IPPNW Calls for Nuclear Weapon-Free
Zone in Central and Eastern Europe
January 19, 1999

Preventing Nuclear Confrontation
A Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone in Central and Eastern Europe

Xanthe Hall, IPPNW
Speech to the Subcommittee on Security and Disarmament,
European Parliament, January 19th 1999

In October 1995, at a meeting in Berlin, the Russian affiliate of IPPNW reported that tension had reached a dangerous level in Russia, due to the perceived threat of NATO expansion. At worst they felt this could lead to a renewed Cold War, at best to a greater support for the opposition parties proposing rearmament. The meeting decided to take urgent action to prevent a build-up of confrontation by appealing to NATO and the Czech, Hungarian and Polish governments to consider a nuclear- weapon-free zone as an appropriate confidence building measure to help relieve tension with Russia. The IPPNW Board of Directors passed a corresponding resolution in December 1995 which has since provided the basis for further work, including the resolution before you.

Since that time my colleagues in IPPNW and I have visited the three new NATO member states-to-be, Russia, the United States, Britain and France and spoken to parliamentarians and ministers, officials of defence departments and foreign offices. We have lobbied NATO, European Parliamentarians, and officials in the European Union and Commission.

In all of these meetings we have proposed that NATO expansion is affecting the disarmament process detrimentally and that measures are needed to encourage Russian ratification of START II, as well as to prevent a new build-up of nuclear weapons, which could lead to a resumption of the arms race. Central to these measures is the proposal for a nuclear-weapon-free zone. Other measures include the abandonment of the hair-trigger alert status, introduction of a no first-use policy, return of US nuclear weapons to the USA, and the ending of nuclear sharing in NATO.

The call for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central and Eastern Europe must therefore be seen within the larger disarmament context, and is not an end in itself. Although it would of course be advantageous to simply secure nuclear-weapon-free status permanently in those countries which are presently nuclear weapon-free, the benefits of such a zone are wider-reaching. There are a number of areas in which such a zone could have a positive effect:

• the relationship to Russia
• on efforts to establish other nuclear-weapon-free zones
• on the relationship of the countries in Central and Eastern Europe to each other
• a "softening" of the divide created through future expansion of NATO and the EU
• a promotion of discussion of and search for answers to actual security needs of the region
• negotiation of negative security assurances for countries in the NWFZ

We have deliberately not listed the countries that might be in such a zone, since this could be counterproductive. We imagine that Ukraine and Belarus, both countries having proposed such a zone, would be willing to join it. On the Western side, Austria and Switzerland are potential members - in both countries there is intensive discussion on this issue, promoted by the peace movement. The Eastern half of Germany is already nuclear weapon-free by law - a result of the 2+4 Treaty that accompanied reunification. And few could be opposed to the idea that the Balkan region should be nuclear weapon-free. Establishing a nuclear weapon-free status in the Baltic States is essential to the relationship with Russia. The real sticking point, however, is the resistance of governments in the new NATO member states-to-be, although their populations are clearly against any deployment of nuclear weapons on their territory.

The key to this proposal, which is a long-term project, is the question of nuclear sharing in NATO. Many regard this as a violation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and complaints have been made to this effect. The United States has less than 200 free fall bombs deployed in European allied countries. Senator William Roth, President of the North Atlantic Assembly, wrote in a draft for the paper "NATO in the 21st Century" that:"Even in the extreme case of a newly antagonistic Russia, these free-fall bombs would likely be the least credible component of any Western response to a Russian military threat. The apparent conclusion is that, from a military perspective, the bombs are largely intended as place-holders, designed to keep open the option of deploying alternative systems for the US arsenal in support of NATO strategy." This paragraph is not contained in the final version of the paper. The question is, again from a military perspective, would not the US nuclear weapons on Trident submarines provide enough nuclear deterrence for the present security situation to enable these remaining substrategic weapons to be withdrawn from Europe? The answer is probably yes, but only if the NATO strategic concept, presently under discussion, reduces the role of nuclear weapons. Ending nuclear sharing would enable Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Germany to join negotiations of a nuclear-weapon-free zone, without fear of becoming second-class NATO members, as is at present the argument against.

April 1999 could be the watershed for future nuclear disarmament. Either NATO will reduce the role of nuclear weapons in the strategic concept or, alternatively, it will take on the new counterproliferation doctrine of the United States, which relies on an increased role for nuclear weapons in deterring other weapons of mass destruction. A call from the European Parliament for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central and Eastern Europe would add to the promotion of the former concept, rather than the latter.

