McKinney-Rohrabacher
Amendment
Foreign Relations Autorization Act, Fiscal
Yers 1998 and 1999
(House of Representatives - June 10, 1997)
Amendment offered by Ms. McKinney
Ms. McKINNEY. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Is the amendment one
of those specifically listed in the order of the House of June
5, 1997?
Ms. McKINNEY. Yes, Mr. Chairman, it is.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Clerk will report
the amendment.
The Clerk read as follows:
Amendment offered by Ms. McKinney:
At the end of the bill add the following (and conform the table
of contents accordingly):
DIVISION C--ARMS TRANSFERS CODE OF CONDUCT
TITLE XX--ARMS TRANSFERS CODE OF CONDUCT
SEC. 2001. SHORT TITLE.
This title may be cited as the `Code of Conduct on Arms Transfers
Act of 1997'.
SEC. 2002. FINDINGS.
The Congress finds the following:
(1) Approximately 40,000,000 people, over 75 percent
civilians, died as a result of civil and international wars fought
with conventional weapons during the 45 years of the cold war,
demonstrating that conventional weapons can in fact be weapons
of mass destruction.
(2) Conflict has actually increased in the post
cold war era, with 30 major armed conflicts in progress during
1995.
(3) War is both a human tragedy and an ongoing
economic disaster affecting the entire world, including the United
States and its economy, because it decimates both local investment
and potential export markets.
(4) International trade in conventional weapons
increases the risk and impact of war in an already over-militarized
world, creating far more costs than benefits for the United States
economy through increased United States defense and foreign assistance
spending and reduced demand for United States civilian exports.
(5) The United Nations Register of Conventional
Arms can be an effective first step in support of limitations
on the supply of conventional weapons to developing countries
and compliance with its reporting requirements by a foreign government
can be an integral tool in determining the worthiness of such
government for the receipt of United States military assistance
and arms transfers.
(6) It is in the national security and economic
interests of the United States to reduce dramatically the $840,000,000,000
that all countries spend on armed forces every year, $191,000,000,000
of which is spent by developing countries, an amount equivalent
to 4 times the total bilateral and multilateral foreign assistance
such countries receive every year.
(7) According to the Congressional Research Service,
the United States supplies more conventional weapons to developing
countries than all other countries combined, averaging $11,889,000,000
a year in agreements to supply such weapons to developing countries
for the six years since the end of the cold war, 58 percent higher
than the $7,515,000,000 a year in such agreements for the six
years prior to the dissolution of the Soviet Union.
(8) Since the end of the cold war, 84 percent of
United States arms transfers have been to developing countries
are to countries with an undemocratic form of government whose
citizens, according to the Department of State Country Reports
on Human Rights Practices do not have the ability to peaceably
change their form of government.
(9) Although a goal of United States foreign policy
should be to work with foreign governments and international organizations
to reduce militarization and dictatorship and therefore prevent
conflicts before they arise, during 4 recent deployments of United
States Armed Forces--to the Republic of Panama, the Persian Gulf,
Somalia, and Haiti--such Armed Forces faced conventional weapons
that had been provided or financed by the United States to undemocratic
governments.
(10) The proliferation of conventional arms and
conflicts around the globe are multilateral problems, and the
fact that the United States has emerged as the world's primary
seller of conventional weapons, combined with the world leadership
role of the United States, signifies that the United States is
in a position to seek multilateral restraints on the competition
for and transfers of conventional weapons.
(11) The Congress has the constitutional responsibility
to participate with the executive branch in decisions to provide
military assistance and arms transfers to a foreign government,
and in the formulation of a policy designed to reduce dramatically
the level of international militarization.
(12) A decision to provide military assistance
and arms transfers to a government that is undemocratic, does
not adequately protect human rights, is currently engaged in acts
of armed aggression, or is not fully participating in the United
Nations Register of Conventional Arms, should require a higher
level of scrutiny than does a decision to provide such assistance
and arms transfers to a government to which these conditions do
not apply.
SEC. 2003. PURPOSE.
The purpose of this title is to provide clear policy guidelines
and congressional responsibility for determining the eligibility
of foreign governments to be considered for United States military
assistance and arms transfers.
