Schlaining Manifesto
by Burg Schlaining, June 15, 1997
Introduction
Since the end of the Cold War, public debate
on security issues, and in particular on nuclear weapons, has
receded and become overshadowed by other more apparently pressing
problems. Despite this fact, opinion polls in many countries show
an overwhelming majority in favour of the abolition of nuclear
weapons. For this reason, NGOs working in the peace and security
fields see a necessity to propose a political programme of action
to move from military defence alliances dependent on nuclear deterrence
to a cooperative and non-nuclear security structure that aims
to prevent and resolve conflicts rather than solve them by use
of force.
On March 13, 1997 the European Parliament adopted
a resolution, calling "on the Member States to support the
commencement of negotiations in 1997 leading to the conclusion
of a convention for the abolition of nuclear weapons". With
this resolution the European Parliament joined for the first time
the International Court of Justice, the Canberra Commission and
more than 60 active and retired high-ranking military officers
in seriously questioning the legitimacy of nuclear weapons and
the concept of nuclear deterrence. While today there is a realistic
chance to finally develop a European Security Architecture no
longer based on nuclear weapons, NATO governments still neglect
this option. Instead, they continue to insist that European security
will require nuclear weapons. They intend to base the future European
Security Architecture on a reformed and enlarged NATO and to develop
a (Western and Central) European Defence and Security Identity.
Thus, the opportunity to develop a truly Pan-European Security
Architecture no longer centred around a military alliance has
been missed.
NATO's Nuclear Future
NATO still clings to its nuclear warfighting doctrine
and insists on retaining nuclear weapons. Up to 200 US nuclear
bombs are still deployed throughout seven European NATO-members;
France and Britain retain their national nuclear postures. NATO
refuses to give up its doctrine to use nuclear weapons first.
Thus NATO explicitly contradicts the advisory opinion of the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) of July 8, 1996, which declares the use
and threat of use of nuclear weapons to be generally contrary
to international law.
It should be emphasised that the ICJ declared the
threat or use of nuclear weapons to be generally illegal. The
ICJ did not approve any "right" to threaten or use nuclear
weapons, but it asserted that it "cannot conclude definitely"
whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or
unlawful "in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in
which the very survival of a State would be at stake". NATO
nuclear strategy is not covered by this doubtful area of uncertainty.
Indeed, NATO threatens to use nuclear weapons even when no member
state is threatened in its very survival.
NATO nuclear forces serve much broader political
purposes: "The nuclear forces of the Alliance continue to
play a unique and essential role in Alliance strategy. (...) A
credible Alliance nuclear posture and the demonstration of Alliance
solidarity and common commitment continue to require widespread
participation by European Allies involved in collective defense
planning, in nuclear roles, in peacetime basing of nuclear forces
on their territory and in command, control and consultation arrangements."
(NATO: The Alliance New Strategic Concept, Rome, 1991) NATO's
nuclear strategy has not been changed since the ICJ advisory opinion.
Due to NATO enlargement the number of countries
committed to such policies will be increased. At the next NATO
summit from 8 to 9 July in Madrid, Hungary, Poland, the Czech
Republic and possibly other states are expected to be invited
to become member states of NATO in 1999. Independently of whether
NATO deploys nuclear weapons in the new member states, it will
increase the number of countries relying on nuclear weapons and
nuclear deterrence. It will expand NATO's system of nuclear sharing
arrangements.
NATO stated in the Founding Act between NATO and
the Russian Federation: "The member States of NATO reiterate
that they have no intention, no plan and no reason to deploy nuclear
weapons on the territory of new members, nor any need to change
any aspect of NATO's nuclear posture or nuclear policy - and do
not foresee any future need to do so." NATO also stated that
it does not intend to build or use nuclear weapons infrastructure
on the territory of its new members. (Founding Act on Mutual Relations,
Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation
of 27 May 1997)
Nevertheless, the Founding Act fails to provide
an internationally binding guarantee that NATO will not deploy
nuclear weapons in these countries. In fact, NATO unilaterally
reserves the right to change this declared policy on nuclear deployments
in the new member states. It is intended that they will become
full and equal members and thus eligible to fully participate
in NATO nuclear sharing and decision-making arrangements. Full
membership status includes the right to ask for the deployment
of US-nuclear weapons as well as an obligation to accept that
US nuclear weapons can be deployed at least during wartime (Denmark,
Norway).
