Nuclear Weapons:
The Global Dialogue
by David Krieger*, 1998
Nuclear weapons,
which might more appropriately be called "instruments of
genocide," are the ultimate weapons of mass annihilation.
Global dialogue, on the other hand, is an engaged series of communications
that seeks a deeper understanding and reconciliation of differences
as well as peaceful solutions to conflicts affecting the international
community. Nuclear weapons necessitate global dialogue.
Throughout the Nuclear Age, most of
the exchange on nuclear weapons within the nuclear weapons states
has been insular, technical and restricted to an elite group of
political, military, industrial and academic participants--hardly
a dialogue. It has been restricted to what kind of nuclear weapons
to create, how to deploy them, how they should be developed and
tested, and how many are needed. This non-dialogue has taken place
within national security establishments, generally behind closed
doors, with little public involvement. The result has been the
development of tens of thousands of nuclear weapons, reliance
on untestable theories of deterrence, and security policies with
the crudeness and finality of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD).
Even in democratic societies such as the U.S.,
Britain and France, the public has never been offered a significant
role in decisions on nuclear policy. The public has managed to
intrude itself in the discourse only in extreme circumstances.
One such circumstance occurred from the mid-1950s through the
early 1960s when the public, with leadership from men like Albert
Einstein, Linus Pauling, Bertrand Russell, and Albert Schweitzer,
became justifiably worried about the health effects of the atmospheric
testing of nuclear weapons. Public protests of atmospheric testing
in the U.S. and elsewhere led to the signing of the Partial Test
Ban Treaty, prohibiting the testing of nuclear weapons in the
oceans, the atmosphere and outer space.
In the U.S., the public again entered the discourse
on nuclear weapons issues in the early 1980s when Cold War rhetoric
reached alarming levels. Ronald Reagan was referring to the Soviet
Union as the "evil empire," and dialogue between the
leaders of the U.S. and the Soviet Union had all but vanished.
Large numbers of people became active in a campaign to freeze
nuclear arsenals as a first step towards nuclear disarmament.
Civic and religious organizations throughout the nation added
their voices in support of the freeze. On June 12, 1982 some one
million people gathered in New York in support of the nuclear
freeze movement.
In the mid-1980s, when the nuclear freeze movement
was active in the United States, Europeans were protesting the
deployment of U.S. cruise and Pershing missiles on their territories.
People throughout Europe feared that with the emplacement of these
nuclear-armed missiles on their soil, Europe would become the
primary battleground for a nuclear war between the U.S. and Soviet
Union.
Each of these periods of public involvement opened
the door to dialogue between the U.S. and Soviet governments on
arms control issues. Unfortunately, the governments chose to take
only small steps rather than significant strides. They ceased
atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons, but continued their testing
underground. In doing so, they immediately reduced the environmental
threat to humanity, but they failed to take the more important
step of ending the nuclear arms race. The nuclear freeze movement
led to a resumption of dialogue between the U.S. and the former
Soviet Union. Mikhail Gorbachev, a leader with surprising vision,
had become the head of the USSR. He and Ronald Reagan almost agreed
to the elimination of their nuclear arsenals at a face to face
meeting in Reykjavik, Iceland in 1986. For a few hours the two
leaders, without their national security subordinates, actually
engaged in a serious dialogue on eliminating their nuclear weapons.
In the end, they were unable to reach an accord due to President
Reagan's commitment to building a missile defense system. A few
years later, however, they began the process of strategic arms
reductions. The U.S. and USSR were also able to agree to the elimination
of all intermediate-range nuclear missiles, leading to the removal
of U.S. cruise and Pershing missiles from Europe.
Among governments in the international community,
a dialogue on nuclear weapons began almost immediately after the
use of nuclear weapons by the U.S. at the end of World War II.
The very first resolution of the United Nations in January 1946
called for the creation of an Atomic Energy Commission with the
task of eliminating nuclear weapons from national arsenals. Early
efforts to achieve the international control of nuclear weapons
at the United Nations failed, however, and the U.S. began atmospheric
testing of nuclear weapons in the Pacific in mid-1946. Three years
later the USSR began testing its own nuclear weapons.
