Nuclearism and Its
Spread To Asia
by David Krieger**, June 1997
Introduction
At its core, nuclearism is the belief that
nuclear weapons and nuclear power are essential forms of progress
that in the right hands will protect the peace and further the
human condition. Nuclearism is a dangerous ideology -- as dangerous
as the technologies it has unabashedly and unreservedly promoted.
In this belief system, "the right hands" have generally
been synonymous with one's own country, and "to further the
human condition" has generally been synonymous with benefit
to oneself, one's country or one's corporation. The key elements
of nuclearism are:
1. The belief that nuclear weapons keep the peace,
and are a necessary evil.
2. The belief that nuclear power is a safe, reliable and inexpensive
source of energy, and that the nuclear power industry is an absolute
good.
3. The belief that, despite the expansion of the nuclear power
industry, the diversion of nuclear materials from the nuclear
fuel cycle to military uses can be prevented.
The ideology and the technologies it has supported
have created extraordinary dangers for all life on Earth. While
the dangers posed by nuclear weapons are potentially more immediate
and cataclysmic in scope, the insidious dangers posed by nuclear
power reactors and their radioactive waste products are now already
harming humankind, other forms of life, and the environment and
this threat will continue for thousands of generations. Believers
in nuclearism, to the extent that they acknowledge these dangers,
argue that nuclear technology brings benefits that more than compensate
for its inherent dangers.
The dangers of nuclear technology may be summarized
as follows:
1. Nuclear deterrence is only a theory. It may
fail causing many times more casualties and suffering than were
experienced at Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
2. Nuclear weapons may be used by accident or miscalculation as
well as by intention. The nuclear destruction of one city by one
bomb could result in millions of deaths and casualties. A large-scale
nuclear exchange could result in the annihilation of humankind
and most other forms of life on Earth.
3. Nuclear weapons or the materials for making them may find their
way into the hands of terrorists or irrational leaders of countries.
4. Nuclear power reactors are subject to catastrophic failures
such as occurred at Chernobyl in the former Soviet Union and nearly
occurred at Three Mile Island in the United States. Such failures
could occur as a result of accident, human error, terrorist activity,
or destruction by an enemy in time of war.
5. The spent fuel storage pools located at nuclear power reactors
are particularly vulnerable to the release of radioactive materials
as a result of terrorist or military attack.
6. Accidents occurring during the transportation of nuclear materials
by highway, railway, ship, or air could result in hazardous releases
of radioactive materials.
7. No long-term means of storage of radioactive waste materials
currently exists to protect the environment and human health against
the dangers of radiation release.
Despite these dangers, the proponents of nuclearism
have succeeded in many countries in obtaining large amounts of
public funding to support the development, testing, deployment,
and maintenance of nuclear weapons and/or the development and
subsidization of the nuclear power industry. The costs of nuclear
technology have included:
1. Over $8 trillion spent on nuclear weapons and
delivery systems by the nuclear weapons states over the past half
century.
2. The diversion of generations of scientists and technologists
to work on weapons of mass destruction rather than on projects
of positive value to humankind.
3. The widespread contamination of the environment by radioactive
pollutants created in the process of building and testing nuclear
warheads over a fifty year period. Cleanup costs are estimated
at hundreds of billions of dollars, and it is understood that
some areas of contamination will never be adequately restored
to safe use. (In the United States, such areas are referred to
as "national sacrifice zones.")
4. Nuclear power reactors, once thought to be relatively inexpensive
to build, now cost some $5 billion per 1000 megawatt reactor.
This cost has priced nuclear reactors out of competitiveness in
the United States despite enormous government (that is, taxpayer)
subsidies.
5. Radioactive wastes generated by the military and nuclear power
industry will need to be stored to prevent environmental pollution
and subsequent health problems for tens of thousands of years.
The bulk of this burden will fall to future generations.
In this paper, I will review the development of
nuclearism in the West, its roots in military technology, its
linkage to commercialism, attempts to place a boundary between
the military and peaceful uses of nuclear technology, and the
spread of nuclear weapons to Asian countries. I will then review
the Non-Proliferation Treaty and its reference to nuclear energy
as an "inalienable right," return to the nuclearist
view that nuclear weapons are a necessary evil and nuclear power
an absolute good, and discuss the need for new thinking about
nuclear technologies, as called for by Albert Einstein. I will
then review nuclearism in Asia, global nuclearism, and finally
the pressing need and important opportunity that now exists to
achieve a world free of nuclear weapons.
Nuclearism Is a Western Ideology
Nuclearism is an ideology that originated in the
West. The primary proponents of nuclearism have been the United
States, Britain, France, and the former Soviet Union (now replaced
by Russia). The "East-West" struggle of the Cold War
described the division of Europe with Western Europe and the United
States on one side of the divide, and Eastern Europe and the former
Soviet Union on the other side. Both sides were proponents of
nuclearism. Both sides believed that their nuclear deterrent forces
prevented nuclear war and thereby kept the peace. Despite a lack
of objective evidence that there was a causal connection between
nuclear arsenals and the absence of a nuclear war, each side credited
its expanding nuclear arsenal with keeping the peace. To underline
this, the United States during the Reagan presidency named some
of its powerful nuclear armed missiles "peacekeepers."
Both nuclear weapons and nuclear power plants are
products of the West. Nuclear weapons, nuclear power, and the
ideology of nuclearism developed in the West and have spread throughout
the world.
Nuclearism Originated As a Military Technology
Nuclear weapons were developed by the United States
with the aid of European refugee scientists during World War II.
The initial impetus for the U.S. effort was the fear that the
Germans might develop similar weapons, and that these weapons
would be necessary to deter the Germans from using theirs. However,
by the time that the first U.S. nuclear weapons were developed,
the Germans had already surrendered without having succeeded in
developing a nuclear weapon.
The first U.S. nuclear weapon test took place on
July 16, 1945 at Alamogordo, New Mexico. The war in the Pacific
was still going on at that time, although the United States was
aware that the Japanese were seeking to negotiate terms of surrender.(1)
Just three weeks after the initial successful test of the weapon,
it was used at Hiroshima, Japan on August 6, 1945, and three days
later at Nagasaki, Japan. At Hiroshima some 90,000 persons, mostly
civilians, were killed immediately, and a total of some 140,000
persons died as a result of the bombing by the end of 1945. At
Nagasaki some 40,000 persons, again mostly civilians, were killed
immediately, and a total of some 70,000 persons died as a result
of the bombing by the end of 1945. The suffering of the survivors,
the hibakusha, continues to the present. The people of Japan were
the first victims of this powerful new technology.
The decision to use the newly developed weapon
against the Japanese was made by U.S. President Harry Truman.
When Truman received confirmation of the "success" of
the use of the nuclear weapon dropped at Hiroshima, he is reported
to have said, "This is the greatest day in history."(2)
One can imagine that the response to the devastation and mass
killing of civilians was viewed somewhat differently in Japan.
In the United States certain myths developed around
the use of nuclear weapons.(3) The weapons were credited with
ending the war and saving American lives. They were, therefore,
generally perceived in a positive light. In Japan, these weapons
were seen from the perspective of the victims, and the Japanese
developed what has been described as a "nuclear allergy."