SEC. 2004. PROHIBITION OF UNITED STATES MILITARY
ASSISTANCE AND ARMS TRANSFERS TO CERTAIN FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS.
(a) Prohibition: Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c),
beginning on and after October 1, 1998, United States military
assistance and arms transfers may not be provided to a foreign
government for a fiscal year unless the President certifies to
the Congress for that fiscal year that such government meets the
following requirements:
(1) Promotes democracy: Such government--
(A) was chosen by and permits free and fair elections;
(B) promotes civilian control of the military and
security forces and has civilian institutions controlling the
policy, operation, and spending of all law enforcement and security
institutions, as well as the armed forces;
(C) promotes the rule of law, equality before the
law, and respect for individual and minority rights, including
freedom to speak, publish, associate, and organize; and
(D) promotes the strengthening of political, legislative,
and civil institutions of democracy, as well as autonomous institutions
to monitor the conduct of public officials and to combat corruption.
(2) Respects human rights: Such government--
(A) does not engage in gross violations of internationally
recognized human rights, including--
(i) extra judicial or arbitrary executions;
(ii) disappearances;
(iii) torture or severe mistreatment;
(iv) prolonged arbitrary imprisonment;
(v) systematic official discrimination on the basis
of race, ethnicity, religion, gender, national origin, or political
affiliation; and
(vi) grave breaches of international laws of war
or equivalent violations of the laws of war in internal conflicts;
(B) vigorously investigates, disciplines, and prosecutes
those responsible for gross violations of internationally recognized
human rights;
(C) permits access on a regular basis to political
prisoners by international humanitarian organizations such as
the International Committee of the Red Cross;
(D) promotes the independence of the judiciary
and other official bodies that oversee the protection of human
rights;
(E) does not impede the free functioning of domestic
and international human rights organizations; and
(F) provides access on a regular basis to humanitarian
organizations in situations of conflict or famine.
(3) Not engaged in certain acts of armed aggression:
Such government is not currently engaged in acts of armed aggression
in violation of international law.
(4) Full participation in U.N. register of conventional
arms: Such government is fully participating in the United Nations
Register of Conventional Arms.
(b) Requirement for Continuing Compliance: Any certification with
respect to a foreign government for a fiscal year under subsection
(a) shall cease to be effective for that fiscal year if the President
certifies to the Congress that such government has not continued
to comply with the requirements contained in paragraphs (1) through
(4) of such subsection.
(c) Exemptions:
(1) In general: The prohibition contained in subsection
(a) shall not apply with respect to a foreign government for a
fiscal year if--
(A) subject to paragraph (2), the President submits
a request for an exemption to the Congress containing a determination
that it is in the national security interest of the United States
to provide military assistance and arms transfers to such government;
or
(B) the President determines that an emergency
exists under which it is vital to the interest of the United States
to provide military assistance and arms transfers to such government.
(2) Disapproval: A request for an exemption to
provide military assistance and arms transfers to a foreign government
shall not take effect, or shall cease to be effective, if a law
is enacted disapproving such request.
(d) Notifications to Congress:
(1) In general: The President shall submit to the
Congress initial certifications under subsection (a) and requests
for exemptions under subsection (c)(1)(A) in conjunction with
the submission of the annual request for enactment of authorizations
and appropriations for foreign assistance programs for a fiscal
year and shall, where appropriate, submit additional or amended
certifications and requests for exemptions at any time thereafter
in the fiscal year.
(2) Determination with respect to emergency situations:
The President, when, in his determination, it is not contrary
to the national interest to do so, shall submit to the Congress
at the earliest possible date reports containing determinations
with respect to emergencies under subsection (c)(1)(B). Each such
report shall contain a description of--
(A) the nature of the emergency;
(B) the type of military assistance and arms transfers
provided to the foreign government; and
(C) the cost to the United States of such assistance
and arms transfers.
[Page: H3619]
SEC. 2005. SENSE OF THE CONGRESS.
It is the sense of the Congress that the Committee on International
Relations of the House of Representatives and the Committee on
Foreign Relations of the Senate should hold hearings on--
(1) controversial certifications submitted under
section 2004(a);
(2) all requests for exemptions submitted under
section 2004(c)(1)(A); and
(3) all determinations with respect to emergencies
under section 2004(c)(1)(B).