In 1968 the international community reached agreement
on a treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. This
agreement defined two classes of states, those with nuclear weapons
prior to January 1, 1967, and all other states. In effect, this
treaty divided the world into nuclear "haves" (U.S.,
USSR, UK, France and China), and nuclear "have-nots"
(all other countries). It effectively established a system of
nuclear apartheid. In Article VI of this treaty, the nuclear weapons
states promised the other states that they would proceed with
good faith negotiations for nuclear disarmament. Today, 30 years
later, many non-nuclear weapons states rightfully question the
good faith of the nuclear weapons states.
In 1995 the dialogue on non-proliferation and disarmament
continued when the parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
held a review and extension conference. At this conference, the
nuclear weapons states sought an indefinite extension of the treaty,
and brought much pressure to bear on non-nuclear weapons states
to achieve this goal. A number of the non-nuclear weapons states
argued for extensions for periods of time (such as 5 to 25 years)
with renewals contingent upon progress by the nuclear weapons
states in keeping their Article VI promises. In the end, the nuclear
weapons states prevailed and the treaty was extended indefinitely.
Certain non-binding commitments, though, strongly
advocated by the non-nuclear weapons states, were agreed to by
the nuclear weapons states. These were: adoption of a Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1996, undertaking negotiations for a
Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, and the promise to engage in
the "determined pursuit... of systematic and progressive
efforts" to achieve nuclear disarmament. A CTBT was adopted
in 1996, but negotiations have yet to begin on a fissile material
cut-off. The "determined pursuit... of systematic and progressive"
efforts by the nuclear weapons states to achieve nuclear disarmament
is not apparent.
There are encouraging developments of more recent
public involvement in the global dialogue on nuclear weapons.
In the mid-1990s non-governmental organizations (NGOs) came to
the NPT Review and Extension Conference and lobbied for a commitment
to the elimination of nuclear arsenals. When their lobbying of
the nuclear weapons states fell largely on deaf ears, these NGOs
prepared and adopted the Abolition 2000 Statement, which calls
for negotiating a treaty by the year 2000 for the phased elimination
of nuclear weapons. The goal of these NGOs was to enter the 21st
century with such a treaty in place. These NGOs and others formed
themselves into a global network to eliminate nuclear weapons,
which is called Abolition 2000. Organizations in the network have
attempted to enter into a dialogue with states on the issue of
abolishing nuclear arsenals.
Another major citizen activity that brought the
public into the global dialogue on nuclear weapons was the World
Court Project. This project sought a decision from the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) on the legality of the threat or use of
nuclear weapons. Over 600 NGOs lobbied at the United Nations and
around the world in support of taking this matter to the ICJ.
They succeeded in getting both the World Health Organization and
the UN General Assembly to ask the Court for an advisory opinion
on the threat or use of nuclear weapons.
Oral hearings at the Court took place in October
and November 1995. The nuclear weapons states and their NATO allies
argued that the Court should not issue an opinion but, if it did,
it should rule that the threat or use of nuclear weapons would
be legal under certain circumstances. Nearly all of the other
states that came before the Court argued that the threat or use
of nuclear weapons would be illegal under international law under
any circumstances.
On July 8, 1996 the Court issued its opinion. It
found that the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be generally
illegal. Based upon the facts before it and the current state
of international law, however, the Court was unable to conclude
whether or not the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be legal
or illegal in an extreme circumstance of self-defense in which
the very survival of a state would be at stake. The Court also
said that any threat or use of nuclear weapons that violated international
humanitarian law would be illegal. Thus, even in an extreme circumstance
of self-defense, when its very survival was at stake, a state
would still have to use nuclear weapons in such a way as not to
injure or kill civilians and not to cause unnecessary suffering
to combatants. Because of the nature of nuclear weapons (instruments
of genocide) this would not be possible.