At the Hiroshima Memorial Peace Park it says, "Never again!
We shall not repeat this evil."
With these tragic events the United States brought
the world into a new era, the Nuclear Age. Its hallmark was a
determined effort that involved the subordination of science and
technology to military purpose. The effort resulted in harnessing
the power of the nucleus of the atom, and releasing a destructive
force far greater than had previously been possible by manmade
means. The Nuclear Age was born of a scientific enterprise with
a military purpose -- the creation of nuclear weapons -- that
was organized, funded and controlled by government. In this new
age the destruction of cities by a single weapon became not only
a possibility, but a reality. The destruction of humankind became
imaginable and possible.
Nuclearism and Commercialism
While nuclearism may have begun as a military-based
ideology, it soon also developed a commercial aspect related to
the use of nuclear reactors to generate electric power. Thus,
nuclearism became an ideology with two intertwined aspects, one
aligned with military ends and one aligned with peaceful ends.
U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower took the lead in promoting the
peaceful applications of nuclear energy for generating electricity
with his "Atoms for Peace" speech at the United Nations
in 1953.(4)
The promise of "Atoms for Peace" was
virtually free and unlimited electric energy to power the world
and provide the benefits of electric energy to the poor of the
Earth. From this technology of death would come, Eisenhower prophesied,
electricity so inexpensive that it would not need to be metered.
It was the promise of something too good to be true, and in fact
it was not true. It was the promise of creating virtually free
electrical power for everyone everywhere. Nuclearism, like a modern
alchemy, promised to convert the evil of a city-destroying weapons
technology to a tool for powering the future.
The promise of nuclear power would prove to be
largely hyperbole based upon wishful thinking or outright fraud.
The hope and dream of "Atoms for Peace" became, however,
a central tenet of the ideology of nuclearism. By adopting this
tenet of nuclearism, developed states were able to shift to taxpayers
the financial responsibility for research and development of the
so-called peaceful atom. Huge taxpayer subsidies authorized in
the United States, Western European nations, and later Japan made
possible the development and implementation of the nuclear power
industry.
The nuclear power industry continues to operate
in the United States only due to Congressional legislation, the
Price-Anderson Act, which transfers the majority of liability
for a major accident from the corporations operating nuclear power
plants to the taxpayers. Even so, there has been no nuclear power
plant built in the United States since the early 1970s. In the
early 1970s, the U.S. nuclear industry was forecasting 1000 nuclear
power plants for the country by the year 2000. Today, however,
there are only 110 such plants, and there are no plans to build
more.
Costs have been the major roadblock to the continued
expansion of nuclear power in the United States. Initially it
was estimated that the capital costs for building a 1000 megawatt
nuclear power plant would be a few hundred million dollars. By
the early 1970s the costs had risen to approximately $5 billion
per reactor.
In true Cold War competitive style, the former
Soviet Union raced ahead with its version of the "peaceful
atom" by building nuclear power plants that would prove to
be among the most dangerous in the world. This was dramatically
demonstrated by the major accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power
plant. This accident had serious consequences in Ukraine, Belarus,
many parts of Europe, and even the United States.(5)
Nuclearism Draws an Artificial Boundary Between
Military and So-Called Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy
Advocates of nuclearism have generally tried to
walk a narrow line between the military and peaceful uses of nuclear
energy. On the one hand, they have sought to contain the spread
of nuclear weapons to additional states. On the other hand, they
have tried to promote the spread of nuclear energy to other states
for research and commercial purposes. Since the knowledge of how
to construct nuclear weapons is readily available and the nuclear
materials needed for this purpose may be derived from the nuclear
power industry, advocates of nuclearism needed to establish at
least a facade of control over the nuclear power industry. They
accomplished this goal through the creation of the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), charged with promoting nuclear energy
internationally while providing safeguards against diversion of
nuclear materials for weapons purposes. It is, of course, a clear
conflict of interest to give promotional functions to a regulatory
agency.
The Spread of Nuclear Weapons
The United States would have preferred to have
maintained its early monopoly over nuclear technology. It was
recognized from the outset, however, that this would not be possible.
The U.S. scientific establishment badly miscalculated the length
of time it would take the Soviet Union to develop nuclear weapons.
Truman was advised that the development of nuclear weapons to
the Soviet Union could take some twenty years, and in fact it
occurred in just four years.
The very first resolution of the United Nations
General Assembly called for the creation of an Atomic Energy Commission
that would develop a plan for the elimination of atomic weapons
from national armaments.(6) But early efforts and proposals to
achieve international control of nuclear weapons failed, and by
July 1946 the United States, then the only nuclear weapons state
in the world, began an atmospheric testing program in the Pacific.
Radioactivity from the testing spread throughout the world, but
brought the greatest harm to the people of the Pacific.
Until 1949, when the former Soviet Union tested
its first nuclear weapon, the U.S. remained the sole nuclear weapons
state in the world. From 1949 forward, until the end of the Cold
War, the United States and former Soviet Union vied with each
other for "nuclear supremacy," a concept that some would
define as beyond the bounds of reason. These two states would
subsequently be joined by the United Kingdom, France, and China
as declared nuclear weapons states. China tested its first nuclear
weapon in 1964, and became the first Asian nation to possess nuclear
weapons. A decade later, in 1974, India tested its first nuclear
weapon, which it claimed was only for peaceful purposes. Subsequently,
Pakistan is thought to have developed a nuclear weapons capability.
Israel is the third of the threshold or undeclared nuclear weapons
states.
China is thought to have developed its nuclear
weapons capability in response to being threatened by nuclear
weapons by the United States during the Korean War in 1954 and
again during the crisis in the Taiwan Straits in 1958.(7) India
is thought to have developed its nuclear weapons capability in
response to China doing so, and Pakistan is thought to have developed
its capability in response to India doing so. Thus, there have
been security concerns that have led to the spread of nuclear
weapons into Asia. China did not want to find itself, as had Japan,
the victim of nuclear weapons delivered by the United States or
later by the Soviet Union. India feared the possibility of attack
by China; Pakistan feared the possibility of attack by India.
This is the faulty logic of deterrence, which has grave built-in
dangers.
The Non-Proliferation Treaty: An "Inalienable
Right" to Nuclear Energy?
It was the general understanding by the U.S., former
USSR, and the UK that the spread of nuclear weapons created a
more dangerous world. These states considered it acceptable and
reasonable that they would maintain their nuclear arsenals, but
believed it to be too dangerous for other countries to follow
their lead in developing and maintaining such arsenals. This led
these leading nuclear weapons states to initiate the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which was opened
for signatures in 1968 and entered into force in 1970.(8) This
treaty created two categories of states, those that had nuclear
weapons prior to January 1, 1967, and all other states. In the
category of nuclear weapons states were the United States, former
Soviet Union, United Kingdom, France and China. France and China,
however, did not become parties to the NPT until the early 1990s.