Participation of non-nuclear weapons states in
NATO nuclear sharing includes the possibility that the control
over nuclear weapons in wartime will be transferred to the Armed
Forces of non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS). Peacetime storage
of nuclear weapons on the territory of a new NNWS and peacetime
training of the use of nuclear weapons are possible, which is
already the case for existing member NNWS.
NATO nuclear sharing and decision making arrangements
are perceived as a violation of Articles I and II of the Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT) by many non-NATO NNWS. Agreement among the parties
to the NPT as to whether this is in compliance or in violation
of the NATO countries' obligations under the NPT has never been
reached. NATO unilaterally declares its nuclear sharing arrangements
to be in compliance with the NPT, but even so the NATO states
did not use the opportunity to deposit clear and formal reservations
to that effect. Nevertheless, during both the NPT Review and Extension
Conference in 1995 and the 1997 PrepCom for the Review Conference
in 2000, the issue was again subject to controversy. When reevaluating
this question it should be taken into account that Russia has
withdrawn all of its nuclear weapons from the territory of foreign
countries.
NATO - The Right Institution of European Security?
NATO argues that the Alliance's expansion will
provide more stability for Europe. Despite the Founding Act between
NATO and the Russian Federation, the opposite may in fact become
true. Neither the Founding Act nor NATO's enlargement effectively
ensure the prohibition of new division lines through Europe. They
might even contribute to their creation.
The goal of being admitted to NATO has already
become a driving force for many countries to overexaggerate the
perceived threat from Russia. In an enlarged NATO they might feel
a need to continue to do so in order to show that their decision
to join was justified. Those not admitted during the first round
of enlargement, will continue to compete for accession. Those
countries, which do not join might start to overexaggerate the
perceived threat from NATO, and may seek closer cooperation with
Russia. If that option is not available to them, they could eventually
feel isolated and insecure. One answer to this problem may be
to develop a neutral position.
If the Founding Act between NATO and Russia succeeds
in keeping fear of NATO low in Russia and in developing a common
international security policy, it may result in a joint northern
block confronting southern countries. It may thus become an instrument
for increasing north-south tensions in the world.
More likely, however, the NATO Russia Founding
Act will not eliminate Russian opposition to NATO enlargement.
Russia is raising serious security concerns. NATO expansion will
leave Russia greatly outnumbered by NATO's conventional forces.
NATO has promised to seek a solution at the Vienna negotiations
about the Conventional Forces Treaty in Europe, but has not yet
tabled a proposal for future conventional force limitations that
could really meet Russian concerns. Russia might therefore finally
decide to compensate its conventional inferiority by copying NATO's
"flexible response" strategy of the 1970s and 1980s.
As a consequence, Russia would have to rely heavily on tactical
nuclear weapons and would also have to resort to a first use policy.
Because of this possibility, NATO expansion may put the ratification
of START II at risk and thus jeopardise the future of nuclear
disarmament.
The cost of NATO expansion must also be taken into
account especially given current severe economic and social problems.
Cost estimates range from US$ 20 to US$ 125 billion over 7-12
years. They will have to be shared between the current and the
new NATO members. Severe burdens will be placed on the new member
states already struggling to transform their weak economies. They
will be forced to spend scarce resources, urgently needed for
stabilising the countries' economies and saving their social security
and education systems, on new defence equipment. They might be
forced to repeat a core mistake from Cold War times - spending
much more on armaments than their economies can afford. This might
destabilise newly established democracies and encourage radical
positions.