SEC. 2006. UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND
ARMS TRANSFERS DEFINED.
For purposes of this title, the terms `United States military
assistance and arms transfers' and `military assistance and arms
transfers' mean--
(1) assistance under chapter 2 of part II of the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (relating to military assistance),
including the transfer of excess defense articles under section
516 of that Act ;
(2) assistance under chapter 5 of part II of the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (relating to international military
education and training); or
(3) the transfer of defense articles, defense services,
or design and construction services under the Arms Export Control
Act (excluding any transfer or other assistance under section
23 of such Act ), including defense articles and defense services
licensed or approved for export under section 38 of that Act .
Ms. McKINNEY (during the reading). Mr. Chairman,
I ask unanimous consent that the amendment be considered as read
and printed in the Record.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Is there objection to
the request of the gentlewoman from Georgia?
There was no objection.
Ms. McKINNEY. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent
that I be recognized for 8 minutes.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Is there objection to
the request of the gentlewoman from Georgia?
There was no objection.
Ms. McKINNEY. Mr. Chairman, I am very proud to
offer the McKinney-Rohrabacher amendment, which I believe is a
significant enhancement to the legislation we are now considering,
the State Department authorization bill.
This is no longer a controversial amendment. Significant
compromise and change have been incorporated into this new version
of the Arms Trade Code of Conduct that I am introducing today.
In the first version of the bill, the President would certify
countries at the beginning of each fiscal year that comply with
the code of conduct. If the President wanted to sell weapons to
a noncomplying government, then the President would have to come
to Congress requesting an exemption and have that exemption approved
by a vote in Congress.
The administration and some Members of Congress
felt this gave too much authority to Congress and deprived the
President of his ability to make foreign policy. In the spirit
of compromise, we have stripped the original bill of this language
and now all that remains are the underlying values that motivated
this bill in the first place, and that is that the United States
ought not be in the business of supplying weapons to dictators.
Gone is the automatic trigger that some objected
to. And so now the piece of legislation before us asks us to make
the fundamental assertion of what we stand for in the world and
whose side we are on. Is it that the United States of America
that speaks eloquently on the subject of respect for human rights
and democracy and democratic traditions is only paying lip service
to these ideals when confronted with a hungry client wanting our
advanced technology only to enhance their ability to torture and
abuse their own population? Or do we stand with those people around
the world who are victims of the world's tyrants, who have no
voice in the international arena and who only have the conscience
of the world to help them?
This legislation helps to give the United States
a conscience for the leaders around the world who do not have
one. This legislation helps to give a voice to those people around
the world who cannot speak out in their own countries. And finally,
this legislation puts the international behavior of the United
States in sync with our words, our beliefs, and our fundamental
values.
The initial opponents of this bill did us a favor,
really, by asking us to remove and cut certain sections of the
bill, because what is left is the fundamental answer to the question,
`Will we sell weapons to dictators?'
This bill is no longer about Presidential prerogatives
being impinged on. This bill is no longer about too much congressional
authority in the area of foreign policy-making. This bill is simply
about whether we will apply the standards to our guns and tanks
and missiles and bombs that we apply to computers and chemicals.
In this country, even a car is considered a lethal
weapon, and we apply certain standards on who can operate a car.
So getting a driver's license and keeping that license subjects
us all to certain competency requirements, certain standards.
If we lose our license, then we fail to meet the requirements
for operating the car. Do we not consider it important who purchases
our rifles, tanks, guns, and bullets? We even have laws that govern
and restrict the flow of certain information and knowledge. Should
we not at least be concerned about who gets our weapons that kill
people?
At home, after much struggle, we have come up with
standards on who can buy a gun. Convicted felons and the mentally
ill cannot buy guns legally in this country. Thank goodness we
were able to pass the Brady bill so that we could stop certain
purchases of guns. Passing the Brady bill was done, though, only
after the unreasonableness and extremism of the NRA was demonstrated
to the American public.
Unfortunately, the code of conduct has its own
equivalent to the NRA which, I believe, is not only extreme but
also reckless in its disregard of what happens when these weapons
are delivered to our dictator clients.
In 1964, the United States made a decision to support
Mobutu Sese Seko, who became a tyrant and a dictator to the people
of Zaire. Over the course of the decades of our support for his
dictatorship, we shipped almost $170 million of weapons to him.