In the NPT, non-nuclear weapons states pledged
not to develop or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons, while nuclear
weapons states pledged not to transfer nuclear weapons or otherwise
help non-nuclear weapons states to develop nuclear arsenals. On
its face, this would appear to be an uneven and perhaps even unreasonable
bargain. The nuclear weapons states, however, did sweeten the
offer by agreeing in Article VI to have good faith negotiations
on a cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date, on nuclear
disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament
under strict and effective international control. The nuclear
weapons states also agreed that they would help other countries
develop nuclear technology for peaceful purposes; the treaty even
refers in Article IV to peaceful nuclear energy as an "inalienable
right." Thus, in attempting to halt the spread of nuclear
weapons to other states, the treaty actually promotes the use
of nuclear technology for generating energy. The dual purpose
nature of nuclear technology has opened a back door to the proliferation
of nuclear weapons, and a number of countries have sought to walk
through it.
India and Pakistan were both able to develop their
nuclear weapons through nuclear reactor programs that were purportedly
being used for peaceful purposes. Iraq also came close to developing
nuclear weapons in this way. What is needed to accomplish this,
in addition to nuclear reactors for energy or research purposes,
are facilities for enriching uranium or separating plutonium from
spent fuel. Two countries in Asia with this capability are North
Korea and Japan. North Korea is thought to possess enough plutonium
for constructing one or two nuclear weapons. Japan has some 13,000
kilograms of weapons-usable plutonium, enough to potentially manufacture
more than a thousand nuclear weapons.(9) South Korea and Taiwan
have tried to acquire the necessary plutonium reprocessing technologies
to develop nuclear weapons, but they have been kept from doing
so by the United States.
Nuclearists View Nuclear Weapons as a Necessary
Evil and Nuclear Power an Absolute Good
In the ideology of nuclearism, nuclear weapons
are accepted as a necessary evil to maintain the peace. This evil,
however, can only be tolerated in certain countries that can be
trusted to control the weapons. Nuclear weapons were seen by the
West as a threat in the hands of the former Soviet Union, but
at least it was understood that they would take necessary steps
to control their weapons. The disintegration of the former Soviet
Union is viewed by many as a serious danger to world security
due to the potential spread of nuclear weapons or weapons-grade
nuclear materials to unstable national leaders or terrorists.
Apparently, though, it has not been considered a serious enough
danger by the United States and its allies to make the control
of nuclear weapons and weapons-grade nuclear materials in the
former Soviet Union a matter of highest priority with appropriate
funding. Some funding has been provided, but the amounts are insufficient
to the nature of the danger.
In the view of nuclearists, world peace can be
maintained by nuclear arms, which would be used only as a last
resort. This intention, of course, could dramatically fail if
weapons from the nuclear arsenal of the former Soviet Union or
any other state fell into the hands of unstable national leaders
or terrorists.
It is also the view of nuclearists that nuclear
power is an absolute good. They envision world markets being expanded
by building highly capital intensive nuclear power plants throughout
the developing world. It is a vision that encompasses the entire
world, bringing the promise of nuclear power to rich and poor
countries alike. It is unfortunately a vision that primarily benefits
its promoters while bringing serious dangers to all who accept
the technology.
The public relations arm of the nuclear power industry,
including the International Atomic Energy Agency, has painted
the promise of safe, reliable, and inexpensive energy in glowing
terms (pun intended), while skimming over the high capital costs,
the need for huge subsidies, the danger of accidents, the added
risks of nuclear weapons proliferation, and the unsolved problems
of nuclear waste storage. These are the considerations borne from
experience that have dampened enthusiasm for nuclear energy in
the United States, Sweden, and other technologically advanced
countries. The nuclear power industry has painted a picture of
the benefits of nuclear energy that has attracted substantial
interest from developing countries, many in Asia -- countries
that are eager to light their cities with this high-tech solution
that they believe will be cheap and environmentally benign. Beneath
the surface of the glittering promises, there is some sense that
dangers are lurking, but these are easily overlooked in the hope
of a quick fix for economies badly in need of inexpensive energy
sources.
Need for New Thinking
Einstein, who had at first encouraged Franklin
Roosevelt to establish a U.S. government project to develop nuclear
weapons, was utterly distraught by what had occurred at Hiroshima
and Nagasaki. He warned, "The unleashed power of the atom
has changed everything save our modes of thinking, and thus we
drift toward unparalleled catastrophe." Einstein's reflection
remains the central challenge of the Nuclear Age.
What will it take to change our modes of thinking
with regard to nuclearism? One source of encouragement is that
nuclearism does not seem to be an ideology with widespread support
among the people of the world. It appears to be largely concentrated
among those who stand to profit from it, and their supporters
in government.
The nature of nuclearism has been revealed in starker
terms in the aftermath of the Cold War. Despite the breakup of
the former Soviet Union and the end of communism as a state ideology
in Russia, the West has continued to rely upon nuclear arsenals
and to pursue policies of maintaining these arsenals, although
at lower levels than in the Cold War period. But these arsenals
do not assure global security, and many experts have argued that
the breakup of the former Soviet Union has created serious dangers
of nuclear weapons falling into the hands of unstable national
leaders or terrorists.
In the West, nuclearism and militarism have forged
a strong link. Most Western European countries have become partners
of the United States, Britain, and France in relying upon nuclear
weapons for security. Russia has also been reliant upon its nuclear
arsenal, and recently has announced that it has adopted a first-use
doctrine, similar to that of NATO countries, if it is threatened
by attack.(10) Eastern European countries, that formerly fell
under the Soviet nuclear umbrella, are now seeking to join NATO
and place themselves under the NATO nuclear umbrella. NATO recently
voted to admit Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic.
This proposed expansion of NATO has placed Russia
on the defensive, and could have the result of stopping all progress
in the reduction of nuclear armaments. The nationalistic Russian
Duma may not ratify START II if NATO is expanded eastward closer
to Russia's borders. George Kennan, an elder statesman of United
States foreign policy and former U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet
Union, has referred to the expansion of NATO as "the most
fateful error in U.S. policy in the entire post Cold War era."(11)
The linkage of nuclearism and militarism has had
huge financial implications. The United States alone has spent
some $4 trillion on its nuclear arsenal and its delivery and command
and control systems since the early 1940s. The former Soviet Union
is thought to have spent nearly a like amount, which ultimately
was a key factor in its economic collapse and disintegration.
Nuclearism in Asia Today
There is some hope, albeit slim, that from the
geographic East, from Asia, there will be leadership for an end
to nuclearism. The Japanese people, as the most prominent victims
of nuclearism, have always opposed nuclear weapons. Their government,
however, has been content to rely upon the U.S. nuclear umbrella,
and has also accumulated many tons of weapons-grade plutonium
that could be fashioned into a sophisticated nuclear weapons arsenal.
The Japanese government has also built up a substantial nuclear
power industry to reduce Japan's reliance on imported oil. The
Chinese have always had a better position on nuclear disarmament
than their Western counterparts. The Indians and the Pakistanis
argued for a universal commitment to complete nuclear disarmament
in connection with the drafting of a Comprehensive Nuclear Test
Ban Treaty, but they were rebuffed by the West.
Can Asian nations resist the temptations to nuclearism?
Are they already too Westernized? Or, is there some aspect of
Asian culture that is capable of rejecting nuclearism and leading
the world back from the insane policies that were pursued during
the Cold War and that continue to be relied upon today? These
questions are worth exploring throughout Asia. If they can awaken
new possibilities to dull the gleaming but false promises of nuclearism,
they may help reverse recent historical trends that have the world
on a collision course with disaster. A review of nuclearism in
major Asian nations follows.