The Court concluded its opinion by stating: "There
exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion
negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects
under strict and effective international control." The nuclear
weapons states have thus far largely ignored this obligation.
The UN General Assembly has responded by referring to this obligation
in annual resolutions calling upon "all States immediately
to fulfill that obligation by commencing multilateral negotiations
... leading to an early conclusion of a nuclear weapons convention
prohibiting the development, production, testing, deployment,
stockpiling, transfer, threat or use of nuclear weapons and providing
for their elimination." These resolutions have been adopted
by the UN general Assembly in 1996 and 1997.
Currently, many prominent voices are being heard
in a decidedly one-sided attempt at global dialogue. These include
distinguished international personalities--including U.S. General
Lee Butler, former U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara,
British Field Marshall Lord Carver, former French Prime Minister
Michel Rocard, and Nobel Peace Laureate Joseph Rotblat--who were
called together by the Australian government in the Canberra Commission
on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons. This commission made a
strong plea for the elimination of nuclear arsenals in their 1996
report. They stated, "The proposition that nuclear weapons
can be retained in perpetuity and never used--accidentally or
by decision--defies credibility. The only complete defence is
the elimination of nuclear weapons and assurance that they will
never be produced again."
Some 60 former generals and admirals from throughout
the world, also joined the call for the abolition of nuclear weapons
in late 1996. The generals and admirals argued, "We believe...
that business as usual is not an acceptable way for the world
to proceed in nuclear matters. It is our deep conviction that
the following is urgently needed and must be undertaken now:
"First, present and planned stockpiles of
nuclear weapons are exceedingly large and should now be greatly
cut back;
"Second, remaining nuclear weapons should
be gradually and transparently taken off alert, and their readiness
substantially reduced both in nuclear weapons states and in de
facto nuclear weapons states;
"Third, long-term international nuclear policy
must be based on the declared principle of continuous, complete
and irrevocable elimination of nuclear weapons."
In early 1998 over 100 international civilian leaders,
including some 50 current or past heads of state or heads of government,
also joined in the call for eliminating nuclear arsenals. These
civilian leaders argued that the following six steps should be
taken immediately:
1. Remove nuclear weapons from alert status, separate
them from their delivery vehicles, and place them in secure national
storage.
2. Halt production of fissile materials for nuclear
weapons.
3. End nuclear testing, pending entry into force
of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
4. Launch immediate U.S./Russian negotiations toward
further, deep reductions of their nuclear arsenals, irrespective
of START II ratification.
5. Unequivocal commitment by the other declared
and undeclared nuclear weapon states to join the reduction process
on a proportional basis as the U.S. and Russia approach their
arsenal levels, within an international system of inspection,
verification, and safeguards.
6. Develop a plan for eventual implementation,
achievement and enforcement of the distant but final goal of elimination.
Nuclear tests by India and Pakistan in May 1998
impacted the global dialogue, underscoring the Indian position
that they will live in a world with no nuclear weapons, but not
in a world of nuclear apartheid. It reflects the failure of the
global dialogue that states as poor as India and Pakistan would
find it necessary to devote any of their resources to nuclear
weapons when so many of their people are without adequate food,
shelter, education, and health care.
Over the years, religious organizations have from
time to time spoken out on nuclear weapons issues. Some 75 U.S.
Catholic Bishops associated with Pax Christi USA issued an important
statement in June 1998 in which they challenged the theory of
deterrence. Their statement concluded, "[T]he time has come
for concrete action for nuclear disarmament. On the eve of the
Third Millennium may our world rid itself of these terrible weapons
of mass destruction and the constant threat they pose. We cannot
delay any longer. Nuclear deterrence as a national policy must
be condemned as morally abhorrent because it is the excuse and
justification for the continued possession and further development
of these horrendous weapons. We urge all to join in taking up
the challenge to begin the effort to eliminate nuclear weapons
now, rather than relying on them indefinitely."