The USA and several European countries are at present
negotiating sales of fighter aircraft to candidate states for
NATO membership, which indicates underlying motives for NATO expansion
quite separate from the NATO claim of desiring stability in the
region.
A Nuclear Future for Europe?
"The debate on the European nuclear deterrent
will be the moment of truth in the construction of a European
political union". (Assembly of the WEU, Document 1420, 19.5.94,
p.35) European Union members are in the process of developing
their own security and defence identity. The Treaty on the European
Union (Maastricht Treaty, Art. J4) commits them to eventually
frame "a common defence policy, which might in time lead
to a common defence". Forming the latter will inevitably
put the future of the British and French nuclear arsenals onto
Europe's agenda. While this is not likely to happen soon, the
European Union members will eventually have to take a decision:
whether the European Union should become a nuclear or a non-nuclear
state. The European governments are slowly starting to explore
this ground.
France and Germany have already declared themselves
"ready to engage in a dialogue on the role of nuclear deterrence
in the context of a European defense policy." (Franco-German
defence and security concept, Nuremberg, Dec. 9, 1996). The former
French Prime minister Alain Jupp, proposed a "concerted"
deterrence for Europe under which France would be prepared to
discuss putting its nuclear weapons at European disposal.
Britain and France have formed the "Anglo-French
Joint Commission on Nuclear Policy" in 1992, which is used
for intensifying technical cooperation as well as political consultations
between both countries.
While the three big European countries have thus
started to intensify consultations on defence related nuclear
matters on a bilateral level, they might wish to explore the ground
behind closed doors for a consensus about the future role of British
and French nuclear weapons in European security.
Nevertheless attempts to speed up the development
of a European defence including a nuclear component has met with
serious resistance. Firstly, countries with a longstanding history
of neutrality, such as Austria, Sweden and Switzerland do not
at present want to enter collective defence commitments. In a
new development, the recently elected UK government has stated
its opposition to a common EU defence policy. Secondly, the public
in many countries is largely opposed to a common European nuclear
deterrent. Finally, the creation of an Independent European Nuclear
posture is bound to violate Articles I and II of the NPT. It is
likely to require a step by step approach of integration which
includes interim steps of nuclear sharing arrangements somewhat
modelled on those of NATO, before Europe is one state, thus transferring
nuclear weapons to NNWS.
Alternative Security Structure for Europe
More attention needs to be given to the development
of a common security for the whole of Europe including the East
and Russia, based on conflict prevention rather than on a military
alliance. Examination of the likely causes of conflicts and methods
of increasing stability within Europe should lead to a joint conceptualisation
of a common security architecture by European countries on an
equal basis.
To achieve these goals a democratic organisation,
in which NGOs play a significant role, should progressively take
over the role as the overall decision-making security body for
Europe. The likely candidate for this would be the Organisation
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). All existing military
alliances in Europe should eventually dissolve when the political
and civilian security model of the OSCE, as defined in Lisbon
in December 1996, is ready to be fully implemented, as they would
become obsolete. The European Union, the strongest substructure
in financial and political terms in the OSCE, should adapt its
emerging Common Foreign and Security Policy (CSFP) to strengthen
the stabilising capability of the OSCE, as the most important
component of pan-European security.
A very important problem is the present parallel
existence of military alliances alongside the OSCE which compete
for dwindling resources, political mandates and status. As long
as most financial resources are drained by the military aspects
of security, which protect the interests of only some member states,
the OSCE can never achieve its very important objectives for stability
and peace in Europe. Moreover, the costs of the expansion of NATO
will make it almost impossible for many member states to set apart
adequate and urgently needed resources for the OSCE.
Intervention in a conflict, once it has become
violent, inevitably turns out to be more expensive than mediation
and conciliation in the early stages, which also seeks to prevent
the human and social tragedy of war. The necessary shift from
the intervention option and military solutions to the conflict
prevention option requires drastic readjustments of the current
disparity between the budgets of NATO and the OSCE.