China
The major nuclear weapons state in Asia is China,
which is thought to have some 400 nuclear weapons, of which some
250 are thought to be strategic weapons.(12) The remaining 150
weapons are thought to be tactical weapons for battlefield use.
Since China's nuclear weapons program has been conducted in great
secrecy, it is possible that the size of their arsenal is considerably
larger. It remains a relatively small arsenal, however, by comparison
with those of the United States and Russia, which are each thought
to currently contain some 10,000 nuclear weapons.(13)
China has always said that it would not be the
first to use nuclear weapons. It is the only one of the declared
nuclear weapons states to make this pledge. China has also repeatedly
called for nuclear disarmament, and said that it would go to zero
nuclear weapons if the other nuclear weapons states would do so
as well. There is no reason to doubt that China is serious about
these pledges as they would appear to be strongly in their interests
given the size of the U.S. and Russian arsenals.
China also appears intent upon expanding its nuclear
energy program. Today it has three nuclear power plants, and has
expressed intentions of expanding to 100 nuclear power plants
by the middle of the next century.(14)
Japan
Japan relies upon the U.S. nuclear "umbrella"
for its defense. The close relationship that has existed between
the U.S. and Japan in the post World War II period has allowed
the U.S. to adopt a very lenient posture toward the Japanese accumulation
of weapons-grade plutonium. While Japan does not have nuclear
weapons, it has the materials, technological capability, and facilities
to produce them rapidly in large numbers. This capacity has been
referred to as "virtual deterrence."(15)
The Japanese government has consistently expressed
its three non-nuclear principles -- that it will not manufacture,
nor possess, nor allow the bringing in of nuclear weapons. In
actual fact, however, the position of the government with regard
to future Japanese possession of nuclear weapons seems to be more
ambiguous than the position of the Japanese people, which is solidly
opposed to Japan becoming a nuclear weapons state.
In Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, the
state renounces the right to make war:
"Aspiring sincerely to an international peace
based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce
war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of
force as a means of settling international disputes.
"In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding
paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential,
will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state
will not be recognized."(16)
Despite this Constitutional provision, however,
Japan now has the third largest military expenditures in the world,
behind only the U.S. and Russia. Japan is now spending some $50
billion per year on its military.(17) It has a very highly trained
and well equipped military force, which it calls its "Self-Defense
Forces."
Japan also has the largest concentration of nuclear
power reactors in Asia with 53 units. These reactors supply some
28 percent of Japan's energy. Japanese officials are seeking to
increase this amount to 42 percent by 2010 in an effort to reduce
the country's dependence on imported oil and gas.(18) The Japanese
have been developing fast-breeder reactors, which produce more
nuclear fuel than they consume. This has provided the rationale
for the country to accumulate large amounts of plutonium that
could also be used for weapons. The Japanese have developed reprocessing
facilities that give them the capability to produce weapons-grade
plutonium. They also have agreements with France for the French
to reprocess their spent fuel and provide them with reprocessed
plutonium.
A series of accidents at nuclear power plants over
the past few years, including one at the Monju fast-breeder reactor,
have undermined confidence in nuclear power among the people of
Japan. This confidence was also undermined by the Kobe earthquake,
and the knowledge that Monju and other reactors were built on
earthquake faults. The Japanese government has tried to allay
fears about nuclear power with a cartoon character, "our
little friend Pluto," who tells children that plutonium is
safe enough to drink.(19)
There is a growing anti-nuclear movement in Japan
directed against nuclear power plants. In August 1996 Japanese
voters in Maki, about 200 miles from Tokyo, participated in the
first referendum in Japan on building a nuclear power plant. The
Maki voters overwhelmingly rejected the plant with 61 percent
voting against it.(20)
The Japanese people have always strongly opposed
nuclear weapons. In the international community the mayors of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki have remained powerful and eloquent spokespersons
for the victims of the bombings in those cities.
North Korea
North Korea, like Japan, has reprocessing facilities
to create weapons-grade plutonium. It also has indigenous uranium
supplies. It is thought that North Korea may have developed 12
to 15 kilograms of separated weapons-grade plutonium, enough for
one or two nuclear weapons. Concern over this possibility led
to an agreement in December 1995 in which North Korea agreed to
freeze its nuclear program in exchange for two 1000 megawatt light
water nuclear reactors, to be financed by Japan and South Korea,
and various other incentives.
A top level defector from North Korea was recently
quoted as saying that "North Korea could turn the capitalist
South into a sea of flames and scorch Japan in a nuclear attack."(21)
South Korea
South Korea has an active nuclear power program
with ten reactors generating over 9000 megawatts of electricity.
Forty percent of its electricity is provided from these plants.
There are plans for an additional 15 reactors in the future.(22)
South Korea has tried since the 1970s to acquire uranium enrichment
or spent fuel reprocessing facilities which would give it the
capability to develop nuclear weapons, but it has been forestalled
in these efforts by the United States.
For many years the U.S. is thought to have maintained
tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea, but it is now believed
that these weapons have been withdrawn. Of course, the continued
U.S. military presence in South Korea creates the possibility
that nuclear weapons could be used in a potential conflict with
North Korea.
Taiwan
Taiwan, like South Korea, has an active nuclear
power program, and has tried to acquire facilities for uranium
enrichment or spent fuel reprocessing, but has not been successful
in doing so. Also like South Korea, it has the technological competence
to develop nuclear weapons if it obtained the materials to do
so. Given its uneasy relationship with China, Taiwan would probably
like to have a nuclear deterrent force against China's nuclear
weapons arsenal.
Taiwan meets one-third of its energy needs by means
of nuclear power. It has six nuclear power plants supplying some
5,000 megawatts of electricity.(23)
India and Pakistan
The Indian subcontinent presents one of the greatest
dangers of nuclear war. Although both India and Pakistan deny
it, they are both thought to have nuclear arsenals. India tested
a nuclear device in 1974, and is thought to have a few dozen nuclear
weapons. Pakistan has never tested a nuclear weapon, but is thought
to possess a similar number or somewhat less than India. Both
countries consider the other an enemy, and they have clashed many
times over the disputed territory of Kashmir.
India has ten nuclear power reactors generating
less than 2000 megawatts of electricity, while Pakistan has only
one nuclear power reactor generating 125 megawatts of electricity.
In 1991 the two countries signed an agreement not to preemptively
strike each other's nuclear facilities.(24)
Global Nuclearism
Nuclearism in Asia is clearly embedded in global
nuclearism. It cannot be separated out and treated for its symptoms
without also treating the systemic disease of global nuclearism.
It is certain that China will not give up its nuclear arsenal
while the U.S. and Russia retain their arsenals. Nor will Japan
give up its nuclear option while China retains its nuclear weapons.
The same is true of India, and it is equally certain that Pakistan
will not give up its nuclear weapons capability while India maintains
its capability. It is fair to say that Asian nuclearism has been
a reaction to the West. The United States demonstrated what may
be viewed as the "usefulness" of nuclear weapons in
warfare and its willingness to use these weapons. But it is a
far different scenario to use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear
armed opponent that is already virtually defeated, as the U.S.
did in Japan, than it is to use nuclear weapons against an opponent
in possession of nuclear weapons or one that could quickly develop
a nuclear weapons arsenal.