We provided $18 million of training to the military; 1,356 officers,
virtually the entire Zairian officer corps, received officer training.
A total of $187 million of U.S. military aid went to Zaire.
What was that aid? 2,500 riot control kits; 2,000
military vehicles for crowd control; 2,000 rifles; $2 million
worth of ammunition, and 24 military aircraft.
What we gave Mobutu was not military assistance
to defend his country from outside intervention. What we gave
to Mobutu was the means to control dissent and demonstrations.
What we gave Mobutu was the means to control his own population
and hence, to keep himself in power. As a result, we are complicit
in how he used his military, trained and supplied by us.
This is the kind of end use that concerns us. This
is the kind of end use that compelled Dr. Arias and four other
Nobel Peace Prize winners to come together 2 weeks ago in New
York to declare their support for the code of conduct. Dr. Oscar
Arias brought together Jorge Ramos-Horta of East Timor, Betty
Williams of Northern Ireland, His Excellency the Dalai Lama of
Tibet, and our own Elie Wiesel. Organizations that have won the
Noble Peace Prize were also represented at this press conference:
Amnesty International, the American Friends Service Committee,
and the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear
War. Dr. Arias also had letters of support from Archbishop Desmond
Tutu, Lech Walesa, and several others who were not able to attend.
The gentleman from New York [Mr. Gilman] attended the press conference
and was moved to a standing ovation after the remarks of Elie
Wiesel.
So, people who have been recognized in the international
community for their dedication to peace have come together to
say that this legislation is necessary. How will history record
those who do not support this legislation?
Member states of the European Union have already
agreed to eight common criteria governing their own arms transfers.
There is growing support for European Union-wide code of conduct
among all of Europe's governments. Germany, Sweden, The Netherlands,
Belgium, and Ireland are all leading this fight. But the boldest
steps have been taken by Tony Blair's Britain. The New Labour
Government has declared that centrality of human rights in its
weapons sales is central to its decisions.
So we are not alone, those of us who want the United
States to stand on the opposite side of whatever dictator is there
with ready cash for our guns and bullets. History teaches us that
those weapons do not end up in a remote depot, they end up either
intimidating or `in' people who want a better way of life and
who dare to say so; who want freedom of expression and who dare
to act; who want to live in a democracy as we do in this country
and who dare to confront tyranny.
We are not alone at home either, even in this administration.
The recently-confirmed CIA director, George Tenet, on May 6, 1997,
at a session of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, said
the following:
`But the proliferation issue--and particularly
the proliferation of ballistic missiles--and conventional weapons--we
often ignore what the proliferation of conventional weapons means
for U.S. forces--this issue is probably the greatest threat to
U.S. forces and our men and women who deploy overseas than any
other' issue.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentlewoman from
Georgia [Ms.McKinney] has expired.
(By unanimous consent, Ms. McKinney was allowed
to proceed for 30 additional seconds.)
[Page: H3620]
Ms. McKINNEY. Mr. Chairman, I cannot say it any better than our
CIA director. The issue before the Congress today is a national
security issue and a moral issue. Seldom are we given such a stark
opportunity to be on the right side of both issues. The Arms Trade
Code of Conduct is just such an opportunity.
I ask my colleagues to vote for this amendment
and let us be known by the values we espouse and not the weapons
of oppression that we supply.
Mr. Chairman, U.S. weapons are currently being
used in 39 of the world's current 42 ethnic and territorial conflicts.
In the past 4 years, 85 percent of U.S. arms sales
to the Third World have gone to undemocratic governments. The
United States is responsible for 44 percent of all weapons deliveries
in the world. The United States is unqualifiedly the arms dealer
to the world, and the merchant for death to the world's dictators.
Language requiring Congress to approve an arms
sale to a dictator before it's been made has been modified to
give the President an automatic waiver for national security purposes
which Congress could block after extensive debate.
A total of 453 American soldiers have been killed
by armies strengthened by our own weapons and military training:
Iraq, Saddam Hussein; Panama, Manuel Noriega; Somalia, Siad Barre,
and Haiti, the Duvalier family.