OSCE action has demonstrated that OSCE member states
are able, without the help of NATO, to prevent conflicts from
openly breaking out, and to allow democratic elections to take
place, as has been attempted in Chechnya and Albania, although
with only a moderate degree of success. Early detection, early
warning, negotiations, mediation, consultations, arbitrations,
sanctions, follow-up procedures are important existing components
of the OSCE mandate. The help of non-governmental organisations
(NGOs) working in peace and conflict research as well as in the
field (in humanitarian or medical assistance and particularly
women's groups) would be invaluable for all of these components
to be adequately fulfilled.
In its Annex, the Lisbon Document, emphasised the
importance of establishing ,Nuclear Free Weapon Zones" (NFWZ)
in the OSCE region as a step towards total nuclear disarmament,
also contained in the Stockholm Declaration of the OSCE Parliamentary
Assembly in July 1996. A strategy for achieving this goal needs
to be more clearly defined.
Political Programme of Action
The USA should immediately withdraw all nuclear
weapons from the territory of non-nuclear weapon states. Such
withdrawals should be made legally binding. First of all, all
nuclear weapons should immediately be taken off alert, as a next
step, warheads should be separated from delivery systems and removed
from their deployment sites to an existing, remote and safe storage
site, under international inspection (e.g. by the OSCE). As an
important step towards a nuclear-weapons free Europe, all states
in Central and Eastern Europe which are currently free of nuclear
weapons should be declared a nuclear weapon free zone. No country
should undertake any preparations or construction of infrastructure
to be able to deploy nuclear weapons on its territory. Decisive
steps should immediately be undertaken by all European states
to comply with Article VI of the NPT and with the advisory opinion
of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) of July 8, 1996, by
starting negotiations for a Nuclear Weapons Convention (NWC) to
eliminate all nuclear weapons worldwide. This should be coordinated
with efforts to promote the effective implementation of the Biological
and Chemical Weapons Conventions as well as to improve international
control of delivery systems.
The Member States of the UN Conference on Disarmament
(CD) in Geneva should be creative in finding ways of ending the
impasse currently overshadowing the negotiations on nuclear disarmament
and non-proliferation issues. In no case should nuclear weapon
states continue or start to offer a nuclear umbrella to non-nuclear
weapons states. To exclude all doubts on the intended legal implications
of deposited reservations made by various states during the NPT
ratification process in the late 60s and early 70s (,European
Option"), the Treaty on the European Union should be amended
by a specific clause (e.g. Title V, Article J.4, Paragraph) which
could read: ,Under international obligations established by the
Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Union
renounces the production and possession of nuclear weapons or
any form of control over them, as part of its common defence."
If the European Union accedes to the NPT, it should do so with
a non-nuclear status. Military as well as commercial production,
reprocessing, and reuse of all nuclear-weapons-usable materials,
including tritium, should be unilaterally phased out or prohibited
by an internationally agreed cut- off treaty. The first step should
be to establish transparency by creating a complete and detailed
inventory, updated annually, of all such materials, past and present.
The next step should be the reduction and elimination of existing
stocks, taking into account materials in warheads. The current
impasse regarding a fissile materials cut-off agreement can only
be overcome if disarmament measures are linked to non-proliferation
measures. Levels of conventional armament under the new CFE should
be reduced to the absolute minimum level required for purely defensive
operations. Levels should not only be measured in numbers but
also in technical quality. Commercial arms transfers should be
controlled and reduced and a conversion programme for the arms
industry needs to be initiated.