It is becoming abundantly clear that nuclear weapons
can serve only one reasonable purpose, and that is to deter another
state from using nuclear weapons. Once one state has used nuclear
weapons against a nuclear armed opponent or the ally of a nuclear
armed opponent, retaliation is likely, and this would make any
first use untenable. If the only purpose of nuclear weapons is
deterrence, then it is clear that as long as any state has nuclear
weapons other states will want to maintain theirs or acquire such
weapons as a means of deterrence. Therefore, there are only two
choices: proliferation and eventual use of nuclear weapons, or
the elimination of all nuclear weapons. General Lee Butler, the
former commander of the U.S. Strategic Command, has found that
a world free of the threat of nuclear weapons is necessarily a
world devoid of nuclear weapons.(25) How are we to proceed in
this direction?
Achieving a World Free of Nuclear Weapons
In 1994 the United Nations General Assembly asked
the International Court of Justice, also known as the World Court,
for an advisory opinion on whether the threat or use of nuclear
weapons was permitted under international law under any circumstances.
Oral hearings on this question were held at the end of 1995. The
three declared Western nuclear weapons states (U.S. UK, and France)
and Russia all argued before the Court that the Court should decline
to answer the question but, if it did choose to answer, it should
find that under certain circumstances the threat or use of nuclear
weapons would be legal. Some NATO allies of these nuclear weapons
states supported their position. China chose not to participate
in the hearings.
Many non-aligned states argued before the Court
that the threat or use of nuclear weapons should be considered
illegal under all circumstances. They argued that international
humanitarian law did not permit any use of nuclear weapons because
such law prohibited the use of excessively injurious weapons (and
surely nuclear weapons fit this category) and that nuclear weapons
cannot distinguish between combatants and non-combatants. Nuclear
weapons, in fact, have been targeted at civilian populations in
policies known as Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD).
After receiving written and oral testimony from
states, the Court deliberated extensively, and released its opinion
on July 8, 1996.(26) The Court found unanimously that the rules
of international humanitarian law apply to any threat or use of
nuclear weapons. They also found in a split vote, decided by the
President of the Court, that the threat or use of nuclear weapons
would generally be illegal under the international law of armed
conflict. The Court indicated that it was unable to determine
one way or the other whether or not the threat or use of nuclear
weapons would be allowed in an extreme case of self-defense in
which the very survival of a state would be at stake. With regard
to this point, the President of the Court, M. Bedjaoui stated
in his separate declaration, "I cannot sufficiently emphasize
the fact that the Court's inability to go beyond this statement
of the situation can in no manner be interpreted to mean that
it is leaving the door ajar to recognition of the legality of
the threat or use of nuclear weapons."(27) He also referred
to nuclear weapons as the "ultimate evil."(28)
The Court also interpreted Article VI of the NPT
to the effect that the nuclear weapons states are under an obligation
to complete good faith negotiations on nuclear disarmament in
all its aspects. The Court stated: "There exists an obligation
to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations
leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict
and effective international control."(29)
Responding to the Court's opinion, the United Nations
General Assembly expressed its appreciation to the Court and called
for the good faith negotiations to begin in 1997 for a Nuclear
Weapons Convention to prohibit and eliminate all nuclear weapons.(30)
(See Appendix A.)
Thus far, the nuclear weapons states have ignored
the Court and the United Nations General Assembly. But the pressure
is building around the world to force the nuclear weapons states
to eliminate their nuclear arsenals. In December 1996, 58 generals
and admirals from 17 nations released a statement calling for
the abolition of nuclear weapons. They stated: "We, military
professionals, who have devoted our lives to the national security
of our countries and our peoples, are convinced that the continued
existence of nuclear weapons in the armories of nuclear powers,
and the ever present threat of acquisition of these weapons by
others, constitute a peril to global peace and security and to
the safety and survival of the people we are dedicated to protect."(31)
The generals went on to urge that "long-term international
nuclear policy must be based on the declared principle of continuous,
complete and irrevocable elimination of nuclear weapons."(32)
(See Appendix B.)
At the NPT Review and Extension Conference in 1995,
representatives of citizen action groups from around the world
gathered in New York to lobby the delegates for nuclear abolition.
An Abolition Caucus was formed and drafted an important statement
known as the Abolition 2000 Statement. (See Appendix C.) This
statement calls for the nuclear weapons states to enter into a
treaty by the year 2000 to eliminate nuclear weapons in a timebound
framework. Based upon this statement an Abolition 2000 Global
Network was formed that now has participation by over 700 citizen
action groups around the world. It is a growing citizens movement
advocating the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.(33)
A Sunflower Story
In June 1996 Ukraine, which had inherited nuclear
weapons from the former Soviet Union, transferred the last of
its nuclear warheads to Russia for dismantlement. The defense
ministers of Ukraine and Russia met with the Secretary of Defense
of the United States at a former Ukrainian missile base which
once housed 80 SS-19 missiles aimed at the United States. They
celebrated the occasion by scattering sunflower seeds and planting
sunflowers. Former U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry said:
"Sunflowers instead of missiles in the soil would insure
peace for future generations."(34)
The sunflower has become the symbol of a world
free of nuclear weapons. It is a simple symbol that powerfully
suggests the difference between a flower that is bright and beautiful
and whose seeds provide nutrition on the one hand, and a missile
that is armed with nuclear warheads that can incinerate the inhabitants
of entire cities on the other hand. There should be no doubt that
the sunflower is the right choice. It represents life rather than
death, and the sun's abundant radiant energy that can be used
to benefit rather than destroy humanity.
Conclusion
Momentum is building throughout the world for the
abolition of nuclear weapons. It is necessary to counter the logic
of death and destruction, the logic of the Cold War that ended
many years ago, with a logic of hope for the future of humanity.
If we are to give hope meaning in our time, we must seize the
opportunity afforded by the end of the Cold War and move surely
and rapidly to denuclearize our planet. Asia has an important
role to play in this movement, which must be primarily a movement
of people that will become so powerful that no government can
stand in its way. Opposition to nuclearism provides an opportunity
for humanity to unite around a common theme of assuring a future
for our children and grandchildren. The time to act is now. There
is far too much to do that is positive rather than to continue
to spend our human, our scientific, and our financial resources
on weapons of mass annihilation and nuclear power reactors that
create radioactive poisons that will endanger the Earth for thousands
of generations. Hiroshima and Nagasaki should have been enough
of a lesson for the world to learn. There is no need to wait until
more cities are added to this unfortunate list. East and West,
North and South face the common problem of nuclear terror. We
can end that terror once and for all if enough of us will stand
up, speak out, and demand an end to nuclearism. It is time to
reject both nuclear weapons and the dangerous technology of nuclear
energy with which weapons production is so intimately intertwined.
* Paper prepared for conference, "Human
Security and Global Governance," sponsored by the Toda Institute,
Honolulu, Hawaii, June 5-8, 1997. The author would like to thank
Lori Beckwith for her research assistance.