In June 1998, eight middle power nations, referring
to themselves as the New Agenda Coalition (Brazil, Egypt, Ireland,
Mexico, New Zealand, Slovenia, South Africa, Sweden), called for
entering the new millennium with a commitment in place to achieve
the elimination of nuclear weapons. In important respects, the
call of the New Agenda Coalition echoed that of Abolition 2000.
"The international community must not enter the third millennium,"
the eight nation declaration asserted, "with the prospect
that the maintenance of these weapons will be considered legitimate
for the indefinite future, when the present juncture provides
a unique opportunity to eradicate and prohibit them for all time.
We therefore call on the Governments of each of the nuclear-weapons
States and the three nuclear-weapons-capable States to commit
themselves unequivocally to the elimination of their respective
nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons capability and to agree to
start work immediately on the practical steps and negotiations
required for its achievement."
While the chorus of voices seeking to eliminate
nuclear weapons is growing and includes many significant leaders,
a real dialogue is not yet occurring. The nuclear weapons states
are not taking seriously the calls for abolition, and they are
not responding to these calls. For the most part, the acts of
the nuclear weapons states constitute a continuation of the status
quo. By the behavior of the nuclear weapons states, including
their lack of dialogue, one would think that the Cold War had
not ended nearly ten years ago.
We appear to be in a dialogue of the deaf. The
people speak, but their voices are still weak. The political leaders
and national security establishments of the nuclear weapons states
do not respond. Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin have been practically
moribund with regard to their own nuclear dialogue. By their work
to extend the NPT indefinitely and to achieve a Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty, they have, arguably, only sought to perpetuate
nuclear apartheid. They also pushed back the date for completing
the START 2 nuclear arms reductions from January 1, 2003 to December
31, 2007.
Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin certainly have not
moved decisively toward eliminating the nuclear threat to humanity
or reducing their own arsenals. I believe that they will be judged
harshly in the future for missing this historic opportunity. It
is unfortunate that they are now being judged harshly for their
respective addictions rather than for their abdication of responsibility
on this issue of greatest importance to humanity's future.
Dialogue is a characteristic of a healthy society.
People must speak and listen to each other. Without dialogue,
democracy fails. Without dialogue, needs go unmet and preventable
disasters occur. In a global society, with technologies as powerful
as nuclear weapons, dialogue is essential if we are to prevent
major catastrophes.
We can learn from the history of the Nuclear Age
that when enough people speak with a strong and unified voice
the political leaders will respond. However, if the people do
not speak, their political leaders will be unlikely to alter the
status quo by themselves. This is one of the great tragedies of
our time. Our political leaders have led by following. This places
additional responsibility on people everywhere. More and more
people must again make their voices heard on nuclear disarmament.
They must demand an end to secrecy and elitism with regard to
decisions on nuclear armaments. But most of all, they must demand
an end to the nuclear weapons era. They must demand negotiations
on the elimination of nuclear armaments, and the conclusion of
a treaty to complete this process.
The future of humanity and much of life remains
in jeopardy of annihilation by nuclear arsenals. The promises
of the nuclear weapons states for good faith negotiations for
nuclear disarmament remain to be fulfilled. The people of the
world, and particularly the people of the nuclear weapons states,
must demand that the promise of Article VI of the Non-Proliferation
Treaty for good faith negotiations to achieve nuclear disarmament,
be kept.
There are hopeful signs. The growth of Abolition
2000 to over 1,100 organizations is a sign of hope. In Japan,
in only three months, over 13 million people signed the Abolition
2000 International Petition calling for ending the nuclear threat,
signing a treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons, and reallocating
resources to meet human needs. Abolition 2000's goal of achieving
an international treaty on nuclear disarmament by the year 2000
has now been echoed by the eight nations of the New Agenda Coalition.
It is a reasonable goal. It provides an immediate focus for a
global dialogue on nuclear disarmament. The missing actors in
this dialogue are the leaders of the nuclear weapons states. The
people must now lead them to the negotiating table.
*David Krieger is the president
of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation. He can be contacted at the
Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, 1187 Coast Village Road, Suite 123,
Santa Barbara, CA 93108-2794.
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