In fiscal year 1994 $7 billion of taxpayer money
went to subsidize U.S. arms exports. In fiscal year 1995, that
figure jumped to $7.6 billion. After agricultural price supports,
this represents the largest subsidy program for business in the
entire Federal budget--Welfare for Weapons dealers.
Our Government employs nearly 6,500 full time personnel
to promote and service foreign arms sales by U.S. companies.
U.S. subsidies for arms transfers are scheduled
to increase. The international market for U.S. arms is estimated
to be around $12 to $16 billion per year. Therefore, our foreign
customers aren't even paying for the weapons that they get. And
more than half of U.S. weapons sales will be paid for by the U.S.
taxpayers.
In 1995, subsidies for arms exports accounted for
over 50 percent of U.S. bilateral aid and more than 39 percent
of total U.S. foreign aid. the emphasis on promoting weapons exports
has come at the expense of programs designed to promote economic
development and social welfare in these recipient nations. I'd
much rather see us exporting tractors and seeds to dictators than
guns and bullets.
The American arms trade policy is killing our citizens,
destroying worldwide democracy, and sending us spiraling down
a path of economic ruin.
President Dwight D. Eisenhower said, `There can
be no peace without law. And there can be no law if we were to
invoke one code of international conduct for those who oppose
us and another for our friends.' We must help to stop the arms
trade boomerang. Over 300 organizations support the No Arms to
Dictators Code of Conduct. Among these organizations are: Vietnam
Veterans Of America Foundation, Young Women's Christian Association--the
YMCA--of America, and Bread of the World, and organizations of
the Presbyterian, Lutheran, and Roman Catholic churches.
I would like to thank the hundreds of volunteers
who have put thousands of hours into making the U.S. Code of Conduct
our law.
Each of us must be concerned about what happens
when we sell weapons to dictators.
I urge my colleagues to support the Arms Trade
Code of Conduct.
Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, I rise in
support of the amendment, the Arms Transfer Code of Conduct, and
it will be the first major reform of U.S. arms transfer policy
in almost two decades.
The code of conduct highlights guiding principles
on human rights and democracy, which I believe are important to
America's leadership role in the post-cold war era. This amendment
would help stem the flow of U.S. weapons to countries that brutalize
their own people.
The code of conduct would make it clear that in
the 21st century the United States of America intends not just
to be a military and economic superpower but a moral superpower
as well. It signals an end to business as usual for human rights
violators.
Mr. Chairman, two-thirds of all of our foreign
military sales go to countries described by the State Department
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices as human rights violators
with undemocratic governments.
Mr. Chairman, a few years ago I made a trip to
Croatia when it was under siege. The gentleman from Virginia,
[Mr. Wolf], and I visited a city that was literally surrounded
by tanks and by military, a place called Vukovar. Vukovar was
finally leveled, but while we were there we saw the bomb casings
and we saw the 500-pound bombs that were dropped. And I will never
forget taking pictures of these bomb casings that had U.S. markings
all over them.
I will never forget also talking to President Milosevic
and trying to ask him to stop that carnage that was going on in
Croatia. Later on it was rolled out to Bosnia. Much of their military
capability came from the United States and then was used in a
slaughterhouse fashion against people who were unarmed, women
and children and men who were civilians.
Mr. Chairman, the code of conduct is not a threat
to U.S. national security. It contains a provision for an emergency
waiver that would allow the President to transfer arms to a country
that does not meet the code's criteria if U.S. national security
really did require such a transfer, and it provides for an orderly
process for Congress to consider other exceptions of nonemergency
nature.
Mr. Chairman, year after year in human rights hearings
in the Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights,
which I now chair, we hear there is a disconnect in U.S. foreign
policy between human rights and other considerations. Amnesty
International put it best when it said about this administration's
human rights policy, that `Human rights is an island off the mainland
of U.S. foreign policy.' This amendment is a step toward closing
the circle, connecting things that ought to be connected.
We must tell the world that freedom and democracy
do matter. A good way to begin is by telling the world that the
United States will not put deadly weapons into the hands of the
enemies of freedom and democracy.
Mr. Chairman, I want to congratulate the gentlewoman
from Georgia, [Ms. McKinney], and the gentleman from California,
[Mr.Rohrabacher], for their good work in crafting this amendment,
and again I rise in very strong support of it.
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