** David Krieger
is president of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation. He can be contacted
at Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, PMB 121, 1187 Coast Village Road,
Suite 1, Santa Barbara, CA 93108-2794; Fax: 805 568 0466; Web
Site: http://www.wagingpeace.org.
ENDNOTES
1. See, for example, President Truman's personal
journal, July 18, 1945. "Stalin had told P.M. [Prime Minister
Churchill] of telegram from Jap Emperor asking for peace. Stalin
also read his answer to me. It was satisfactory. Believe Japs
will fold up before Russia comes in...."
2. Wyden, Peter, Day One, New York: Simon and Schuster,
1984, p. 289. Also quoted as "It is the greatest thing in
history" in Udall, Stuart L., The Myths of August, New York:
Pantheon Books, 1994, p. 23.
3. For a good review of these myths, see: Udall,
Stuart L., The Myths of August, New York: Pantheon Books, 1994.
4. Speech given by Dwight Eisenhower to the United
Nations General Assembly, December 8, 1953.
5. Yaroshinskaya, Alla, Chernobyl, The Forbidden
Truth, Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1995.
See also "Chernobyl spawns crisis in Belarus," by Angela
Charlton, The Honolulu Advertiser, March 26, 1996.
6. United Nations General Assembly Resolution I
(1), January 24, 1946.
7. Mack, Andrew, Proliferation in Northeast Asia,
Washington D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center, Occasional Paper No.
28, July 1996, p. 6.
8. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,
729 UNTS 161.
9. Mack, Andrew, Op. Cit., p. 2.
10. "Russia Adopts 'First Strike' Nuclear
Tactic," Santa Barbara News Press, May 26, 1997.
11. Kennan, George, "A Fateful Error, Expanding
NATO Would Be a Rebuff to Russian Democracy," New York Times,
February 5, 1997.
12. "British, French, and Chinese Nuclear
Forces," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November/December
1996, p. 64.
13. Arkin, William M. and Robert S. Norris, "Nuclear
Notebook," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January/February
1997 and May/June 1997.
14. Farley, Maggie, "Asia and the Atom: Willing
and Wary." Los Angeles Times, July 4, 1996.
15. Mack, Andrew, Op. Cit., p. 17.
16. Asai, Motofumi, "Japan at the Crossroads:
'Redefinition' of the U.S.-Japan Security System," Pacific
Research, May 1996, p. 11.
17. Mann, Jim, "Clinton Second Term Resembles
Ike Redux," Los Angeles Times, May 21, 1997.
18. Watanabe, Teresa, "In Historic Vote, Japanese
Town Rejects Nuclear Plant," Los Angeles Times, August 6,
1996.
19. Farley, Maggie, Loc. Cit.
20. Watanabe, Teresa, Loc. Cit.
21. "Defector Suggests N. Korea Has Atom Arms,
Paper Says," Los Angeles Times, April 23, 1997.
22. Farley, Maggie, Loc. Cit.
23. Pollack, Andrew, "Reactor Accident in
Japan Imperils Energy Program." New York Times, February
24, 1996.
24. Kapur, Ashok, "Western Biases," The
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January/February 1995.
25. General Lee Butler speaking at the National
Press Club, Washington D.C., December 4, 1996.
26. "Advisory opinion of the International
Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear
weapons," United National General Assembly A/51/218, October
15, 1996.
27. Ibid., 40.
28. Ibid., 42.
29. Ibid., 37.
30. United Nations General Assembly Resolution
51/45 M, December 10, 1996.
31. "Statement on Nuclear Weapons By International
Generals and Admirals," December 5, 1996.
32. Ibid.
33. For more information on Abolition 2000, contact
the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation at PMB 121, 1187 Coast Village
Road, Suite 1, Santa Barbara, CA 93108-2794; (805)965-3443; e-mail:
wagingpeace@napf.org. Information is also available on Worldwide
Web at www.napf.org.
34. "Sunflower Seeds Sown at Ukrainian Missile
Site," New York Times International, June 5, 1996.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Appendix A
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 51/45M
on Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons
December 10, 1996
Recalling its resolution 49/75 K of 15 December
1994, in which it requested the International Court of Justice
to render an advisory opinion on whether the threat or use of
nuclear weapons is permitted in any circumstances under international
law,
Mindful of the solemn obligations of States parties,
undertaken in article VI of the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons, particularly to pursue negotiations in good
faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear
arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament,
Recalling its resolution 50/70 P of 12 December
1995, in which it called upon the Conference on Disarmament to
establish an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament to commence
negotiations on a phased programme of nuclear disarmament and
for the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons within a time-bound
framework,
Recalling also the Principles and Objectives for
Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament adopted at the 1995
Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and in particular the
objective of determined pursuit by the nuclear weapon states of
systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally
with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons,
Recognizing that the only defence against a nuclear
catastrophe is the total elimination of nuclear weapons and the
certainty that they will never be produced again, Desiring to
achieve the objective of a legally binding prohibition of the
development, production, testing, deployment, stockpiling, threat
or use of nuclear weapons and their destruction under effective
international control,
Reaffirming the commitment of the international
community to the goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons
and welcoming every effort towards this end, Reaffirming the central
role of the Conference on Disarmament as the single multilateral
disarmament negotiating forum,
Noting the adoption of the Comprehensive Nuclear
Test Ban Treaty by the General Assembly in its resolution 50/245
of 10 September 1996,
Regretting the absence of multilaterally negotiated
and legally binding security assurances from the threat or use
of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states,
Convinced that the continuing existence of nuclear
weapons poses a threat to all humanity and that their use would
have catastrophic consequences for all life on Earth.
Expresses its appreciation to the International
Court of Justice for responding to the request made by the General
Assembly at its forty-ninth session;
Takes note of the Advisory Opinion of the International
Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons, issued on 8 July 1996 (A/51/218);
Underlines the unanimous conclusion of the Court
that "There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith
and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament
in all its aspects under strict and effective international control";
Calls upon all States to fulfill that obligation
immediately by commencing multilateral negotiations in 1997 leading
to an early conclusion of a nuclear weapons convention prohibiting
the development, production, testing, deployment, stockpiling,
transfer, threat or use of nuclear weapons and providing for their
elimination;
Requests the Secretary-General to provide necessary
assistance to support the implementation of the present resolution;
Decides to include in the provisional agenda of
its fifty-second session an item entitled "Follow-up to the
Advisory Opinion on the International Court of Justice on the
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons."
Sponsors:
Afghanistan, Algeria, Bangladesh, Belize, Brazil,
Burundi, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ghana, Guatemala,
Guyana, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Lesotho,
Libyan, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Marshall Islands, Mexico, Mongolia,
Myanmar, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay,
Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Samoa, San Marino, Singapore, Solomon
Islands, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Thailand, Uruguay, Viet Nam and
Zimbabwe
Appendix B
Statement On Nuclear Weapons By International
Generals And Admirals
December 5, 1996
We, military professionals, who have devoted our
lives to the national security of our countries and our peoples,
are convinced that the continuing existence of nuclear weapons
in the armories of nuclear powers, and the ever present threat
of acquisition of these weapons by others, constitute a peril
to global peace and security and to the safety and survival of
the people we are dedicated to protect.