OSCE member states should continue, in a constructive
and innovative way, the ongoing process of the drafting of "A
Common Security Model for Europe in the 21st Century". The
security needs of each and every group of OSCE member states should
be integrated into the framework of a "common and cooperative
security without dividing lines" as defined in the Lisbon
Document. Steps should be taken by member states, especially the
members of the European Union within the proposed CSFP, to strengthen
the OSCE both politically and financially. The OSCE should improve
its decision-making process by refining the Moscow mechanism for
the "unanimity minus one" procedure. Recognition by
all member states of the Court of Conciliation and Arbitration
in Geneva, as the OSCE's mandatory dispute-resolution authority
(for instance by deleting the proviso clause) is essential. The
OSCE should improve the performance of its tasks, by expanding
the existing Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC) and the Economic
Forum, and in particular by establishing a sanctions authority,
which would measure case by case the effectiveness and consequences
to the population of imposing sanctions, and draw up a code disallowing
sanctions on humanitarian and medical assistance. A concept for
the establishment of fully integrated OSCE mobile peace-keeping
police contingents, trained in conflict moderation and capable
of self-defence should be developed. An initiative to develop
the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR)
into a forum for cross-frontier NGO cooperation should be launched.
Setting up an early-warning system for conflict prevention which
is supported by civilians and local organisations can help to
identify flash-points before conflicts break out. Recognised mediation
training in conflict resolution should be more widespread and
could be encouraged as a voluntary service. East and west European
citizens should establish a Citizen Verification Network which
observes their own military as closely as possible and especially
any actions taken with regard to nuclear weapons.
There needs to be more widespread discussion on
the lessons that are learned from each war or conflict that is
experienced. Mediators should be encouraged to regularly communicate
with each other to share their experiences with each other and
also with NGOs. A network of people working in conflict prevention,
humanitarian assistance and research should be established. A
self administered NGO liaison within the OSCE should be established,
which would draw on the experience and capacities of NGOs in the
field of peace work, and would support NGOs in introducing, on
a decentralised basis, a voluntary Civil Peace Service (CPS),
and a European civilian youth association. Yearly allocations
to the OSCE, from 1998 on, irrespective of increases in their
financial contributions to the actual implementation of individual
missions, should be at least doubled. The Forum for Security Cooperation
(FSC) should be entrusted with the task of elaborating a comprehensive
disarmament treaty (new Military Forces in Europe - MFE - treaty),
in order to achieve nuclear- weapon-free zones in the area of
the OSCE (beginning with Central and Nordic Europe and Central
Asia) as a step towards the global abolition of all nuclear weapons.
Furthermore, negotiations with Mongolia (not an OSCE member state
and a declared nuclear weapons free state) should be initiated,
to allow their participation in the proposed OSCE nuclear-free
zone in Central Asia (Almaty Declaration).
The Schlaining Declaration of NGOs is signed by
representatives of the following NGOs in preparation for formal
approval by these organisations:
International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear
Arms (IALANA)
Dieter Deiseroth, Fax: +49-211-683883
International Network of Engineers and Scientists
for Global Responsibility (INES, INESAP) Martin Kalinowski, Fax:
+49-6151-166039, E-mail kalinowski@hrzpub.th-darmstadt.de
International Peace Bureau (IPB) Chris Bross, Fax:
+41-22-7389419, E-mail ipb@gn.apc.org Solange Fernex, Fax: +33-3-89407804
International Physicians for the Prevention of
Nuclear War (IPPNW) Xanthe Hall, Fax: +49-30-6938166, E-mail ippnw@vlberlin.comlink.de
Mouvement de la Paix / France Lysiane Alezard, Fax: +33-140115787,
E-mail: mvtpaix@globenet.org
Peace Centre Burg Schlaining / Austria Georg Schöfbänker,
Fax: +0043-732770149, E-mail georg.schoefbaenker@jk.uni-linz.ac.at
Project on European Nuclear Non-Proliferation (PENN)
Otfried Nassauer, Fax: +49-30-4410221, E-mail its@gn.apc.org
Woman's International League for Peace and Freedom
(WILPF) Kirsti Kolthoff, Fax: +46-8-611-3898, E-mail kirsti@kloker.finansforbundet.se
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