Relationship to Russia

Since the announcement of the intention to expand NATO, the relationship to Russia has been deteriorating. Although the Founding Act between NATO and Russia appeared to have improved the relationship, many in Russia feel that it was simply a face-saving device for Yelzin and little more. The formulation in the Act on the deployment of nuclear weapons in new NATO member states has convinced hardly anybody that deployment is no longer an option, even if there is no intention or plan to do so. The Russian response has been alarming:

• a change of nuclear doctrine - the dropping of the Russian no-first use policy
• suggestion of possible plans to build thousands of small tactical nuclear weapons
• modernisation of Topol-M generation of strategic nuclear weapons
• extreme delay in the ratification of START II

Just as NATO repeatedly states in their documents that it has to view Russia as a potential enemy, the Russian military is surely advising its government simularly the other way round. General Naumann, Chairman of the NATO Military Representives Committee is fond of listing Russia's hardware and manpower and presenting it as a threat to NATO allies because of its economic and political instability. In the same way, many Russian politicians and military personnel point to NATO expansion, the US drive to expand NATO's nuclear deterrence to include all weapons of mass destruction, intervention or attack by NATO or the US without a UN mandate, and the increase in out-of-area activity, as constituting a threat to their security interests. There was never a time so ripe for a disarmament initiative or two.

Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones

Nuclear-weapon-free zones are generally regarded as a good thing. Many documents of the UN, OSCE, EU, and NPT Conferences welcome present NWFZs and promote the creation of further ones. The entire Southern hemisphere (unfortunately not including all oceans) is regulated by nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties. New ones are being called for in South East Asia, the Middle East, and Central Asia.

But many countries point to Europe and ask why, when this is also a region in conflict, is it regarded by some states as impossible to consider a nuclear-weapon-free zone here? Why should India and Pakistan consider it, if those who speak in favour of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South East Asia are not prepared to negotiate one in their own region?

Critics of the whole concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones say that they are discriminatory and could lead to a world where the nuclear apartheid of the NPT is underpinned by regional laws forbidding the acquisition of nuclear weapons, while the permanent five happily continue to threaten the world. The only answer to this criticism is a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Europe.

Expansion and Security in Central and Eastern Europe Countries on the other side of what is seen by them as the new divide, caused by negotiations over membership in NATO and the EU, say that non-membership increases instability. Whether membership increases stability in the long-run is debatable, but what is clear is that non-membership can mean the creation of a grey zone and leaves those countries open to other forces, particularly those of organised crime and the illegal arms trade. Security for such countries is a priority, particularly internal security. The lessons learnt from the OSCE mission in Bosnia show us that democratisation improves security and can be achieved through work with civil society on the ground. Although NATO may offer a military response to attack, it is unlikely that it could help bring stablility to countries without basic democratic structures, nor is it willing to do so. Conditions for membership include a democratic structure and lack of conflict with neighbours or with minorities living within the country.

Although the OSCE does a very good job in preventing conflict in many countries, assisting negotiation, and strengthening civil society, the question remains of the security relationship between members and non-members of the EU and NATO. The negotiations for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central and Eastern Europe would provide a structure within which many aspects of the security situation in the region could be considered. It could enable cross-over discussion between future members, candidates and non-members of NATO and the EU to settle any remaining border disputes and come to agreements on addressing their security problems effectively. Like most NWFZ treaties, the European one might include negative security assurances from the permanent five, which already exist in the context of the NPT, but would be legally strengthened.

Conclusion

The resolution you have before you is complementary to other resolutions that the European Parliament has passed on disarmament. The resolution on the New Agenda Coalition, subcritical testing and for the commencement of negotiations on a Nuclear Weapons Convention have all enormously helped the work of people seeking nuclear disarmament. In each of our countries, such resolutions enable us to show solid support for such initiatives. Equally, the work of persuading the Central and Eastern European states that a nuclear-weapon-free zone would benefit their security and promote disarmament by reducing tension with Russia, can be aided significantly through a European Parliament resolution.

A nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central and Eastern Europe should be viewed as a step towards a Europe ultimately completely free of nuclear weapons, including in Britain and France. Promotion of the idea through a public hearing and dialogue with other security institutions by the Sub-Committee will give support to voices in the East that seek a way out of the present escalation of tension between NATO and Russia, that still contains the threat of nuclear confrontation.