Through our variety of responsibilities and experiences
with weapons and wars in the armed forces of many nations, we
have acquired an intimate and perhaps unique knowledge of the
present security and insecurity of our countries and peoples.
We know that nuclear weapons, though never used
since Hiroshima and Nagasaki, represent a clear and present danger
to the very existence of humanity. There was an immense risk of
a superpower holocaust during the Cold War. At least once, civilization
was on the very brink of catastrophic tragedy. That threat has
now receded, but not forever-unless nuclear weapons are eliminated.
The end of the Cold War created conditions favorable
to nuclear disarmament. Termination of military confrontation
between the Soviet Union and the United States made it possible
to reduce strategic and tactical nuclear weapons, and to eliminate
intermediate range missiles. It was a significant milestone on
the path to nuclear disarmament when Belarus, Kazakhastan and
Ukraine relinquished their nuclear weapons.
Indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty in 1995 and approval of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
by the U.N. General Assembly in 1996 are also important steps
towards a nuclear-free world. We commend the work that has been
done to achieve these results.
Unfortunately, in spite of these positive steps,
true nuclear disarmament has not been achieved. Treaties provide
that only delivery systems, not nuclear warheads, will be destroyed.
This permits the United States and Russia to keep their warheads
in reserve storage, thus creating a "reversible nuclear potential."
However, in the post-Cold War security environment, the most commonly
postulated nuclear threats are not susceptible to deterrence or
are simply not credible. We believe, therefore, that business
as usual is not an acceptable way for the world to proceed in
nuclear matters.
It is our deep conviction that the following is
urgently needed and must be undertaken now:
First, present and planned stockpiles of nuclear
weapons are exceedingly large and should now be greatly cut back;
Second, remaining nuclear weapons should be gradually
and transparently taken off alert, and their readiness substantially
reduced both in nuclear weapons states and in de facto nuclear
weapons states;
Third, long-term international nuclear policy must
be based on the declared principle of continuous, complete and
irrevocable elimination of nuclear weapons.
The United States and Russia should-without any
reduction in their military security-carry forward the reduction
process already launched by START-they should cut down to 1000
to 1500 warheads each and possibly lower. The other three nuclear
states and the three threshold states should be drawn into the
reduction process as still deeper reductions are negotiated down
to the level of hundreds. There is nothing incompatible between
defense by individual countries of their territorial integrity
and progress toward nuclear abolition.
The exact circumstances and conditions that will
make it possible to proceed, finally, to abolition cannot now
be foreseen or prescribed. One obvious prerequisite would be a
worldwide program or surveillance and inspection, including measures
to account for and control inventories of nuclear weapons materials.
This will ensure that no rogues or terrorists could undertake
a surreptitious effort to acquire nuclear capacities without detection
at an early stage. An agreed procedure for forcible international
intervention and interruption of covert efforts in a certain and
timely fashion is essential.
The creation of nuclear-free zones in different
parts of the world, confidence-building and transparency measures
in the general field of defense, strict implementation of all
treaties in the area of disarmament and arms control, and mutual
assistance in the process of disarmament are also important in
helping to bring about a nuclear- free world. The development
of regional systems of collective security, including practical
measures for cooperation, partnership, interaction and communication
are essential for local stability and security.
The extent to which the existence of nuclear weapons
and fear of their use may have deterred war-in a world that in
this year alone has seen 30 military conflicts raging-cannot be
determined. It is clear, however, that nations now possessing
nuclear weapons will not relinquish them until they are convinced
that more reliable and less dangerous means of providing for their
security are in place. It is also clear, as a consequence, that
the nuclear powers will not now agree to a fixed timetable for
the achievement of abolition.
It is similarly clear that, among the nations not
now possessing nuclear weapons, there are some that will not forever
forswear their acquisition and deployment unless they, too, are
provided means of security. Nor will they forego acquisition it
the present nuclear powers seek to retain everlastingly their
nuclear monopoly.
Movement toward abolition must be a responsibility
shared primarily by the declared nuclear weapons states- China,
France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, by
the de facto nuclear states, India, Israel and Pakistan; and by
major non-nuclear powers such as Germany and Japan. All nations
should move in concert toward the same goal.
We have been presented with a challenge of the
highest possible historic importance: the creation of a nuclear-
weapons-free world. The end of the Cold War makes it possible.
The dangers of proliferation, terrorism, and new
nuclear arms race render it necessary. We must not fail to seize
our opportunity. There is no alternative.
Signed,
CANADA
Johnson, Major General V. (ret.) Commandant, National Defense
College
DENMARK
Kristensen, Lt. General Gunnar (ret.) former Chief of Defense
Staff
FRANCE
Sanguinetti, Admiral Antoine (ret.) former Chief of Staff, French
Fleet
GHANA
Erskine, General Emmanuel (ret.) former Commander-in-Chief and
former Chief of Staff, UNTSO (Middle East), Commander UMFI (Lebanon)
GREECE
Capellos, Lt. General Richard (ret.) former Corps Commander
Konstantinides, Major General Kostas (ret.) former Chief of Staff,
Army Signals
INDIA
Rikhye, Major General Indar Jit (ret.) former military advisor
to UN Secretary-General Dag Hammerskjold and U Thant
Surt, Air Marshal N. C. (ret.)
JAPAN
Sakoijo, Vice Admiral Naotoshi (ret.) Sr. Advisor, Research Institute
for Peace and Security
Shikata, Lt. General Toshiyuki (ret.) Sr. Advisor, Research Institute
for Peace and Security
JORDAN
Ajelilat, Major General Sahfiq (ret.) Vice President Military
Affairs, Muta University
Shiyyab, Major General Mohammed K. (ret.) former Deputy Commander,
Royal Jordanian Air Force
NETHERLANDS
van der Graaf, Henry J. (ret.) Director Centre Arms Control &
Verification, Member, United National Advisory Board for Disarmament
Matters
NORWAY
Breivik, Roy, Vice Admiral Roy (ret.) former Representative to
NATO, Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic
PAKISTAN
Malik, Major General Ihusun ul Haq (ret.) Commandant Joint Services
Committee
PORTUGAL
Gomes, Marshal Francisco da Costa (ret.) former Commander-in-Chief,
Army; former President of Portugal
RUSSIA
Belous, General Vladimir (ret.) Department Chief, Dzerzhinsky
Military Academy
Garecy, Army General Makhmut (ret.) former Deputy Chief, USSR
Armed Forces General Staff
Gromov, General Boris, (ret.) Vice Chair, Duma International Affairs
Committee, former Commander of 40th Soviet Army in Afghanistan,
former Deputy Minister, Foreign Ministry, Russia
Koltounov, Major General Victor (ret.) former Deputy Chief, Department
of General Staff, USSR Armed Forces
Larinov, Major General Valentin (ret.) Professor, General Staff
Academy
Lebed, Major Alexander (ret.) former Secretary of the Security
Council
Lebedev, Major General Youri V. (ret.) former Deputy Chief Department
of General Staff, USSR Armed Forces
Makarevsky, Major General Vadim (ret.) Deputy Chief, Komibyshev
Engineering Academy
Medvodov, Lt. General Vladimir (ret.) Chief, Center of Nuclear
Threat Reduction
Mikhailov, Colonel General Gregory (ret.) former Deputy Chief,
Department of General Staff, USSR Armed Forces
Nozhin, Major General Eugeny (ret.) former Deputy Chief, Department
of General Staff, USSR Armed Forces
Rokhilin, Lt. General Lev, (ret.) Chair, Duma Defense Committee,
former Commander Russian 4th Army Corps
Sleport, Lt. General Ivan (ret.) former Chief, Department of General
Staff, USSR Armed Forces
Simonyan, Major General Rair (ret.) Head of Chair, General Staff
Academy
Surikov, General Boris T. (ret.) former Chief Specialist, Defense
Ministry
Teherov, Colonel General Nikolay (ret.) former Chief, Department
of General Staff, USSR Armed Forces
Vinogadov, Lt. General Michael S. (ret.) former Deputy Chief,
Operational Strategic Center, USSR General Staff
Zoubkov, Rear Admiral Radiy (ret.) Chief, Navigation, USSR Navy
SRI LANKA
Karumaratne, Major General Upali A. (ret.)
