operations. In the case of the Department of Defense, we recommend major changes in reporting relationships. We endorse changes proposed for the Department of Energy.

Integrated planning and budgeting of resources. There is no system for tracking resource expenditures for combating proliferation. Doing so is essential to an effective interagency effort. The Commission recommends the creation of a new budget sub-function for this purpose. The National Director should be charged with preparing government-wide plans, especially for technology development and acquisition, to combat proliferation. These plans should be designed to enable the Executive Branch and Congress to measure progress and assure that resources are applied effectively and flexibly to explicit program objectives and schedules.

We believe the adoption of the Commission report will reduce the risks to the American people from WMD proliferation. The Commission's recommendations promote:

• A national strategy that will more effectively employ a broader range of policy instruments in both bilateral and multilateral diplomacy, from export controls to foreign assistance;
• Greater efficiency, accountability, and capability for defense against and response to weapons of mass destruction, from biological agent detection to reducing the risk of leakage from the Russian nuclear stockpile;
• Better intelligence about the intentions and capabilities of proliferators;
• Enhanced capability to take timely and effective operational actions that could deter or prevent the use of WMD; and
• A more transparent process for tracking the application of resources to their intended purposes, coordinating agency efforts, and evaluating progress toward achieving clear program objectives.

The Commission does not assert that these changes, even if fully implemented, will "solve" the proliferation problem. We live in a dangerous world where hostile forces will seek to exploit WMD to their advantage and to threaten us, especially since a new WMD threat can arise with little or no warning. It is precisely because WMD pose this grave danger to us that the threat must be addressed with grit and determination, but also with the most effective and efficient organization this country can muster.

* The preceding section is the Executive Summary of a report (informally called the "Deutch Report on Proliferation") that was presented to US Congress on July 14, 1999.