Silva, Major General C.A.M.M. (ret.) USF, U.S.A.
TANZANIA
Lupogo, Major General H.C. (ret.) former Chief Inspector General,
Tanzania Armed Forces
UNITED KINGDOM
Beach, General Sir Hugh (ret.) Member U.K. Security Commission
Carver, Field Marshal Lord Michael (ret.) Commander-in-Chief of
East British Army (1967-1969), Chief of General Staff (1971-1973),
Chief of Defense Staff (1973-1976)
Harbottle, Brigadier Michael (ret.) former Chief of Staff, UN
Peacekeeping Force, Cyprus
Mackie, Air Commodore Alistair (ret.) former Director, Air Staff
Briefing
UNITED STATES
Becton, Lt. General Julius (USA) (ret.)
Burns, Maj. General William F. (USA) (ret.) JCS Representative,
INF Negotiations (1981-88), Special Envoy to Russia for Nuclear
Dismantlement (1992-93)
Carroll, Jr., Rear Admiral Eugene J. (USN) (ret.) Deputy Director,
Center for Defense Information
Cushman, Lt. General John H. (USA) (ret.) Commander, I Corps (ROK/US)
Group (Korea) (1976-78)
Galvin, General John R., Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (1987-1992)
Gayler, Admiral Noel (USN) (ret.) former Commander, Pacific
Horner, General Charles A. (USAF) (ret.) Commander, Coalition
Air Forces, Desert Storm (1991) former Commander, U.S. Space Command
James, Rear Admiral Robert G. (USNR) (ret.)
Odom, General William E. (USA) (ret.) Director, National Security
Studies, Hudson Institute Deputy Assistant and Assistant Chief
of Staff for Intelligence (1981-1985), Director, National Security
Agency (1985-1988)
O'Meara, General Andrew (USA) (ret.), former Commander, U.S. Army
Europe
Pursley, Lt. General Robert E. USAF (ret.)
Read, Vice Admiral William L. (USN) (ret.) former Commander, U.S.
Navy Surface Force, Atlantic Command
Rogers, General Bernard W. (USA) (ret.) former Chief of Staff,
U.S. Army; former NATO Supreme Allied Commander (1979-1987)
Seignious, II, Lt. General George M. (USA) (ret.) former Director
Army Control and Disarmament Agency
Shanahan, Vice Admiral John J. (USN) (ret.) Director, Center for
Defense Information
Smith, General William Y. (USAF) (ret.) former Deputy Commander,
U.S. Command, Europe
Wilson, Vice Admiral James B. (USN) (ret.) former Polaris Submarine
Captain
Appendix C
Abolition 2000 Statement
April 25, 1995
Statement of the Non-Governmental Organization
(NGO) Abolition Caucus at the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT) Review and Extension Conference
A secure and livable world for our children and
grandchildren and all future generations requires that we achieve
a world free of nuclear weapons and redress the environmental
degradation and human suffering that is the legacy of fifty years
of nuclear weapons testing and production.
Further, the inextricable link between the "peaceful"
and warlike uses of nuclear technologies and the threat to future
generations inherent in creation and use of long-lived radioactive
materials must be recognized. We must move toward reliance on
clean, safe, renewable forms of energy production that do not
provide the materials for weapons of mass destruction and do not
poison the environment for thousands of centuries. The true "inalienable"
right is not to nuclear energy, but to life, liberty and security
of person in a world free of nuclear weapons.
We recognize that a nuclear weapons free world
must be achieved carefully and in a step by step manner. We are
convinced of its technological feasibility. Lack of political
will, especially on the part of the nuclear weapons states, is
the only true barrier. As chemical and biological weapons are
prohibited, so must nuclear weapons be prohibited.
We call upon all states(particularly the nuclear
weapons states, declared and de facto(to take the following steps
to achieve nuclear weapons abolition. We further urge the states
parties to the NPT to demand binding commitments by the declared
nuclear weapons states to implement these measures:
1) Initiate immediately and conclude by the year
2000 negotiations on a nuclear weapons abolition convention that
requires the phased elimination of all nuclear weapons within
a time- bound framework, with provisions for effective verification
and enforcement.*
2) Immediately make an unconditional pledge not
to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons.
3) Rapidly complete a truly comprehensive test
ban treaty with a zero threshold and with the stated purpose of
precluding nuclear weapons development by all states.
4) Cease to produce and deploy new and additional
nuclear weapons systems, and commence to withdraw and disable
deployed nuclear weapons systems.
5) Prohibit the military and commercial production
and reprocessing of all weapons-usable radioactive materials.
6) Subject all weapons-usable radioactive materials
and nuclear facilities in all states to international accounting,
monitoring, and safeguards, and establish a public international
registry of all weapons-usable radioactive materials.
7) Prohibit nuclear weapons research, design, development,
and testing through laboratory experiments including but not limited
to non-nuclear hydrodynamic explosions and computer simulations,
subject all nuclear weapons laboratories to international monitoring,
and close all nuclear test sites.
8) Create additional nuclear weapons free zones
such as those established by the treaties of Tlatelolco and Raratonga.
9) Recognize and declare the illegality of threat
or use of nuclear weapons, publicly and before the World Court.
10) Establish an international energy agency to
promote and support the development of sustainable and environmentally
safe energy sources.
11) Create mechanisms to ensure the participation
of citizens and NGOs in planning and monitoring the process of
nuclear weapons abolition.
A world free of nuclear weapons is a shared aspiration
of humanity. This goal cannot be achieved in a non- proliferation
regime that authorizes the possession of nuclear weapons by a
small group of states. Our common security requires the complete
elimination of nuclear weapons. Our objective is definite and
unconditional abolition of nuclear weapons.
* The convention should mandate irreversible disarmament
measures, including but not limited to the following: withdraw
and disable all deployed nuclear weapons systems; disable and
dismantle warheads; place warheads and weapon-usable radioactive
materials under international safeguards; destroy ballistic missiles
and other delivery systems. The convention could also incorporate
the measures listed above which should be implemented independently
without delay. When fully implemented, the convention would replace
the NPT.
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